INFORMATION TO USERS This was produced from a copy o f a docum ent sent to us fo r microfilming. While the m ost advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this docum ent have been used, the quality is heavily dependen t upon the quality o f th e material subm itted. The following explanation o f techniques is provided to help you understand m arkings or no ta tions which m ay appear on th is reproduction. 1. The sign o r "target" fo r pages apparently lacking from the docum ent photographed is " Missing Page(s)" . If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) o r section, they are spliced in to th e film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure you o f com plete continuity. 2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black m ark it is an indication th a t the film inspector noticed either jlu rre d copy because of movement during exposure, or duplicate copy. Unless we m eant to delete copyrighted materials th a t should not have been film ed, you will find a good image of th e page in th e adjacent fram e. If copyrighted m aterials were deleted you will find a targe t note listing th e pages in th e adjacent fram e. 3. When a m ap, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the m aterial being pho to- graphed th e photographer has followed a definite m ethod in "sectioning" the material. It is custom ary to begin film ing at the upper left hand corner of a large sh ee t and to con tinue from left to right in equal sections w ith small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again-beginning below the first row and continuing on until com plete. 4 . For any illustrations th a t canno t be reproduced satisfactorily by xerography, photographic prints can be purchased a t additional cost and tipped in to your xerographic copy. R equests can be m ade to our D issertations Custom er Services D epartm ent. 5. Some pages in any docum ent may have indistinct p rin t. In all cases we have filmed the best available copy. University MicrtiJilms International 300 N. ZEEB RD.. ANN A R BO R , Ml 48106 8124805 Larson, Jon Erik THE PROBLEM OF THE PERSON IN SOVIET PHILOSOPHY Duke University Ph.D. 1981 University Microfilms International 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 THE PROBLEM OF THE PERSON IN SOVIET PHILOSOPHY by Jon Erik Larson Department of Philosophy Duke University Date: ^//(/ Approved: W. Bernard Peach, Supervisor (? jtcy<al.y> kLttr s_,> Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Duke University 1981 ABSTRACT (Philosophy) THE PROBLEM OF THE PERSON IN SOVIET PHILOSOPHY fey Jon Erik Larson Department of Philosophy Duke University W. Bernard Peach, Supervisor An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Duke University Date: ' & ! Approved: 1981 ABSTRACT This dissertation describes and assesses post-1 9 6 1 Soviet discussions of the nature of the person. It focuses on post1 9 6 1 literature because the volume of Soviet material on the nature of the person increases dramatically following the 22d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). At that congress the CPSU declared that the USSR had become a socialist nation and that the country would now build a communist society. According to the CPSU, building communism required educating persons capable of living in communist society. Unlike many Western theories on the nature of the person, Soviet theories do not proceed from the proposition that a person's consciousness or self-consciousness differentiates him from all other kinds of entity. They proceed rather from the proposition that a person is different from all other kinds of entity because he is social. Soviets attempt to describe what makes persons social. Soviets have argued among themselves concerning a number of issues regarding the nature of persons. During the early I9 6O3 some argued that no general theory of the person was possible and that theories must center on persons of particular classes and historical eras. In the late 1960s Soviets came to believe that a general theory of the person is possible. General theories of the person presented by Soviets sometimes distinguish between persons, humans and individuals. This distinction is most clear when these are conceived as properly social, bio-social, and properly biological entities, respectively. There is no general agreement concerning this distinction, however, and this lack of agreement has carried over into discussions of the essence of Man. This essence is said to consist in social relations. Soviets have attempted to account for a person's social nature by concentrating on his ethical behavior, his social roles and his activity. None of these accounts succeeds in describing what makes persons social. Since social relations are considered the essence of Man, Soviets attempt to characterize them. The best attempt to do this describes social relations as relations between conscious entities. This attempt fails because it is inconsistent with Marxist dogma that consciousness is a consequence--not a cause- of Man's social nature. It also fails because it does not exclude some apparently non-social relations. Research for this dissertation was conducted at the libraries of Duke University, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Moscow State University and Leningrad State University, and at the Library of Congre and the Lenin Library. TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE.................................................... iv Chapter ONE. THE PERSON IN GENERAL.............................. 1 Introduction ................................ 1 Attack on General Accounts ................. 4 Critical Evaluation ......................... 9 Continuation of the A t t a c k .................. 17 Interpretation and Evaluation ............... 25 Review and Evaluation of Drozdov's Criticism..................... . 29 Remarks on the History of the Debate . . . . 40 TWO. PERSONS, HUMANS AND INDIVIDUALS ................. 49 Introduction ................................ 49 Early Discussions of the Distinction . . . . 53 Three Trends of the Late 1960s and Early 19 7 0 s ................................. 69 Recent Discussions of the Distinction . . . . 80 Critical Evaluation ......................... 83 THREE. THE ESSENCE OF M A N ............................... 89 Introduction ................................ 89 Biological Essence Theories ................. 91 The Bearer of the Essence of M a n ........... 104 Only Humans Can Be Social.................115 Critical Evaluation....................... 118 FOUR. THREE THEORIES OF THE P E R S O N ................... 122 Introduction .............................. 122 Tugarinov's Account ....................... 124 Kon's Account................................ 139 Demin's Theory ........................... 144 Critical Evaluation.......... 148 ii FIVE. SOCIAL RELATIONS ............................. 160 Introduction ............................. 160 Early Period Theories........................167 Middle Period Accounts ................... 175 Recent Accounts ........................... 199 Critical Evaluation ....................... 2ok Appendix ONE. INDIVIDUALITY AND A U T O N O M Y ..................... 209 Introduction ............................. 209 Individuality ............................. 210 A u t o n o m y .................................... 215 Critical Evaluation ....................... 217 TWO. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION .................... 219 BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................223 iii PREFACE This dissertation describes and evaluates post-1 9 6 1 Soviet discussions on the nature of the person. I chose to focus on post1961 literature because Soviets display a more intense interest in the nature of persons after the 22d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. At that congress, the Communist Party declared that the Soviet Union had become a socialist nation and was now prepared to move towards communism. Progress towards communism, according to the Communist Party, required educating persons capable of living in communist society. Thus, after 1961 interest in the nature of the person expanded at least partially for political reasons. Soviet discussions of the nature of the person are not uniformly motivated by a desire to describe ways for educating persons capable of living in communist society. As the Communist Party moved away from a position centered on the imminent arrival of communism, philosophers stressed less the education of the communist person. I believe this change in emphasis is important and have chosen to underscore it by presenting theories chronologically. I also have used a stylistic technique the reader might find disconcerting of writing primarily in the present tense. When attempting to describe what differentiates persons from other kinds of entity, Western philosophers generally have proceeded from a proposition to the effect that persons alone are conscious or self-conscious. Soviets reject this procedure. They start with the position that persons alone are social. Their accounts, therefore, are attempts to describe what makes persons social. I take this method seriously and use the bulk of this dissertation to present these accounts. Someone familiar only with Western accounts of the nature of the person might find the presentation disconcerting because it is so unlike what he might ordinarily expect in accounts on the nature of the person. I describe the Soviet discussion of the person but do not relate* this discussion to the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin. This procedure perhaps is unfair to the writers whose work I discuss because much of what they say might presuppose theses for which Marx, Engels and Lenin argue. My intention in presenting the material as I do is to provide as complete a description as possible of Soviet discussions of the person during the 19 6 0s and 1 9 7 0s. The Soviet theories of the person I discuss are described without reference to the political or social positions of their authors. Furthermore, I do not relate the developments which occur in Soviet discussions of the person to political events. This ignores the fact that the importance of a philosophical theory in the Soviet Union is generally as much a function of the position of the person who states that theory and the sanctions the political system gives to the theory as a function of the content of the theory itself. Since the material on the problem of the person is voluminous and my intention was to focus first on the philosophical content of Soviet theories of the person, I chose to focus on the content of these theories and not on the political events related to them. The translations of Russian passages are, for the most part, my own. I have chosen to translate as literally as possible. Consequently, the translations often are cumbersome. This is true both of direct quotations and of paraphrases. I conducted research for this dissertation at Duke University, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Library of Congress, Moscow State University, the Institute for Scientific Information on the Social Sciences (Academy of Sciences, USSR), and Leningrad State University. My research in the Soviet Union was made possible by a graduate student/young faculty fellowship administered by the International Research and Exchanges Board. I owe thanks to Professor Vladimir Ivanovich Razin, Chairman of the Department of Historical Materialism at Moscow State University, who served as my advisor in the Soviet Union, and to Mikhail Vasil'evich Demin, a senior lecturer in the same department, who assisted me in my studies. I am grateful to Bob Otto, a graduate student in vi history at the University of Wisconsin- Madison, who lent a patient ear to my early musings on the problem of the person in the Soviet Union. Many others whom I do not mention, including the members of my study group in the School of Business Administration at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, are remembered with gratitude. Dr. Bernard Peach, my supervisor, and his wife, Amby, deserve special mention for support- academic and personal- above and beyond the requirements of friendship. Special thanks also are due to Gary Shull, Mildred Edgerton, Donald Hester, Jim and Barbara Fyfe, and my parents, Douglas and Bernadine Larson, who each in his or her own way has contributed to this dissertation. If dissertations ordinarily contained dedications, I would dedicate this dissertation to Kristine Mary Haataja. In lieu of a dedication, I offer here my deepest gratitude for years of support and patient toleration for which I can never hope to repay her. CHAPTER ONE THE PERSON IN GENERAL Introduction At its 22d congress in 1961 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) adopts its third program. The preamble of that program notes that the Second Program of the CPSU (adopted in 1919) called for the construction of a socialist society and declares that that task has now been accomplished. The Third Program now calls for the 1construction of a communist society. In outlining the tasks which it believes must be performed to construct communism, the CPSU says, "High communist consciousness, diligence and discipline, devotion to social interests are 2integral qualities of a human of communist society." In an address on 18 October 1961 to this congress, Khrushchev speaks of the formation of a new human as one of the tasks which must be fulfilled in order to construct communism. He says that the formation of the communist person involves increasing the consciousness and cultivation of the members 1Material.y XXII S"ezda KPSS [Materials of the 22d Congress of the CPSUJ (Moscow* Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1 9 6 1), pp. 3 2 1-3 2 2 . ^Materialy, p. 3 6 6. of society.^ At a plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU the following year Khrushchev says, "During the process of creating a communist society, the formation of a human with high communist consciousness and morals does and will Lproceed." Similarly, the Third Program calls for the comprehensive (vsestoronee) and harmonious development of the human personality and, particularly, for the affirmation of communist morals.^ The importance of this program for philosophy lies in the fact that it addresses the education and responsibility of individuals. During the five years after the 22d Congress of the CPSU the volume of literature devoted to questions concerning the individual and his relationship to society steadily increases. The Soviets call these questions, collectively, 'the problem of the person (lichnost' )' and sometimes 'the problem of Man (chelovek)'. Widespread discussion of the problem of the person represents, in fact, a shift in emphasis in Soviet %aterialy, p. 1 9 3. 4Plenum TsK KPSS [Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1 9 6 2), p. 8 . ^Materialy, pp. 410-412. 3 discussions of humans. Tugarinov describes this shift: For the course of a number of years Marxist literature, while not denying the role of the person in history (of which anti-Marxists groundlessly accused and accuse it), nevertheless . . . has accented more the role of the masses than^the role of the separate person (otdel'naia lichnost1). Tugarinov says that for historical and ideological reasons the previous discussions had emphasized the role of the masses. Of these reasons he gives two. He says: This was a natural reaction to the basic tendency of idealist philosophy and non-Marxist ideology in general to see in the action of a person, particularly of a prominent one, the basic factor for the development of history. Tugarinov adds: Furthermore, the historical tasks of victory over capitalism, of carrying out the socialist revolution and of constructing socialism and the broad democratic character of communist organization demanded that the problem of the role of the working masses in history in general and in the development of socialist sogiety in particular be advanced in the social sciences. He says, lastly, that emphasis on the role of the masses in history, . . . retains its significance even for the present stage of Marxism for a series of reasons including the struggle with the remnants of Stalin's cult of the personality. Tugarinov claims correctly that before the early ^Vasilii Petrovich Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo [The person and society] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 1965). P. 30. 7'Tugarinov, Lichnost' 1 obshchestvo, p. 30. Q Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, pp. 30-31* g'Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. 31* 1960s Soviet philosophical discussions of humans centered on the role of the masses in history. He also correctly suggests that this literature challenged the significance of the influence of prominent persons in history. And one person whose significance was challenged in this literature was Stalin. This does not mean, however, that no literature either on the problem of the person or on the role of the masses in history was published under Stalin. Literature on each topic appeared occasionally. After Stalin's death in March 1953 the volume of the literature on the role of the masses in history increases significantly and peaks in 1956 after Khrushchev's speech before the 20th Congress of the CPSU in which he condemned Stalin's cult of the personality. The volume of literature on the problem of the person does not noticeably change until after the adoption of the Third Program of the CPSU. In fact, it is not until May 1963 that a subject heading, 'Society and the person (Obshchestvo i lichnost' )', appears in the best Soviet index of domestic philosophical literature, Novaia sovetskaia literatura po filosofii. Attack on General Accounts One of the first articles on the problem of the person to appear after the 22d Congress of the CPSU was 5 written by Tugarinov. In it he says: The definition of the concept of a person and its criteria is not at all a useless matter. It makes it possible for us to see in which directions worl^should be conducted on the development of the person. Later he says: The basic traits of a person are the following: his rationality (thus, a small child is not a person); possession by a human, which is connected with rationality, of certain rights on the one hand and on the other hand of obligations and the responsibility of the person to society; a person's behavior, his activity, which proceeds from this; the presence of concretely-historical forms and levels of the freedom of the person; individuality of a person, that is, his difference fyjm other humans in interests, needs, tastes, etc. Tugarinov adds that each of these properties might only be potential and not actual. In 1964 Andreeva, Gak, Dudel' et al. criticize Tugarinov for giving a definition of a person in general (lichnost' voobshche). They say that such definitions are unrelated to an historical epoch, to a given social formation and to the class and group membership of a human. They say, "When examining the problem of the person and society one should not . . . proceed from the concept 12'person in general'." Rather, one should study a person as a person of a particular historical era and, when he 10Vasilii Petrovich Tugarinov, "Kommunizm i lichnost' [Communism and the person]," Vopros.v filosofii, 1962, No. 6 , p. 16. 1 1Tugarinov, "Kommunizm i lichnost'," p. 16. 12Kommunizm i lichnost' [Communism and the person] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 196^), p. 9lives in a class society, as a member of his particular class. The justification by Andreeva et al. for their claim that a person should be studied as a person of a particular historical era and, when he lives in a class society, as a member of his class has two themes. The first theme centers on Marx's claim that the essence of Man is the ensemble of social relations. The purpose of arguments in this first theme is to establish this claim. The second theme centers on Marx's claim that the essence of Man is not an abstraction inherent in each individual. Andreeva et al. take this to mean that the essence of Man (and so, Man himself) changes. They argue that social relations differ from historical era to historical era and, within a class society, from class to class. They draw the intermediate conclusion that the essence of persons (and, hence, the persons themselves) differs from historical era to historical era and, for persons in a class society, from class to class. The final conclusion is the claim about how a person should be studied. These two themes are woven together in the discussion--especially in the interpretations Andreeva et al. give for Marx's sixth thesis on Feuerbach. This thesis reads, in part, " . . . the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its 13reality it is the ensemble of the social relations." J One interpretation the authors give emphasizes the second theme. It says that this thesis . . . means that no unchanging human nature exists, that a human is a product of his social history and is not determined by the laws of the natural world, but by the peculiar specific laws of social development. Another interpretation emphasizes the first theme. Marx's words . . . cannot have to do with the separate person (otdel'naia lichnost') as well, since no person can not be in social relations with other individuals and, in a society split i&to classes, with individuals of one or another class. ^ Despite this interweaving of themes, the arguments Andreeva et al. give generally emphasize one theme more than another. Andreeva et al. begin an argument highlighting the first theme by considering ways in which persons are differentiated from each other. They indicate that there are both psychological and social differences between persons. Psychological differences are differences in temperament, character, abilities and talent. Social differences are differences in opinions, values, ideals, character of activity (progressive, reactionary), one's role 13-'Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, ed. C. P. Putt (New Yorkt International Publishers, 1941), p. 84. 14Kommunizm i lichnost1, p. 131 *5•'Kommunizm. i lichnost' , p. 14. in social life, etc.1^ The argument then turns from a consideration of psychological and social differences between persons to a consideration of the formation of a person's psychological properties. A person's psychological properties have a physiological basis rooted in higher neural activity. Individual psychological differences are connected with differences in types of neural activity consisting in the strength, balance and liveliness of neural processes. A type of neural activity is given to a person from birth and, although it possesses a certain stability and determinateness, it is in constant motion and change which is conditioned by the totality of interrelations of the organism and the surrounding environment. ' Andreeva et al. add that while types of neural activity are innate to humans, psychological properties are not. There is another necessary condition for them. That condition is the influence of the social environment. They attempt to show this in a particular consideration of the psychological properties, i.e., temperament, character, abilities and talent. Temperament, they concede, is conditioned primarily by a person's inborn constitutional type. But they minimize the importance of this psychological property by asserting that . . . temperament determines neither a human's intellectual life nor his interests. And for talent it has no determining significance; humans with completely different>temperaments to a large extent can be equally talented. 'Kommunizm i lichnost', p. 1 0. Kommunizm i lichnost', p. 1 0. I 'Kommunizm i lichnost', p. 1 1. 9 Andreeva et al. lay greater stress on abilities and character. Concerning the former, they say it is impossible to deny natural dispositions. But . . . natural dispositions are only possibilities which must be realized. And for their realization education, upbringing and self-education, as well as favorablêgonditions of the social environment are required. ' A person's character, they say, is . . . the fruit of a social environment understood in the broadest sense beginning with the peculiarities of the historical epoch, of the social order, of political life, of the condition of the culture, etc. and ending with the peculiarities of personal fate of various kinds. Summarizing these points, Andreeva et al. says Both the capacities and the character of a human, his whole cast of mind are under the determining influence of the social environment in which his life takes its course. Critical Evaluation Andreeva et al. give these considerations with the object of showing that the influence of the social environment is a causally necessary condition for a person's possession of psychological characteristics. While this thesis is plausible, they fail to demonstrate it. They simply assert that the influence of the social environment is causally necessary for a person's possession of abilities and character and, by extension, of psychological properties 19Kommunizm i lichnost*, p. 11. 20Kommunizm i lichnost', p. 12. 21Kommunizm i lichnost', p. 12. 10 in general. In order to demonstrate such a causal dependence of a person's possession of psychological characteristics on the influence of the social environment, Andreeva et al. might have cited social psychological studies supporting this claim. They do not do so, perhaps because they take the claim to be well-established. These considerations presumably are part of an argument for the thesis that the essence of a person is the ensemble of his social relations. In order to be such they need to be supplemented. Consider Myslivchenko's remarks on three senses of the concept 'essence (sushchnost')'. First, it signifies some thing, a certain object in contradistinction to other objects. Second, essence is that by means of which a given object is defined, i.e., it signifies the qualitative specific nature of the object picked out- its more important, primary qualities. Third, essence is the basis for determinations of an individually existing thing which conditions in a law-like manner all changes in the given existing^thing, i.e., essence is the internal basis for change. Andreeva et al. use the concept 'essence' in Myslivchenko's second sense; they attempt to identify the more important, primary characteristics of a person. They consider these more important, primary characteristics to be a person's social relations. The discussion of psychological and social differences and of psychological characteristics presupposes 22Aleksandr Grigor'evich Myslivchenko, Chelovek kak predmet filosofskogo poznaniia [Man as an object of philosophical knowledge] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 1972), p. 56. 11 that all persons have psychological characteristics. It needs first, however, to be supplemented with the premiss that persons alone have psychological characteristics. Andreeva et al. discuss psychological and social differences only as differences between persons. They do not say that there are psychological and social differences only between persons. Similarly, they discuss psychological characteristics only as characteristics of persons and not as characteristics only of persons. Andreeva et al. center their discussion on these differences and characteristics to show that, since the influence of the social environment is a causally necessary condition for a person's possession of these characteristics and, hence, for the existence of these differences between persons, the fact that a person is influenced by the social environment is more important than the fact that he possesses psychological characteristics. It does not follow from this, however, that non-persons do not also possess psychological characteristics and that for these non-persons the fact that they are influenced by the social environment is more important than their possession of psychological characteristics. Thus, one might argue that according to Myslivchenko's second sense of 'essence', for both persons and such non-persons, being influenced by the social environment is more important and more essential than possession of psychological characteristics. But Myslivchenko also says that, in the second sense, 'essence' signifies the qualitative specific nature of an object. 12 If (1) both persons and i.on-persons have psychological characteristics and (2) the influence of the social environment is more important for each because it is a causally necessary condition for the possession of these characteristics, then neither the influence nor the possession of these characteristics is qualitatively specific to persons. Hence, neither would be essential to persons. If the fact that the influence of the social environment is a causally necessary condition for a person's possession of psychological characteristics is reason to believe that this influence is more essential to a person, then one must assume that persons alone have psychological characteristics. The argument needs, secondly, to be supplemented with an argument that there is no influence of the social environment without social relations. Presumably, Andreeva et al. want to show that the essence of a person is the ensemble of his social relations. But all they attempt to show is that the influence of the social environment is a causally necessary condition for a person's possession of psychological characteristics. They need to tie the influence of the social environment to social relations. A case can be made for their being mutually necessary conditions. First, social relations are a logically necessary condition for the influence of the social environment. The social environment could not influence a person unless there were some vehicle for this influence. The vehicle for the influence of the social environment on a person is his relations to it. In so far as these relations are relations of a person to the social environment, they are social relations. Second, the influence of the social environment is a logically necessary condition for social relations. A social relation is a vehicle for the influence of the social environment on a person. As such, it is a causal relation. There cannot he a causal relation unless there is a cause and an effect. Thus, there is no causal relationship when there is no influence. Thus, there is no social relation unless there is an influence, in particular, of the social environment. Thus, social relations are logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the influence of the social environment. As they are now supplemented, the premisses of this argument reads (1) A thing has psychological characteristics if and only if it is a person. (2) If a thing has psychological characteristics, then it is influenced by the social environment. (3) A thing is influenced by the social environment if and only if it stands in a social relation to something. From these premisses one may conclude only: (4.1) If a thing is a person, then it stands in a social relation to something. This does not give the logical equivalence Andreeva et al. need between being a person and standing in a social relation to something. Even the conclusion one may draw is not a logical conditional. Rather, it is a causal one. For the considerations Andreeva et al. give for the second premiss suggest only that the influence of the social environment is a causally necessary condition for the possession of psychological characteristics. Even if this is true it does not follow that there could not be a person who would possess psychological characteristics and would not be influenced by the social environment. In order to show that there could be no such person, one must show that the influence of the social environment is a logically necessary condition for the possession of psychological characteristics. But even if this were shown, it does not follow that social relations are essential to persons. There might be social relations between non-persons, e.g., bees. In this case social relations would not be (part of) the qualitative specific nature of a person. And since they would not be (part of) the qualitative specific nature they would not be essential to a person. (I shall consider arguments against considering non-persons social in chapter three.) One way to demonstrate that all and only persons are social would be to show that the influence of the social environment is a logically sufficient as well as necessary condition for the possession of psychological characteristics. In this case, one could draw the conclusion: (4.2) Something is a person if and only if it stands in a social relation to something. But, while this is the conclusion Andreeva et al. want, they exclude the alteration of the second premiss required to draw it. According to them the influence of the social environment is a necessary condition for the possession of psychological characteristics; but so is complex biological structure. Since each is a necessary condition, neither alone is a sufficient condition either for the possession of psychological characteristics or, consequently, for being a person. One way out of this problem would be for Andreeva et al. to say that the influence of the social environment and complex biological structure are separately necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the possession of psychological characteristics. In this case, one could draw the conclusions (4.3) Something is a person if and only if it stands in a social relation to something and has a complex biological structure. One could then conclude that social relations together with complex biological structure are essential to a person. Another way out would be for Andreeva et al. to deny that complex biological structure is a necessary condition and to assert that the influence of the social environment is necessary and sufficient for the possession of psychological characteristics. One could then draw 16 conclusion 4.2. One could also conclude that social relations alone are essential to a person. Yet another alternative would be for Andreeva et al. to proceed from an assumption about the person other than the first premiss. That is, they might proceed from an assumption that all and only persons, say, are 23self-conscious, play roles, or are active. J They might then attempt to show that all and only beings that are self-conscious, play roles, or are active are social and that being social is logically prior to being self-conscious, playing roles, or being active. Each of these alternatives has been advocated by some Soviet philosopher. Some have said that there is a 2 6biological essence of the person. J Many have said that the concept 'person' has only to do with a human's social 23>V. I. Dobrynina and V. A. Khoroshilov review these alternatives in "Marksistskoe uchenie o lichnosti (Stat'ia I) [Marxist teaching on the person (First article)]," Filosofskie nauki, 1975 > No. 2, p. 132. 24Konstantin Konstantinovich Platonov centers on self-consciousness in "Psikhologicheskaia struktura lichnosti [Psychological structure of the person]," in Lichnost' pri sotsializme (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1 9 6 8), pp. 62-77. Igor' Semenovich Kon centers on roles in his Sotsiologiia lichnosti [Sociology of the person] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1 9 6 7). Liudmilla Panteleevna Bueva centers on activity in her Sotsial'naia sreda i soznanie lichnosti [Social environment and consciousness of the person] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 8). 26■^Tugarinov suggests this in Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. 4 3 . 17 26nature. The latter two positions are considered in the second and third chapters. It has been assumed to this point that the remarks Andreeva et al. make on psychological and social differences and on psychological characteristics are part of an argument for the thesis that the essence of a person is the ensemble of his social relations. A more charitable interpretation would be to attribute to them the intention of showing only that the influence of the social environment is a causally necessary condition for the possession of psychological characteristics. In this case the thesis that the essence of a person is the ensemble of his social relations would not be a conclusion but an assumption. The point would be to show that a person possesses psychological characteristics because he stands in social relations to something. Of course, Andreeva et al. fail to demonstrate even this. But they might fail to do so, as suggested earlier, because they feel that this claim is well established. Continuation of the Attack The thesis that the essence of a person is the ensemble of his social relations is an assumption of an argument given by Andreeva et al. for the major conclusion 2 6Kharis Fatykhovich Sabirov takes this position in his Chelovek kak sotsiologicheskaia problema [Man as a sociological problem] (Kazans Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1 9 7 2), p. 2 0 9 . 18 that a person should be studied as a person of a particular historical era and, when he lives in a class society, as a member of his class. Since what actually exists are definite social formations with their particular social relations, Man, being in essence a totality of social relations, must also be studied concretely historically- as a human of a certain historical epoch and, in a society dividgd into opposed classes, as a member of a certain class. Given the assumption that the essence of a person is the ensemble of his social relations, what remains to be shown is that social relations do differ from historical era to historical era and, in a class society, from class to class. Prom this one may draw the intermediate conclusion that the essence of persons (and, hence, persons themselves) differs from historical era to historical era and, for persons in a class society, from class to class. The final conclusion that a person should be studied as a person of a particular historical era and, when he is a member of a class society, as a member of his class follows naturally in that what is being studied (provided the intermediate conclusion follows) are essentially different things. Drozdov criticizes Andreeva et al. for denying a PRgeneral conept (poniatie) of the person. He takes 2 7'Kommunizm i lichnost', p. 14. 2 8Aleksandr Vasil'evich Drozdov, "0 poniatiiakh 'obshchestvo' i 'lichnost'' i ikh metodologicheskom znachenii [Concerning the concepts 'society' and 'person' and their methodological significance]," in Metodologicheskie voprosy obshchestvennykh nauk (Leningrad* Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 8), p . 40. Andreeva et al. to deny a general concept of the person because they claim that " . . . in an antagonistic society members of opposed classes cannot be brought under one 2Qgeneral definition (opredelenie) . . . y The issue, then, is whether by denying a general definition of the person, Andreeva et al. also deny a concept of the person in general. Concerning the relationship between concepts and definitions the Filosofskaia entsiklopediia [Philosophical encyclopedia] says: In so far as the results of the study of an object are represented in the corresponding concept, one may consider a definition a formulation (in an eviden±Qand condensed form) of the content of these concepts. Since Andreeva et al. deny there is a definition of the person in general, they deny that there can be a formulation of the content of the concept of the person in general. In order to maintain that there, nevertheless, is a concept of the person in general, Andreeva et al. need to assert either (1) that, while the concept of the person in general has content, that content cannot be formulated or (2) that the concept of the person in general is a concept without content. They appear to accept the latter alternative. 29Kommunizm i lichnost', p. 2 5 . 30Filosofskaia entsiklopediia, s.v. "Opredelenie Definition ." 20 They say: . . . by a person one should understand not a human in general but a concretely given human in the unity of his typical and individual traits. Of course, such a concept of the person is a formal concept! the content is given to it by study of a concrete historical epoch, social formation, which gives rise to definite social types embodied in concrete people (litso) as well as in the peculiarities of an individual (individ) which are connected with the specific character of his personal fate. The formal concept of the person could be a concept of the person in general. But, as a formal concept, it lacks content. Some Soviet authors other than Andreeva et al. who write on the problem of the person in the early 1960s make similar remarks concerning the person in general. Davidovich, for example, says in 1962 that an individual in general (individ voobshche) is an empty shell (pust.yshka). He adds that One may understand Man only when he is examined as the subject of collective activity in interconnection with other humans, in interrelations with the society he was born and lives in. Kriazhev attempts to make a similar point when he argues that there is no eternal nature of the person. ^ Both Andreeva et al. and Drozdov refer to a 31J Kommunizm i lichnost', p. 1$. 32^ Vsevolod Evgen'evich Davidovich, Obshchestvo i lichnost' [Society and the person] (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo "Vysshaia shkola", -1962), p. 6 . 33-^Petr Efimovich Kriazhev, Obshchestvo i lichnost' [Society and the person] (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1 9 6 1), p. 84. philosophical principle commonly cited in the literature on the problem of the person. This principle, as Lenin states it, reads: . . . the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc .-3 The relationship between the universal, the particular and the individual is analogous to the relationship between genus, species and exemplar. 'Particular', in this case, refers to properties which, while they belong to more than one being, are less than fully universal. Kagan, for one (and perhaps uniquely in Soviet philosophy), appears to consider this category superfluous, saying that " . . . it signifies only a moment of transition from 'individual' to 'universal'. Andreeva et al. and Drozdov disagree about just how universal the universal in a person is. On the one hand, Andreeva et al. construe the universal in a person to be those properties he has in common with other persons of his -^Vladimir Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 38: Philosophical Notebooks (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1 9 6 1), p. 361. -'-'Moisei Samoilovich Kagan, "K postroeniiu filosofskoi teorii lichnosti [Towards the construction of a philosophical theory of the person!," Filosofskie nauki, 1971, No. 6 , p. 1 3. 22 historical era and, when he lives in a class society, with other persons of his class. They say: Each person, just as any individual, is a unity of the universal and the particulars he unites in himself traits which he has in common with other humans in class society, with humans of his class, his social group, etc. Drozdov, on the other hand, construes the universal in a person to include properties he has in common with all other persons. He says: The person appears first and foremost as a contradictory unity of the universal and the individual. Both universal traits, belonging to all humans of the past, present and future, and specific signs, characteristic for a person of a given formation and a given class, are inherent in an actual person. ' What differentiates Andreeva et al. from Drozdov is not that the latter asserts and the former deny a concept of the person in general. Andreeva et al. do not claim nor does what they say entail that there is no such concept. They disagree with Drozdov about the content of the concept of the person in general. They say it lacks content; Drozdov says that it has content. In their argument for a difference in social relations from historical era to historical era and, in a class society, from class to class, Andreeva et al. identify three categories of social relations, viz., economic, political and ideological. Social relations falling into each of these categories are said to be relations between •^Kommunizm i lichnost', p. 13- -^Drozdov, "'Obshchestvo' i ' l i c h n o s t " p. 39* 23 interests. Political and ideological relations are said to be relations between political and intellectual (dukhovnyi) OQinterests, respectively. Presumably, economic relations, over which political and intellectual relations rise, are relations between economic interests. This suggests that the category of social relations depends on the category of the interests related. Andreeva et al. identify three relations between interests, viz., agreement, divergence and enmity. Interests of different people, different classes, social groups and their separate individuals are found in different relations. They can be in agreement. They can to a greater or lesser degree diverge. Thex can be antagonistic, mutually exclusive and inimical. " If it is assumed (as was suggested in the preceding paragraph) that social relations are relations between interests, it follows that agreement, divergence and enmity between interests are social relations. It is not clear whether Andreeva et al. intend this to be an exhaustive list of social relations. 'Are in agreement', 'diverge' and 'are inimical' are, however, the only relational terms they predicate of interests. Andreeva et al. say that . . . every socio-economic formation is characterized by a social structure inherent in it and by a system, corresponding toQit, of interrelations of interests between humans. •^Kommunizm i lichnost', p. 1739 -^Kommunizm i lichnost', p. 17ilQKommunizm i lichnost', p. 17. zk They say that in primitive society there is no separation of the interests of some members from the interests of others. The reason for this agreement in interests is an identity in property relations in primitive society. Common ownership of the means of production and common labor placed all members of the community in an equal position and the extremely low resultativeness (resul'tativnost') of labor efforts made for equality in consumption, too. Although one member of the species could surpass another in physical strength and in magnitude of needs, this could not be taken into account in the distribution of the means of subsistence procured. For a primitive human nothing existed he could begin to call his own. In a class society, according to Andreeva et al., there is a separation of the interests of the exploiters from the interests of the exploited. In fact, the exploiters' interests are irreconcileably opposed to the interests of the exploited. This enmity between interests is said to have arisen with the division of labor and the formation of k2private property. The authors do not spell out how private ownership is a reason for enmity between interests in a class society. Drozdov, however, fills in some of the detail. The authors consider the fact that a bourgeois is a property owner, an exploiter, and a proletarian is a laborer deprived of the means of production to be a most important difference in^the personality of the bourgeois and of the proletarian. ^ The reason, then, for the enmity between the exploiters' kjKommunizm i lichnost', p. 17. kpKommunizm i lichnost', p. 18 ^Drozdov, "'Obshchestvo' i 'lichnost'1," p. 4l. 25 interests and the interests of the exploited is the difference in property relations in a class society. Exploiters own property while the exploited do not. Interpretation and Evaluation It is not clear whether Andreeva et al. consider the social relation (i..e., agreement, divergence, enmity) or its category (i.e., economic, political, ideological) more important for describing the system of social relations which characterizes a given social formation. They might prefer the social relations themselves because they appear to differentiate primitive social formations from class social formations in terms of them. Since interests are in agreement in primitive society and the interests of some are inimical to the interests of others in a class society, primitive society might be differentiated from class society by this difference in the social relations themselves- agreement in primitive society and enmity in class society. Persons in primitive society could similarly be differentiated from persons in class society by the agreement of the interests of the former with those of all others in his society and the enmity of the interests of the latter to those of some others in his society. But while a person of one social formation can be differentiated from a person of another social formation by means of the difference in their social relations, persons of different classes in a class society (the same social 26 formation) cannot be differentiated in this manner. If enmity is a symmetrical relation, then a person of one class is no different from a person of another class in terms of the relation between his interests with the intersts of the other person. The interests of the former are inimical to the interests of the latter, just as the interests of the latter are inimical to the interests of the former. That is, the social relation, enmity, of the interests of one to those of the other is the same. In fact, Andreeva et al. appear to consider agreement of interests, on the one hand, evidence of categorical identity of social relations and enmity between interests, on the other hand, evidence of categorical diversity of social relations. They explain the agreement of interests in primitive society by an identity in property relations, a sub-category of economic relations. Conversely, they cite the enmity between interests in capitalist society as reason for differentiating the bourgeois from the proletarian. They say that a society such as capitalism, . . . although it constitutes a kind of economic whole, is not knit together by commonness of interests of all its members and is not, therefore, an actual collectivity (kellektivnost1). As for the person, as soon as we consider his fate under capitalism, the question immediately arises, "What kind of person is beingji,spoken about- a bourgeois or the person of the laborer?" The enmity between interests in a class society can be IlIlKommunizm i lichnost', p. 1927 explained (as Drozdov suggests) by a difference in property relations. It appears, then, that the category of a social relation is more important for describing the system of social relations which characterizes a given social formation. First, one can differentiate social formations (and their members) by means of category. A primitive society is one in which property is held in common; a class society is one in which property is privately owned. A person in primitive society is an owner of common property; a person in a class society is an owner or not an owner of private property. Second, one can differentiate persons within the same social formation by means of category. An exploiter is an owner of private property; one who is exploited does not own private property. Finally, the category of a social relation is to be preferred because a particular category of social realtions, economic relations, is regarded to be basic in some sense. Economic relations are said to be the relations over which other categories of social relations rise. Since, for the purposes of distinguishing social relations of different historical eras or of different classes within an historical era, the category of a social relation is more important than the relation itself (i.e., agreement, divergence or enmity), Andreeva et al. should modify the second premiss of their major argument. The conclusion of the major argument is the proposition that a person should be studied as a person of a particular historical era and, when he is a member of a class society, as a member of his class. The second premiss of this argument states that social relations differ from historical era to historical era and, in a class society, from class to class. Differences in category of social relations are not, however, differences in social relations proper. The category of a social realtion depends upon the kind of the interests related. Enmity between political interests, for example, is a political relation because it is a relation between political interests. Such a relation between political interests does not differ as a relation from enmity between economic interests. Both are relations of enmity. They are different because the kinds of the interests related are different. In order to capture the importance of the kind of the interests related for the purposes of distinguishing social relations of different historical eras or of different classes within an historical era, Andreeva et al. should modify the second premiss so that it states that social relations and the kinds of the interests socially related differ from historical era to historical era and, in a class society, from class to class. Even if Andreeva et al. are granted this modification in the second premiss, they do not establish the conclusion of the major argument. Their argument for the second premiss proceeds from a more particular contention that property relations differ from historical era to historical era and, within a class society, from class to class. This claim can be taken to be analytic or synthetic. If it is analytic, then a particular historical era necessarily has the property relations it has. Thus, for example, a given society could not be a primitive society unless property were commonly owned in it. What needs to be shown now is that historical eras are historical, i.e., that they actually occurred. Andreeva et al. present no evidence to show that there ever was a primitive society (or, for that matter, a class society) in their sense. If the claim is synthetic, then a historical era is discovered to have the social relations it has. Thus, for example, a primitive society might not have had common ownership of property; it just happens that there is no such primitive society. In this case evidence should be presented to show that no such primitive society ever existed. Andreeva et al. do not present such evidence. In so far as their expressed interest is in studying Man historically and concretely, this failure by Andreeva et al. to present such evidence is critical. They thereby fail to follow their own dictum. Andreeva et al. might (and probably do) presume that Marx has already presented all the relevant evidence. In that case, they should at least review this evidence. Review and Evaluation of Drozdov's Criticism Andreeva et al. claim that there is a formal concept of the person and that this concept has no content. They do not show, however, that it has no content. If they show anything, they show that property relations differ from historical era to historical era and, in a class society, from class to class. Property relations, being economic relations, are taken to be in some sense more basic than social relations falling into other categories. These other social relations are said to emerge from economic relations. Andreeva et al. say that the formal concept of the person is one of a concretely given human in the unity of his typical and individual traits. These typical and individual traits presumably depend upon the person's social relations. If they do, in order for the formal concept of the person to lack content there would have to be no social relation all persons have in common. In so far as property relations are more basic than other social relations, these other social relations depend in some sense upon property relations. In order to show that the formal concept of the person lacks content, Andreeva et al. should show that each social relation included in a social formation characterized by a particular property relation is excluded in any other social formation characterized by another property relation. They do not show this. Nor can they, according to Drozdov. He says that 31 there are traits which belong to all humans. Among the universal traits of a person are the capacity to be a subject, the bearer of social relations, reason, the presence of ideals and the capacity for their purposeful implementation, etc. 5 Drozdov criticizes Andreeva et al. in three ways. He argues, first, that Marx did not deny a general concept of the person. He quotes from Marx's sixth thesis on Feuerbach and contrasts this with the seventh which readsi Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the "religious sentiment" is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual whom he analyzes belongs in reality to a particular form of society. Drozdov interprets the sixth and seventh theses as follows: Marx ascertains the obvious fact that the universal actually exists in the separate, is manifested through the individual. Thus, reference to this position of Marx cannot servers support for the point of view being criticized by us. ' Of course, Andreeva et al. do not deny that there is a general concept of the person. In so far as Drozdov is criticizing that point of view, he is criticizing a point of view they do not support. Drozdov argues, second, that a bourgeois and a ^Drozdov, "'Obshchestvo' i 'lichnost''," p. 3946Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," p. 84. ^Drozdov, "'Obshchestvo' i 'lichnost''," p. 41. 32 proletarian do have things in common. Can it he that the proletariat, being the gravedigger of capitalism, is not at the same time its product in the broadest sense of this word? Capitalism daily, hourly, using all means, methods, and forms, an alse the very conditions of life, corrupts the proletariat, tries to raise it in the spirit of bourgeois ideology, psychology and {jjigrals, which as a consequence become habits for it. He adds, later: While underscoring the opposition of the person of the bourgeois and the proletarian, one must not forget that he is included within the limits of^pne type of person--the person of bourgeois society. y The argument is rhetorical and does not establish the point Drozdov seeks to establish, i.e., that the proletarian and the bourgeois have something in common. Rather, Drozdov asserts that both are persons of bourgeois society. This kind of person is not characterized and so it is impossible to judge whether there is such a person. Drozdov gives an argument against the denial of the concept 'society in general (obshchestvo voobshche) 1 which bears upon whether there is a trait common to all persons. He says: By opposing the concepts 'society in general' and 'social formation' the advocates of a denial of the former concept are forced, contradicting themselves, constantly to speak of 'society in general'. They define a social formation itself as a society at a certain stage of historical development. One may say, similarly, that Andreeva et al. are forced to LQDrozdov, "'Obshchestvo' i 'lichnost''," p. 42. ^Drozdov, "'Obshchestvo' i 'lichnost''," p. 42. -^Drozdov, "'Obshchestvo' i 'lichnost''," p. 35. use the concept 'person in general' when they speak of persons of different historical eras. Andreeva et al. can accept this consequence. They do not deny that there is a concept of the person in general. They do deny that this general concept of a person has content; according to Andreeva et al. the general concept of a person is a formal concept. What divides Drozdov from Andreeva et al. is not that Drozdov claims that there is a general concept of a person while Andreeva et al. claim that there is no such concept. They disagree about whether the general concept of a person is merely formal. This disagreement amounts to a disagreement about whether the general concept of a person has content. If the general concept of a person has content there must be a characteristic all persons have in common. Drozdov's most compelling argument addresses this issue. He 3^ says: The ahsolutization of the individual (otdel'noe), the denial of 'person in general', and even more of a universal type of person belonging to a formation . . . deprives us of the possibility of speaking about the historical progress of the person, of comparing the person of different epochs and formations. For the purposes of comparison, universal traits, with respect to the level of which we make judgments about the progress of the person, are necessary. If one acknowledges only a person of a given formation or class, then one should speak not of the historical development of the person but of the changing of various persons who, due to the absence of traits common to them expressed by the general concept of a person, prove to be incomparable phenomena. . . . The existence of class types of person is not subject to doubt. This is not grounds, however, for denying some traits common to these types which belong to some or another extent to all^humans of a given epoch and to humans of all epochs. Drozdov centers on the fact that Marxists speak of the development of the person. He believes that for such talk to be possible there must be some grounds for positive comparison of persons. He says that the grounds for positive comparison of persons are the characteristics persons have in common. Thus, according to Drozdov, a necessary condition for speaking of the development of the person from primitive society to class society would be attributing to persons in primitive society at least some characteristics they have in common with persons in class society. One judges the progress of a person in class society with respect to a person in primitive society by means of these concepts. Drozdov says that if such positive comparison is impossible, one should speak of the •"^Drozdov, "'Obshchestvo' i 'lichnost''," p. ^3 . 35 replacement of a person of one kind by a person of another kind instead of speaking of the development of the person. Thus, according to Drozdov, if positive comparison is impossible, one should speak of a person of class society replacing a person of primitive society instead of speaking of the development of persons of class society from persons of primitive society. Andreeva et al. could reply that Drozdov wrongly assumes that persons of different historical eras or of different classes can be compared positively. They might insist that only negative comparison is possible. This negative comparison would consist in listing characteristics a person of one historical era has which a person of another historical era does not have. One can negatively compare the number four and a duck in such a manner. One might do so by noting that the number four is even while a duck is not even. Andreeva et al. might say that comparison of persons of different historical eras proceeds in a similar manner. Such a reply would not address Drozdov's claim that positive comparison of persons must be possible if one is to speak of the development of the person. In fact the suggestion that only negative comparison of persons of different historical eras is possible could serve as grounds for claiming that talk of the development of the person is impossible. One could claim that two things which can only be compared negatively are so radically different that one can speak only of the replacement of one by the other. This consequence would be intolerable for a Marxist whose theory of history is centered on development from one historical era to the next. Given the assumptions that (1) talk of the development of the person is possible and (2 ) positive comparison of persons of different historical eras is a necessary condition for speaking of the development of the person, Drozdov's argument is conclusive. He demonstrates, on the basis of these assumptions, that there is a general concept of a person (which issue was not in dispute) and that a general concept of a person has content (the disputed issue). While Andreeva et al. should concede that there is a general concept of a person and that this concept has content, i.e., is not just a formal concept, they can salvage a more limited claim about how persons should be studied. Recall that the conclusion of their major argument was that a person should be studied as a person of a particular historical era and, when he lives in a class society, as a member of his class. Andreeva et al. could say that they intend to deny neither that there are characteristics all persons have in common nor that significant things can be said about persons in general by referring to these common characteristics. They could say that they do mean to insist that care be exercised in identifying these characteristics. One should be especially careful, for example, not to construe the characteristics of persons in the present historical era as characteristics all persons have in common. Tugarinov, whose position is attacked by Andreeva et al., himself makes this point in 1 9 6 8. Andreeva et al. could also insist that the characteristics persons do have in common not be overrated. One way of overrating these characteristics would be to understand the only or most important things one may say about any particular person to be the things one may say about him because he has these characteristics. Andreeva et al. could insist that the particular circumstances of a person are at least as important as and, perhaps, more important than the characteristics he shares with all other persons for the purposes of describing this particular person. They could claim that the reason a person should be studied as a person of a particular historical era and, when he lives in a class society, as a member of his class is that a person's particular circumstances must be taken into account in giving any comprehensive description of him. Andreeva et al. could appeal to the Soviet concrete-abstract distinction to support this claim. They would say that the general concept of a person is abstract and that more particular consideration of his concrete J Vasilii Petrovich Tugarinov, "Dialektika sotsial'nogo i biologicheskogo v cheloveke [Dialectics of the social and the biological in Man]," in Lichnost' pri sotsializme (Moscow! Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1 9 6 8), pp. 55-56. characteristics is necessary. According to Il'enkov the concept 'abstract' is construed differently in formal logic from the way it is construed in dialectical logic. He says that in formal logic 'abstract' is a synonym for 'purely conceivable' and 'concrete' is a synonym for 'particular' or <53'sensorily perceivable'. ^ He says that this has led some to conclude that concrete concepts reflect things (veshch') while abstract concepts reflect properties (svoistvo) and relations (otnoshenie). But, he says, it is not possible to Kh,think of a thing without thinking of its properties. Andreeva et al. do take the general concept of a person to be abstract. If they took this to mean that a person in general is only purely conceivable, they might have concluded that there is no instantiation of a person in general. They might, therefore, conclude that a person in general is not actual. This might be why they say that there is no general definition of a person and, by implication, that the general concept of a person is only a formal one. If these possible conclusions are warranted by what Il'enkov says 'abstract' and 'concrete' mean in formal logic, they are not warranted by what he says the distinction is in dialectical logic. 153-'■'Eval'd Vasil'evich Il'enkov, "Ponimanie abstraktnogo i konkretnogo v dialektike i formal'noi logike [Understanding the abstract and the concrete in dialectics and formal logic]," in Formy myshleniia (Moscows Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1 9 6 2), p. 203• y Il'enkov, "Abstraktnogo i konkretnogo," p. 1 7 6. 39 Il'enkov says that in dialectical logic something concrete is not something immediately given to contemplation but a unity in a diversity. When one studies something concretely, one studies all the characteristics of that thing. Il'enkov also says that in dialectical logic something abstract is not something purely conceivable. Rather, it is something considered in isolation from other things. When one studies something abstractly, he disregards all but one feature of that thing. ^ Il'enkov notes that it is practically if not in principle impossible to study something either absolutely concretely or absolutely abstractly. Thus, most if not all studies of things are more or less concrete or abstract. He says, however, that the concrete is primary with respect to the abstract and that, when studying any particular thing, one should attempt to study it concretely. He thereby suggests that one should attempt to be as comprehensive as possible in his study of any particular thing. Appealing to the abstract-concrete distinction in dialectical logic, Andreeva et al. could say that the general concept of a person is abstract. They would mean by this that the general concept of a person comprehends characteristics which, while real and common to all persons, are considered in isolation from other characteristics of •^Il'enkov, "Abstraktnogo i konkretnogo," p. 19 7 . -^Il'enkov, "Abstraktnogo i konkretnogo," p. 1 9 8. persons in that concept. They could say that by insisting that a person be studied concretely, they are insisting that when a particular person is under consideration the characteristics comprehended by the general concept of a person be supplemented by characteristics which would provide a more complete understanding of the person under consideration. Soviets would, in general, consider this point unobjectionable. In fact, many Soviets make a similar point. The outcome of the dispute between Andreeva et al. and Drozdov is this. There is a general concept of a person and that concept is not a formal one. It comprehends actual characteristics which all persons have in common. While recognizing that there is such a general concept of a person, one should attempt to study any particular person concretely, considering other characteristics he might not have in common with all other persons. Remarks on the History of the Debate Andreeva et al. do not deny that there is a general concept of a person. They do, however, deny that there is a general definition of a person. This amounts to a denial that there are characteristics all persons have in common. Positions similar to theirs, in which the significance of characteristics common to all persons is minimized or denied, are frequently advocated by Soviets during the early 41 1960s .'^ In fact, such positions are much more common during this period than ones in which the existence of characteristics common to all persons is asserted. With the single exception of the criticism of Tugarinov by Andreeva et al. criticism of theories centered on the person in general is directed against Western philosophers. This criticism generally begins with a claim that Western philosophers assert that there is an abstract, eternal nature of the person. This claim is then attacked for being ahistorical. Critics of these early positions often make Drozdov's mistake which is to take advocates of these theories to claim that there is no general concept of a person. What these early theories actually say is that a general concept of the person is empty, i.e., that it has no content. I shall, for this reason, call these early theories 'empty concept theories'. A reply, published in 1965* by Tugarinov to the criticism of Andreeva et al. appears to be the first and only Soviet criticism of empty concept theories published cnPositions similar to that of Andreeva et al. are advocated by Kriazhev, Obshchestvo i lichnost', p. 84; A. P. Balabeshko, Obshchestvo i lichnost' fSociety and the person] (Alma-Ata: Kazakhskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1 9 6 2), pp. 44ff.s Davidovich, Obshchestvo i lichnost', ch. 6 ? Lev Nikolaevich Mitrokhin, "Problema cheloveka v marksistskom osveshchenii [The problem of Man in a Marxist light],*' Voprosy filosofii, 19^3» No. 8 , pp. 14-15? Grigorii Vasil'evich Teriaev, Obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskaia formatsiia [Social-economic formation] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo VPS i LON pri TsK KPSS, 1 9 6 3), pp. 6-7? Konstantin Mikhailovich Liubutin, "Starye idei v novoi odezhde [Old ideas in new clothing]," Voprosy filosofii, 1965, No. 7 , p. 1 3 1. 42 before 1 9 6 6. In this reply Tugarinov does not so much criticize Andreeva et al. as assert an opposing position. He says that everything concrete is a unity of the universal (obshchee), particular (osobennoe) and individual (edinichnoe). The concept 'person1, he says, expresses the universal belonging to a person.-^ More direct criticism of empty concept theories appears in 1 9 6 6.-^ Drozdov, for example, says then that if there is no general concept of a person one should speak only of persons of the capitalist system, persons of the feudal system, etc. and not simply of persons. ^ 0 A more indirect criticism is made in the same year in a paper Batenin delivers at a symposium entitled 'Man in socialist and bourgeois society (Chelovek v sotsialisticheskom i burzhuaznom obshchestve)'. This symposium was held early in 1966 shortly before the 2 3d Congress of the CPSU. In his paper Batenin says that there is a species essence of the person (rodovaia sushchnost1 D Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, pp. 9 2-9 3 . < Q-^See Otar Ivanovich Dzhioev, "Tsennost' i istoricheskaia neobkhodimost' [Value and historical necessity]," Filosofskie nauki, 1 9 6 6, No. 6 , p. 3 5 ; Aleksandr Vasil'evich Drozdov, Chelovek i obshchestvennye otnosheniia [Man and social relations] (Leningrad! Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, i9 6 0 ), pp. 33-34. ^0Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, pp. 33-34. 6lSergei Stepanovich Batenin, "Osnovnoi kriterii progressa lichnosti [The basic criterion of the progress of the person]," in Chelovek v sotsialisticheskom i burzhuaznom obshchestve: Materialy simpoziuma, vyp. 1 (Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 6 6), pp. 61-74. ^3 lichnosti) which persons of each historical era have. He says: . . . within general historical development a new person was a new stage in the development of the species essence of the person. Through all these stages a general tendency- the geggral direction of the progress of the person- proceeds. This claim is similar to Drozdov's claim that there must be a general concept of a person if one is to speak of the development of persons. In another paper delivered at the same symposium Platonov defends an empty concept theory. He says: Any attempt to study the "person in general" is scholastic and fruitless. . . . The difference between the personality of the bourgeois and the personality of the worker is determined by a difference in their actual social and, primarily, production relations. The personality of the slave was formed when the personality of the slaveowner existed together with the corresponding social relations. The personality of the proletarian was formed under capitalism. J Egides, another participant in this symposium, makes note of the exchange between Tugarinov and Andreeva et al. He cites the criticism Andreeva et al. make of Tugarinov, but pursues another avenue in his own criticism of Tugarinov. He appears to consider the dispute between Tugarinov and Andreeva et al. insignificant, saying that it " . . . has been reduced to a discussion of the question about whether a 62Batenin, "Kriterii progressa lichnosti," p. 61. ^Konstantin Konstantinovich Platonov, "Psikhologiia lichnosti [The psychology of the person]," in Chelovek v sotsialisticheskom i burzhuaznom obshchestve: Simpozium (doklady i soobshcheniiaJ (Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 6 6), p. 308. 44 64definition of a 'person in general' is possible." While the arguments in these papers demonstrate conclusively neither the correctness nor the incorrectness of empty concept theories, the concluding paper of this symposium which represents itself as expressing the sense of the conference comes out squarely against theories centered on a person in general. This paper attacks bourgeois theory in general and existentialist theory in particular for centering on the person in general. It reads: The false character of the interpretation in existentialism of actual problems consists in the fact that a precisely fixed historical concreteness is expressed here by a model of an abstract human who is invested from the beginning with anthropological traits; and the moods, feelings, attitude of a bourgeois human are declared to be "eternal," "natural" properties. . . . Thus, existentialist problems, which appear outwardly as problems of an abstract, "every" human- of a human "in general"- actually prove to be problems of a certain historical (namely, bourgeois) human. ^ According to this paper, one of the virtues of Marxism is that it stipulates that persons be studied concretely, rejecting methods which proceed from an abstract conception 64Petr Markovich Egides, "Lichnost' kak sotsiologicheskaia kategoriia [The person as a sociological categoryj," in Chelovek v sotsialisticheskom i burzhuaznom obshchestve: Simpozium (doklad.v i soobshcheniia) (Moscow; Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1966), p. 322. 6^Chelovek v sotsialisticheskom i burzhuaznom obshchestve: Materialy simpoziuma fMan in socialist and bourgeois society: Materials of a symposium]], vyp. 2 (Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 6 6), p. 18. of a person. It reads: The emergence of the Marxist conception of society was connected with a renunciation of general "philosophizing" concerning the nature of Man "in general," of Man with a capital M. In place of abstract speculative judgments Marx set the task of studying "actual human relations," of analyzing the activity of a concrete historical human within the whole context of social relations. This paper also rejects Batenin's claim that there is a species essence of the person. It says that this position is the source of a mistaken claim that society is something external with respect to a person. The correct view, it suggests, is one in which persons and society are unified.^ It appears that after 1966 most Soviets reject empty concept theories. This is especially interesting given the strong affirmation of an empty concept theory in the conclusions of the 1966 symposium. It is also interesting because empty concept theories appear to go uncriticized between the time of this conference and the publication in 1968 of Drozdov's extensive attack on them. This attack seems to have been published after most Soviets have already rejected empty concept theories. In 1967 Gak, one of the authors of Kommunizm i lichnost', refers to the concept 'person in general' in a criticism of a position similar to that of Tugarinov's. He does not, however, object to the use of this concept. He objects rather to loading this concept with characteristics which are not 66Chelovek v obshchestve, vyp. 2, p. 3 7 . 6*7'chelovek v obshchestve, vyp. 2 , p. 3 8 46 68properties of every human. More evidence in support of the proposition that most Soviets reject empty concept theories by the end of 1968 is found in an anthology, Lichnost' pri sotsializme [The person under socialism], published in that year. A note preceding the preface to this anthology reads 1 This book is compiled on the basis of materials of a symposium "Man in socialist and capitalist society" which was conducted by the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in 1966 and which ,q has evoked a large response in our country and abroad. ' The papers in this anthology, published by authors who published papers in the materials of the symposium, are for the most part the same as those earlier papers. Nevertheless, Egides, who in his 1966 paper appears to consider the issue insignificant, says, in 1 9 6 8 1 . . . the sociological approach of K. Marx and F. Engels to the problem of the person in primitive society . . . is important for a definition of a personality (lichnostnost') in general. No paper by Tugarinov appears in the materials of the 1966 symposium. He does, however, publish a paper in the 1968 anthology. In that paper Tugarinov says that the biological sciences as well as the psychological and pedagogical 68Grigorii Moiseevich Gak, Dialektika kollektivnosti i individual'nosti (Dialectics of collectivity and individuality] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 1 9 6 7), p. 16. ^ Lichnost1 prj sotsializme (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1 9 6 8), p. 2. ^Petr Markovich Egides, "Lichnost' kak sotsiologicheskaia kategoriia [The person as a sociological category]," in Lichnost' pri sotsializme (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", i9 6 0 ), p. 7 9 . sciences must presuppose that there are characteristics common to all persons. He says that while Marx and Engels argued against an abstract understanding of the person, this does not mean that there is no person in general. Tugarinov suggests that if one acknowledges a person in primitive society, a person in feudal society, etc., then one thereby necessarily acknowledges a universal concept of a person, 71viz., 'person in general'. In 1966 Platonov declared categorically that all attempts to study the person in general are scholastic and fruitless. He qualifies this assertion in 1968 in his paper in Lichnost' pri sotsializme. He says then, " . . . in the final analysis any attempts to be confined to the study of 72the 'person in general' are scholastic and fruitless."' Thus, whereas in 1966 Platonov objected to all attempts to study the person in general, in 1968 he objects only to attempts confined to the study of the person in general. The problem of the person in general is rarely discussed after 1 9 6 8. When it is mentioned, authors defend the use of the general concept of a person. For example, in 1972 Myslivchenko says: Marx, first, acknowledged the existence of the nature of Man "in general" (i.e., the species essence of Man) and, second, considered it necessary to study its concrete,TM historical, changing content (i.e., Man's existence). J ^Tugarinov, "Dialektika v cheloveke," pp. 55-56. "^Platonov, "Struktura lichnosti," p. 64. ^Myslivchenko, Chelovek kak predmet, p. 46. 48 Thus, after 1968 the existence of a general concept of a person is accepted without question. The rejection of a general concept of a person appears to have been discarded before 1 9 6 8. This is curious given that the 1966 symposium reaffirms the rejection of a general concept of the person and that no conclusive arguments against its rejection appear before 1 9 6 8. One might surmise that there were political reasons for its dismissal since it appears to have been discarded just after the 2 3d Congress of the CPSU. There is, however, no conclusive evidence to support this surmise. Whatever the Soviets' reasons for rejecting the thesis that there is no general concept of the person, what is important for our purposes is that they ultimately come to favor a general theory of the person. The remainder of this dissertation centers on general theories of the person. I now turn to a consideration of theories on the terminology of these accounts. CHAPTER TWO PERSONS, HUMANS AND INDIVIDUALS Introduction In the first chapter I discussed the level of generality at which Soviets consider it appropriate to speak of persons. I indicated that during the early period (1961 - 1 9 6 6) of the discussion of the problem of the person, following the 22d Congress of the CPSU, Soviets often claim that at the most comprehensive level of generality a person should be studied as a member of his historical era or, when that person is a member of a class society, as a member of his class. The authors of this position take the universal characteristics of a person to be the characteristics he has in common with other members of his historical era or, when that person is a member of a class society, with other members of his class. By the mid-1960s this claim is challenged by authors who assert that there are characteristics any person has in common with all other persons. They argue that these characteristics are the universal characteristics of a person and that they provide the content for a general concept of a person. This view becomes orthodoxy during the late 1960s. I now turn to a consideration of the terminology in which Soviet discussions of the nature of a person are framed. This terminology is technical. It includes the terms 'person (lichnost')', 'human (chelovek)', 'individual (individ)' (or, alternately, 'individuum (individuum)'), 'essence of Man (sushchnost* cheloveka)' and 'individuality (individual'nost')'. Three of these terms, viz., 'person', 'human' and 'individual', are usually contrasted with each other. They are most often used to refer to an entity. (There is, however, a non-substantive usage for the Russian term 'lichnost''.) The other terms, i.e., 'essence of Man' and 'individuality', are sometimes paired. This generally is not the case, though. These terms are most often used to refer to properties of an entity. (The Russian term 'individual'nost'' does have a substantive use.) In this chapter I consider various positions on the usage of the terms 'person', 'human' and 'individual'. I devote chapter three and an appendix to discussions of the terms 'essence of Man' and 'individuality', respectively. When the meanings of the terms 'person', 'human' and 'individual' are differentiated, they are used either (1) to refer to different kinds of entities or (2) to focus attention on different aspects of a single entity. These two purposes are often combined. When an author is interested in focusing attention on different aspects of a single entity, he generally calls this entity a human. Whatever an author's particular purposes in differentiating the terms 'person', 'human' and 'individual', his general 51 purpose is usually to underscore the proposition that humans are social. He might also have another general purpose. This other general purpose would he to emphasize that humans also have a "biological nature. One way these terms might be distinguished for these general purposes is the following: Humans, it would be noted, are creatures with both biological and social characteristics. On the one hand, they are members of a biological species, viz., homo sapiens. As members of this species, humans may be called 'individuals'. The term 'individual' calls attention to the fact that a human is a biological creature. On the other hand, humans are also members of societies. In order to be a member of a society a human must manifest social characteristics. Anything that manifests social characteristics, it would be said, may be said to be a person. Thus, since humans are members of societies, humans may be called 'persons'. The term 'person' calls attention to the fact that a human is a social creature. Unfortunately, distinctions Soviets make between the terms 'person', 'human' and 'individual' are never so neat. Humans, to be sure, are generally said to be bio-social creatures. But at least one author has insisted that the term 'human' be considered synonymous with the term 'essence of Man' which, he says, refers only to a social nature. *Petr Efimovich Kriazhev, "Nekotorye sotsiologicheskie voprosy formirovaniia lichnosti [Some 52 The term 'individual' often is used to denote a member of the species homo sapiens. It is also used, though, to denote either a member of any animal species or a single representative of a biological species or a social group. The Russian term 'lichnost'' poses special problems. It can be used to refer either to a particular- a person- or to a property- personality (the quality of being a person). Most authors do use the term 'lichnost'' to center on the social nature of an entity. Some authors argue, however, that persons cannot be taken to be exclusively social. These authors say that, in addition to social properties, persons have biological and psychological properties. These properties, they say, must be incorporated in the concept of a person. Some Soviets do not differentiate the meanings of the terms 'person', 'human' and 'individual's rather, they use them interchangeably. This is true especially of accounts published shortly after the 22d Congress of the CPSU. Differentiation of the terms 'person' and 'human' is introduced in 1 9 6 2; differentiation of the terms 'person' and 'individual' is introduced in 196 . At least one Soviet argues that these terms should be used interchangeably.-^ sociological questions on the formation of the person]," Voprosy filosofii, 1 9 6 6, No. 7, p. 1 5. 2Since the term 'lichnost'' means either 'person' or 'personality', I use both these translations. The English 'person' and 'personality' translate only 'lichnost''. - Gak, Dialektika, pp. 13-1 7. Early Discussions of the Distinction Tugarinov is the first Soviet to differentiate the concepts 'person' and 'human' during the post-1 9 61 discussion of the problem of the person. In 1962 he says, "A human is a bearer of the qualities and characteristics of 4a person; personality is a property of a human." Tugarinov reiterates and expands upon this point in 1 9 6 5. He says that the extensions of the concepts 'person' and 'human' are practically the same; all humans, with certain exceptions, are persons. But in content these two concepts are not at all the same. The concept 'person' refers to a property of a human and a human is the bearer of this property. Consequently, these concepts are differentiated as property and substrate. Tugarinov says that a property belongs to a substrate and is inseparable from it. A property, he says, can be separated from a substrate only in thought. Tugarinov says that there is another way to distinguish the concepts 'human' and 'person'. A human, he says, is both a biological and a social creature. "It is well-known that a human as a substrate is, on the one hand, a thing of nature and, on the other hand, a social £phenomenon- an element of society." It is only qua social 4 .Tugarinov, "Kommunizm i lichnost'," p. 16. ^Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. 42. £ Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. 43. 54 phenomenon, however, that a human is a person. The property being a person is characteristic of a human not as a biological creature but as a social creature, i.e., of a socialshistorical human as an aggregate of social relations. Thus, according to Tugarinov, in addition to the fact that the concepts 'human' and 'person' are distinguished because the former refers to a thing or substrate while the latter refers to a property, . . . the concepts 'human' and 'person' are also distinguished with respect to the fact that the concept 'human' is a natural-social concept and the concept 'person' is a social concept, i.e., it is connected not with the physical being of a human but with his social properties. In conclusion, Tugarinov gives the following definition of a persons "A person is a human taken in the aggregate of the properties which develop in him in the course of interactions with society. Tugarinov says that this concept of a person (where a human is a person in virtue of his having personality) is a normative concept of a person. According to Tugarinov, this concept of a person contains certain ideals a human should try to fulfill. (I shall discuss what Tugarinov says is the content of this concept in chapter four.) He says, in particular, that the ideals incorporated in this concept of a person are communist traits one should try to develop 7'Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. 43. 8mTugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. 43. Q'Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. 43. 55 10and cultivate. Tugarinov does identify another, non-normative concept of a person. He says that when the non-normative concept of a person is intended, it is identical with the concept 'separate human (otdel'nyi chelovek)' or 'individual'. Tugarinov says that this concept of a person incorporates primarily universal historical or universal human traits. Tugarinov justifies incorporating these traits in this concept of a person, saying that the individual " . . . existed in every society and every society consisted, consists and always will consist (while 1 1it still exists) of separate individuals." He concludes that the individual is, within the limits of the existence of human society, a perpetual phenomenon. Tugarinov does not specify which traits are incorporated in this second, non-normative concept of a person. In fact, he says that the definition of this 12concept of a person is a formal one. If, according to the Soviets (as was suggested in the first chapter), a formal concept is a concept without content, Tugarinov contradicts himself. He insists, on the one hand, that there are universal human traits but, in an apparent concession to Andreeva et al., says, on the other hand, that the concept 10Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, pp. 3^-35* ^Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. 3^* 12Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. ^0. of a person which incorporates these universal human traits is formal and, consequently (according to the theory of formalism outlined), has no content. In light of the pains to which Tugarinov goes to establish the claim that there are universal human traits, his reference to the concept of a person which incorporates these traits as a formal one should probably be regarded as a mere verbal concession to Andreeva et al. One might even make a good guess concerning the kinds of properties Tugarinov believes are universally human. Recall that he says that this second concept of a person is synonymous with the concept 'separate human' or 'individual'. When Tugarinov differentiates his normative concept 'person' from the concept 'human' he says that humans have biological properties as well as social properties. If a separate human is an instantiation of this concept, then he, too, has biological properties as well as social properties. This suggests that Tugarinov would consider both biological and social properties to be among the universal human traits incorporated in his second, non-normative concept of a person. Since this concept is synonymous with the concept 'separate human' or 'individual', biological and social properties would be incorporated in this concept, too. In 1964 Kon gives a definition of a concept 'human individual (chelovecheskii individ)' which appears to incorporate only biological properties. He says, "The concept 'human individual' signifies only membership in the human race and does not include concrete social or 13psychological characteristics." J Kon contrasts the concept of a human individual with the concept of a person which, he says, " . . . signifies an integral human in the unity of his individual abilities and the social functions (roles) he jii,fulfills." Kon's concept of a person is one of a socialized human. He says, "A human is not b o m a person but becomes one."1'' Kon describes socialization as a process of assimilation of an individual into a collective. A collective can be an estate, a class, a nation or society as a whole. An individual is assimilated into a collective by coming to fulfill the roles in which his rights and obligations with respect to that collective are fixed. Kon describes membership in a class as a person's social position. He says, moreover, that a person's social position does not depend on his will. But, Kon continues, a person's concrete role does depend upon how he conceives and evaluates his position. He illustrates this qualification 13-Filosofskaia entsiklopediia, s.v. "Lichnost' Person ," by Igor' Semenovich Kon. 1^Kon, "Lichnost'," FE, p. 1 9 6. ^Kon, "Lichnost'," FE, p. 1 9 6. in the following manners A slave who does not recognize his enslavement and vegetates in silent submission is simply a slave. A slave who recognizes his enslavement and who has reconciled himself to it is a lackey, a lout. But a slave who recognizes hjs enslavement and rises against it is a revolutionary. According to Kon, how a person conceives of his social position depends, in turn, on his social relations. He says, "A person's self-consciousness, his conceptions of his capacities, properties and social position, are always 17produced by the individual's actual social connections." ' Kon summarizes these points, saying, "A person is social since all his roles and his self-consciousness are the 1 ftproduct of social development." Kon's concept of a person is one of an entity for which social relations are of paramount importance. These relations determine at least the character of that entity's psychological processes, e.g., the way that entity conceives of its social position. Social relations might also be, for Kon, a necessary condition for the occurrence of these processes. Kon does not, however, address this issue here. In any case, Kon clearly believes that social roles must be incorporated in the concept of a person and, if psychological properties are incorporated in it at all, then they are of secondary importance. Kon might also include l6Kon, "Lichnost'," FE, p. 1 9 6. 1^Kon, "Lichnost'," FE, p. 196 . ^Kon, "Lichnost'," FE, p. 196. 59 biological properties in his concept of a person. He does speak only of individuals becoming persons. And since he characterizes a human individual as a member of the human race, he might mean to incorporate the properties which are the criteria for membership in the human race in his concept of a person. This, however, is unclear. Kon's account is similar to Tugarinov's in the following ways. First, both appear to make no distinction between the concepts 'human' and 'individual'. Second, both insist on including social characteristics in their concepts of a person. Their accounts differ in these ways. First, Tugarinov includes social characteristics in his concept of an individual; Kon does not. Second, Tugarinov's normative concept 'person' is one of a property; Kon's concept of a person is one of an entity. Finally, Kon might incorporate biological properties in his concept of a person; Tugarinov clearly does not. In 1 9 6 3^ and again in 1965 Platonov, unlike Tugarinov and Kon, discusses the concept 'person' without distinguishing it from the concepts 'human' and 'individual'. He says that there are four aspects of a ^Konstantin Konstantinovich Platonov, 0 chertakh lichnosti novogo rabochego [Concerning the traits of the new worker's personalityJ (Moscow, 1 9 6 3). PP. 9-13» 60 person and conditionally calls them - socially conditioned peculiarities (purposefulness, moral qualities); - "biologically conditioned peculiarities (temperament, dispositions, instincts, simplest needs); - experience (volume and quality of knowledge, skills, abilities and habits); - individual peculiarities of various psychic processes. Platonov says that each trait of a person can be classified under one of these four aspects. He says, furthermore, that without any one of these four aspects we would not be able to classify all the properties of a person. Platonov concludes that isolation of each of these four aspects of a person " . . . is necessary and sufficient for evaluating the most general structure into which is laid more narrow, 21typical (tipovye) and individual structures." Platonov says that socially conditioned peculiarities are the most important of the four aspects of a person. They form a person as a whole. In support of this claim, Platonov says: The reflection by consciousness of social relations in which a person is included exercises the greatest influence on the formation of a person's traits. A human's relationship to labor, to other humans and to himself, all his other moral traits and his purposefulness up to its highest manifes±ation--convictions- are manifested in these traits. 20Konstantin Konstantinovich Platonov, "K teorii lichnosti [[Towards a theory of the person]," ch. 1 in Lichnost' i trud (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 1965). P. 38. ^Platonov, "K teorii lichnosti," p. 3 8 * Platonov, "K teorii lichnosti," pp. 39-^0. Platonov "believes that socially conditioned peculiarities are so influential that in the course of one's upbringing the effects of biologically conditioned peculiarities can be completely cancelled out by them. He says, furthermore, that in the course of historical development the influence of biologically conditioned peculiarities has diminished in 2 3just this manner. While Platonov considers a person's socially conditioned peculiarities more important than his biologically conditioned peculiarities, he also feels that a person's biological side can be underrated. He believes that hereditary genotypical traits should be considered in an account of the person. Platonov says in support of this claim that biologically conditioned peculiarities are manifested distinctly in childhood and old age. He says, moreover, Various kinds of illnesses, trauma and intoxification result in different forms of personal pathology with symptoms which are sometimes quite distinct and sometimes difficult to detect. Platonov gives as examples epileptoid character, frontal post-traumatic non-criticality, sclerotic sentimentality and the pathological development of a person during psychopathy. Platonov believes that biological peculiarities are significant for more than just psychiatric disorders. He says that dispositions, for example, can influence a person ^Platonov, "K teorii lichnosti," p. 3 8 . 2 kPlatonov, "K teorii lichnosti," p. 40. 62 at any stage of biological development. Inclinations, moreover, are the basis for socially conditioned 2Ktransformation. Platonov says that the social conditionality of a person cannot be understood unless that aspect of a person which unifies his experience is included in the structure of a person. Platonov calls this aspect 'preparedness (podgotovlennost')'. The concept 'preparedness' unifies knowledge and skills as well as abilities and habits. The latter two, according to Platonov, are built upon the former two. Platonov says that this aspect--preparedness- mediates between the socially and biologically conditioned aspects of 26a person. Platonov says little about individual peculiarities of various psychic processes. He merely says that isolating them from a general structure of the person limits an understanding of them, or, on the contrary, substitutes the 2 7integral person for separate functions. ' In 1965 Parygin claims, as does Platonov, that psychological characteristics should be incorporated in the concept of a person. Unlike Platonov, Parygin differentiates concepts of an individual and of a person to underscore the importance of psychological characteristics. 2^Platonov, "K teorii lichnosti," p. 42. P Platonov, "K teorii lichnosti," p. 43* ^Platonov, "K teorii lichnosti," p. 43. 63 He says, "An individual appears as a bearer of universal p Qhuman properties of the psyche." Parygin claims that, while they are not the primary characteristics of a person, the properties of an individual are included in the concept of a person. He says that the primary characteristic of a person is his social role. He objects, however, to attempts to reduce the concept of a person to a person's social status. He says: The operation of simply discarding the psychological during the examination of a person as a social phenomenon seems to us unfounded. Ignoring the psychological content of a person converts him into a personified social function, a "unit", a "twig" and other details of a faceless social mechanism. Such a definition of a person is not universal even if it does reflect the fact that he is formedpin some or another concrete historical circumstances. ' Parygin says that.the concept of a person cannot be reduced to his social roles because a necessary condition for a social role to be a part of the structure of a person is that it be reflected in some one of the person's psychological features. Parygin says that these features include the person's ideas, concepts, purposes, needs and values.-^0 Parygin's account differs from Platonov's in that Platonov includes biological characteristics in his concept 2 8Boris Dmitrievich Parygin, Sotsial'naia psikhologiia kak nauka QSocial psychology as science! (Leningrad* Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 5), p. 113. 2 97Parygin, Sotsial'naia psikhologiia, p. 114. 3 0J Parygin, Sotsial'naia psikhologiia, pp. 114-115. of a person while Parygin does not mention these characteristics. They also differ in that Parygin identifies a concept of an individual while Platonov does not. Their accounts are similar in that both include social characteristics in their concepts of a person and both claim that these characteristics are a person's primary characteristics. The most important similarity between the accounts of Parygin and Platonov consists in the fact that both explicitly include psychological characteristics in their accounts of a person. In this they differ from Kon and Tugarinov who center upon social characteristics in their accounts of a person. Parygin's account also differs from those of Kon and Tugarinov in that he includes only psychological properties in his concept of an individual while neither Kon nor Tugarinov mentions psychological properties in his account of an individual. The division between these two pairs appears to be interdisciplinary. Parygin and Platonov are psychologists; Kon is an ethnographer and Tugarinov- a philosopher. In 1966 Kriazhev, a sociologist, criticizes both Tugarinov and Platonov. He believes Tugarinov makes a mistake because Tugarinov does not differentiate the concepts 'human' and 'human individual (chelovecheskii individ)'. (I discuss this criticism in chapter three.) Kriazhev criticizes Platonov for including non-social characteristics in his concept 'person'. He believes that Platonov does this because he fails to differentiate the 65 concepts 'person' and 'human individual'.^1 Kriazhev introduces the concept 'human individual' in a discussion of the concept 'individual'. He says that " . . . the term 'individual' relates to each particular 32animal organism including the human one."^ Thus, while human beings are individuals so, too, are dogs, snails and aardvarks. An individual is not necessarily a human being. Kriazhev says that the existence of individuals is the first prerequisite of any human history. He adds, however, that as long as an individual's needs remain with the limits of the purely natural, have not been transformed within social relations and are not satisfied in a social manner, there can be no talk of any kind of traits of a person. He says, "Truly human needs cannot be satisfied by the same means as for animals . . . ; they arise owing to the presence of 33social production and exchange. A human individual, according to Kriazhev, is a bio-social creature. He is genetically related to the animal and has a biological organization which is subject to biological laws. But a human individual is also included in a higher, social structure and is the individual bearer of 31Kriazhev, "Sotsiologicheskie voprosy," p. 1 -. 32v Kriazhev, "Sotsiologicheskie voprosy," p. 1 5. •^Kriazhev, "Sotsiologicheskie voprosy," p. 1566 this structure. He says s . . . a human individual is singled out from the common mass of hiological individuals by his bio-social structure. His biological organization is socially transformedjuand adapted to fulfilling social functions. What differentiates human individuals from individuals simpliciter, then, is that at least some of their biological functions are transformed in the course of their socialization. By modifying the term 'individual' with the adjective 'human', one produces a term which refers not simply to an entity which is a member of a biological species, but to an entity which is also part of a social structure. Kriazhev says that the concepts 'human' and 'essence of Man' are not identical because in some circumstances by 'human' is meant 'human individual'. He adds, however, that an interest in a deep understanding of the problem of the person dictates the separation of the category 'human individual' from the category 'human'. Kriazhev says that if these concepts are separated, then . . . no doubt remains that in Marxist sociology the concept 'human' (if it is revealed in content and not formally, i.e., through a definition of essential connections) contains just what Marx understood by the essence of Man.-'-' Thus, according to Kriazhev, the concept 'human' should be construed as the concept- 'essence of Man'. Kriazhev says 3Z1, J Kriazhev, "Sotsiologicheskie voprosy," p. 1 5. -^Kriazhev, "Sotsiologicheskie voprosy," p. 16. that the essence of Man is social and only social. Thus, his narrow concept 'human' incorporates only social characteristics. Kriazhev says, last, that a person is only social. He is an individual existence (b.ytie) of social relations.^ He objects particularly to one of Platonov's claims that the non-social characteristics of a person arose before humans did. He says that in doing this Platonov mistakes anthropogenesis for the genesis of the person. He indicates that, strictly speaking, it is impossible to study even a primitive human individual as a person. A primitive human individual is an entity which becomes a person. Platonov responds to Kriazhev's criticism in 1 9 6 8. He says that Kriazhev illegitimately attributes to him the identification of the concepts 'person' and 'human individual'. Platonov says, furthermore, that Kriazhev opposes the concepts 'human' and 'individual' which, according to Platonov, are related to each other as universal and particular.^ Platonov objects more particularly to Kriazhev's identification of the concepts 'essence of Man' and 'person'. (Actually, Kriazhev identifies the concepts 'essence of Man' and 'human'.) Platonov says that the mistaken identification of these concepts manifests a tendency of some scholars to exclude •^Kriazhev, "Sotsiologicheskie voprosy," p. 16. -^Platonov, "Struktura lichnosti," p. 70. 68 a biologically conditioned substructure from the concept of a person. He calls this tendency one of sociologizing the person. Platonov continues, Such a vulgar sociologization of the person is manifested in a distinctive social behaviorism from the position of which all actions of a person are always nothing other than an immediate response to a corresponding social stimulus. The influence of the environment (including social conditions) on the behavior and formation of the person are conceived according to the formula "stimulus-response". Platonov would replace an account of a person which centers exclusively on his social characteristics with an account which attributes both social and biological characteristics to a person. He cautions against overemphasis of a person's biological characteristics, though, indicating that a person's biological substructure is subject to his social superstructure. Platonov continues to insist upon his four-aspect model of the structure of a person. He describes this model as objective, adding that a subjective system (a system of concepts concerning the person and interpersonal relations) must reflect this model. He now stresses more social and biological factors over and above the other two factors, though. He says, "In the final analysis a person as a whole is formed by the complex qualitative interaction of only two factors- the social and the biological. •^Platonov, "Struktura lichnosti," p. 70. ■^Platonov, "Struktura lichnosti," pp. 70-71. Three Trends of the Late 1960s and Early 1970s Platonov's account reflects one trend in Soviet theory of the person in the late 1960s and early 1 9 7 0s. This trend is to attribute to a person qua person both biological and social characteristics or, in one case, psychological and social characteristics. While authors who advocate this position acknowledge that social characteristics are the primary characteristics of a person, they caution against a sociologization of the person. They feel that theories asserting that only social characteristics are incorporated in the concept of a person are guilty of just this transgression. The transgression consists in conceiving of a person only as a member of collectives and as having his behavior determined exclusively by phenomena pertaining to his membership in collectives. These authors claim that to conceive of a person in this way is to dissolve him into collectives. As a remedy to such a dissolution these authors introduce biological characteristics into the concept of a person. They do this both to underscore the role of these characteristics in determining behavior and to introduce psychological characteristics. While these authors generally concede that psychological characteristics are the result of the interaction of social and biological features of a person, they believe the introduction of psychological characteristics is necessary for describing a person as a subject (especially of social relations) and, more particularly, as an agent. These authors believe that a person qua agent not only is formed by his relations with other persons, i.e., his social relations; he also is the creator of these very relations. In 1968 Bueva presents a theory representative of this trend. Her theory does not fit entirely into it, though, because she asserts that the concept of a person incorporates social but not biological characteristics. She does, however, indirectly attribute psychological characteristics to a person. She does this by means of her concept 'individual'. Following Parygin, Bueva says that the concept 'individual' may be used for ascertaining universal properties of the psyche. She amends this concept of an individual, saying that it may also be used " . . . for the definition of a human as a single bearer of social relations and functions, for the differentiation of a hOsingle representative of any social group." Thus, Bueva conceives of an individual as a psycho-social entity. Again following Parygin, she says that the properties of an individual enter into the concept of a person. Thus, for Bueva, a person is a psycho-social entity, too. Concerning the concept of a person in particular, hoBueva, Sotsial'naia sreda, p. 28. 71 she asserts: A person is a more concrete social characteristic of a human. In this concept are fixed the spcifically social (but not biological) qualities and properties of a human. These are formed in social relations and determine his socially significant activity and behavior. As an element of a social system- a bearer of and expresser of connections and relations typical for it- a person appears by means of his fulfillment of certain social functions. But this is only one side of the matter, characterizing a person more as an object in a system of social connections. . . . The other side of the problem consists in the fact that objective social relations, which constitute the essence of social structure, themselves are formed from the actions of various persons and, consequently, bear the impression of their internal world, their consciousness. A person is not only a /Iproduct" of his circumstances; he also is their creator. Bueva says that psychological characteristics do not belong to a person qua object of social relations. They do, however, belong to a person qua subject of social relations. Parygin, who continues to represent this tendency, gives an account in 1971 slightly different from Bueva's account. He says that both biological and social characteristics must be used in a description of a person. Both types of characteristics must also be used in descriptions of persons qua subjects as well as in descriptions of them qua objects. Such characterization of a person is necessary to account for his choice of models ^Bueva, Sotsial'naia sreda, p. 26. for behavior. Parygin says: A person is in all cases a nexus of biological and social relations regardless of whether he is examined as a subject or object of all these relations or even only of social relations. This means that not only social but also biological relations make a human a product of a program which strictly regulates his behavior. It follows from this, further, that even in the position of an object and product of bio-social relations it proves necessary for a person to choosê different models and stereotypes of social behavior. While what Parygin intends is not clear, he appears to assert the following. Sometimes mutually exclusive alternatives are presented to a person because the social and biological processes which characterize him operate independently. Conflict between these processes can arise independently of the person's conscious processes. When such conflict arises, the person must choose one of the alternatives. Having become conscious of the conflict, a person qua subject chooses some way to behave. In this way one can account for a person's being both the product and the creator of his social environment. There are two other, less striking features of accounts representing this trend. One is that, if a concept of an individual is identified at all, both biological (or psychological) and social characteristics are incorporated 42Boris Dmitrievich Parygin, Osnovy sotsial'no-psikhologicheskoi teorii [Fundamentals of social psychological theoryJ (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 1 9 7 1), p. 106. in it. Savchenko, for example, says: A human as an individual always appears in two capacities. As an organism, as an individual of the species homo sapiens he is studied "by a complex of predominantly "biological sciences. But a human is also a unique, separate representative of human society, a member of a certain class, collective, group. The other feature is that these theories never differentiate the concepts 'individual' and 'human'. One could argue that these theories never differentiate among individuals, humans or persons since they attribute biological (or psychological) and social characteristics to all three. Given that these theories stress humans' possession of both biological and social characteristics, I call them 'bio-social person theories'. Another tendency in Soviet theory of the person during the late 1960s and early 1970s is represented by theories which assert that a person qua person has only social characteristics. Authors representing this trend stress that persons are the outcome of the development of individuals. An individual (or individuum) is said to be a non-social creature with certain biological characteristics. Any entity possessing these characteristics is a member of the species homo sapiens. These biological characteristics are the material basis for the socialization of an individual. Through socialization an individual 43G. I. Savchenko, "0 marksistskom ponimanii sushchnosti cheloveka kak sotsial'nogo individa [On the Marxist understanding of the essence of Man as a social individual]," in Nekotorye problemy lichnosti (Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1971). P* 50. becomes a person who, necessarily, is a member of society. These authors introduce a third term (usually 'human') to refer to an entity which is both an individual and a person. Thus, according to these theories, a human qua individual is a biological creature; a human qua person is a social creature; and a human simpliciter is a bio-social creature. In 1971 Kagan gives the most comprehensive presentation of such a theory. He differentiates, first, the concepts 'individ', 'osob'' and 'individuum'. Kagan says that, properly speaking/ the term 'individ' can be used to refer to any particular specimen of a species. The term 'osob'' refers to any non-anthropological particular. The term 'individuum' refers only to human beings, i.e., members of the species homo sapiens. Kagan notes, however, that the term 'individ' often is used in this way. He says: In any case, when speaking of a human as an "individuum" or an "individual", we indicate the traits of a human which belong to him biologically. These genetic parameters lie, first, on a somatic physiological level which embraces individual peculiarities in constitution and type of nervous system since, in certain respects,uu even an individuum's psyche is genetically determined. Kagan contrasts this concept of a human qua individuum, who is a member of the species homo sapiens, with the concept of a human qua person, who is a member of society. He says, "A person stands before us as the 'social face' of a human, as the fruit of the socialization of the individuum through Ll L Kagan, "K postroeniiu," p. 14-. 75 lie:ontogenesis." J Kagan answers objections in bio-social person theories that regarding a person to be only social is to sociologize him. He concedes that the dispute is over terminology, saying: First, the fact that each concrete human is distinctive, unique, unrepeatable in a somatic, a physiological, a psychological and a practical-behavioral sense is not subject to dispute. One may, to be sure, call all this integration of specific traits of a single human 'person', but then one is forced to seek a new term which would signify the social "section" of a human as opposed to his biological "section." While he makes this concession, Kagan does say that scientific methodology requires that a strict and unambiguous terminology be developed. In another reply, Kagan says: . . . an unwillingness to acknowledge a person to be a purely social phenomenon leads to . . . social, psychological, physiological and somatic factors being considered equally important factors in this structure. Their actual correlation, however, is far from what it appears to be in such models. These models are unacceptable precisely because they do not reveal the true role of the social factor in the intellectual world and in the practical activity of a person. ' Kagan believes that there should be a concept referring to a human in his most important capacity, viz., as a social creature. He says that this concept is the concept of a person. Kagan says that the heart of the problem of the llK•^Kagan, "K postroeniiu," p. 14 46Kagan, "K postroeniiu," p. 1547'Kagan, "K postroeniiu," p. 15. person consists in the fact that every individuum is subject to socialization. He says that in the course of socialization . . . the social removes the biological so that even elementary physiological activities are performed by a human in a way which has been socially transformed in comparison with their animal prototypes. Kagan says that biological properties, therefore, cannot be used to characterize a person alongside social properties. Kagan also argues against considering psychological properties as important as biological and social properties. He says that psychological processes are simultaneously both biological and social. Kagan describes the subject of activity as " . . . the modus of transition from society to the person just as a genotype is the modus of transition from a species hoto an individual." 7 He says that the subject of activity is the transmitter of social information from the universal- society- to the particular- the person. A subject of activity is described not as an agent but as a possessor of potentials which might or might not be realized. The realization of these potentials depends on a human's social conditions and his genotype. Boriaz gives a similar account in 1973. His account does differ from Kagan's, though. Boriaz does not discuss persons as subjects of activity and does not attempt to hftKagan, "K postroeniiu," p. 15• ho'Kagan, "K postroeniiu," p. 17. account for psychological characteristics of a human. While he does not distinguish between the concepts 'individ', 'osob'' and 'individuum', Boriaz does acknowledge that the term 'individual' is used to refer either to a particular human (a bio-social creature) or to a human qua member of the species homo sapiens (a biological creature). He insists that in the strictest sense of the term, 'individual' refers only to biological properties of a human. Identification of a concept of an individual which incorporates only biological characteristics is the most distinctive feature of theories representing the second trend. By making this distinction, authors of these theories may discuss the development of persons from non-social creatures. Authors of bio-social person theories, which do not focus on the development of persons, do not provide such terminology. Since the concept of a biological individual differentiates these theories from others, I call them 'biological individual theories'. Theories representing the third trend during the late 1960s and early 1 9 7 0s conceive of the person as a social creature and of the individual as a bio-social creature. Their authors appear to have no common purpose. ^°Vadim Nikolaevich Boriaz, "K dialektike sviazi poniatii 'chelovek', 'lichnost'', 'individ' [Towards the dialectics of the connection of the concepts 'human', 'person', 'individual']," in Problemy dialektiki, vyp. 2, ed. V. V. II'in (Leningrad 1 Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1973)» PP* 103-104. In 1967 Kon, who in 1964 said that an individual is a representative of the human race, adopts a theoryrepresenting this trend. He now saysi A human simply as a single representative of some whole (biological species or social group) is signified by the word 'individual'; specific characteristics of the actual life and activity of a given concrete human do not enter into the content of this concept. Whereas in 1964 Kon seems to attribute only biological characteristics to an individual, he now attributes both biological and social characteristics to individuals. He shows little interest either in this concept or in the distinction between it and the concept 'person' on which he focuses. Concerning the latter, he now says: The concept of a person . . . has many meanings. On the one hand, it signifies a concrete individual (person (litso)) as the subject of activity in the unity of his individual properties (the individual) and his roles (the universal). On the other hand, personality is understood as a social property of the individual, as the totality of socially significant traits integrated in him which are formed during the process of direct and indirect interaction of the given person (litso) with other humans and which make him, in turn, a subject of labor, cognition and intercourse. Kon considers the second sense of the concept 'person' especially important for sociology which, he says, studies a person as a member of a society, a class or a social group. Thus, for Kon, the concept 'person' identifies the object of a particular science. In 1968 Tugarinov restates his distinction between 151 J Kon, Sotsiologiia lichnosti, p. 6 . £$?Kon, Sotsiologiia lichnosti, p. 7* the concepts 'individual' and 'person' (in the normative sense). Tugarinov reiterates that personality is a social property of a human and that an individual unites both biological and social properties. In what appears to be a concession to Kriazhev, he says, "The biological in him is only 'removed', i.e., preserved in a transformed <53c o n d i t i o n . S t i l l , he argues, biological characteristics belong to an individual and should be attributed to him as a proper object of philosophical study. Tugarinov believes that biological characteristics should be attributed to individuals as objects of philosophical study because philosophy studies its objects in their entirety. Thus, while Kon identifies an object of sociological study, Tugarinov identifies an object of philosophical study. In 1971 Tugarinov modifies his position. He still claims that personality is a social property. But he now says an individual has three kinds of properties, viz., biological, social and psychological. He also claims that psychological processes are irreducible to biological and <2j,social processes. They, therefore, are considered a third feature of an individual. No thesis characterizes theories representing the third trend. These theories do, however, have common ■^Tugarinov, "Dialektike v cheloveke," p. 57* 54Vasilii Petrovich Tugarinov, Filosofiia soznaniia [Philosophy of consciousness] (Moscow* Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 1971), pp. 28-34. features. First, only social properties are incorporated in the concept of a person. Second, "biological, social and (in Tugarinov's theory) psychological characteristics are included in the concept of an individual. Third, these theories make no distinction between the concepts 'human' and 'individual'. What differentiates these theories from bio-social person theories and biological individual theories is that they combine these theses. Authors of these theories share no common purpose. They seem most interested in characterizing the entity denoted by one of the terms, 'human', 'individual' or 'person', as the object of some field of study. Thus, Kon says persons are objects of sociological study and Tugarinov says individuals are objects of philosophical study. But even this feature does not differentiate these theories. Platonov, for example, says that since persons are "bio-social entities, psychology is best equipped to study them. Kagan objects to this claim, saying that philosophy is "best equipped to study persons. Other sciences, he says, can only study certain aspects of persons. ^ Recent Discussions of the Distinction Characterizing an entity as the object of a certain field of study becomes a more common feature of theories during the 1970s. Kagan's claim that philosophy is in the ^Platonov, "Struktura lichnosti," p. 62. -^Kagan, "K postroeniiu," p. 11. best position to study persons comprehensively becomes widely accepted. Still, scholars attempt to delineate the province of other disciplines in the study of persons by differentiating aspects of persons properly studied by those sciences. For example, in 1971. Naumova says that sociology studies persons as objects of social relations.-^ In 1972 Mylivchenko says that philosophy is in the best position to describe humans as phenomena of the natural world and to characterize the relationship between biological and social features of humans. ^ By 1975. differentiation of approaches is generally accepted. In that year Dobrynina and Khoroshilov identify philosophical, sociological, philosophical-sociological and social psychological aspects of the problem of the person. 7 By the late 1970s works on the problem of the person standardly refer to a differentiation in approaches.^® As differentiation of approaches to the study of persons becomes more widely accepted, the distinction between the concepts 'person', 'human' and 'individual' becomes less clearcut. Authors begin to qualify claims cn■^'Nina Fedorovna Naumova, "Problema cheloveka v sotsiologii [The problem of Man in sociology]," Voprosy filosofii, 1971. No. 7, pp. 60-61. -^Myslivchenko, Chelovek kak predmet, pp. 3-5* -^Dobrynina and Khoroshilov, "Uchenie," pp. I3O-I3 8 . ^®See, e.g., Mikhail Vasil'evich Demin, Problemy teorii lichnosti LProblems in the theory of the person] (Moscow! Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1977). p. 7. 82 about these concepts by indicating that they are giving definitions appropriate for a certain field of study. Thus, for example, Myslivchenko says that the following are definitions for philosophy. A human (on a philosophical plane) is the subject of cultural-historical activity or, more accurately, the subject of certain social relations and by the same token of the historical and cultural process. At the same time he is not only a subject but also a synthesis- a result- of these relations and processes. An individual is a separate representative of the human race--an individual with respect to the universal. The most important anthropological and social characteristics of the species (with the exception of relative immortality) belong in principle to an individual, too. A person (on a philosophical plane) is a relatively continuous, dynamic, socially determined totality of intellectual, socio-political and moral-willful qualities of a human, the consciousness and acts of whom are characterized by a certain level of social maturity and by the effort to manifest one's g. individuality--individual abilities. Myslivchenko says that for sociology a person is, first and foremost, an object of social relations. Kriazhev anticipates this differentiation of senses of the concept 'person' and, in 1 9 6 8, objects to it. He argues that the concept 'person' must be used in one and only one sense. Otherwise we will open the path to making absolute a relative aspect of this concept. A sociologist will cease to understand the legal scholar and they both will cease to understand the psychologist, etc. For, when speaking^gf a person, each will understand his own 'sense. 6 1Myslivchenko, Chelovek kak predmet, pp. 3 6-3 7 . 62Petr Efimovich Kriazhev, "0 sotsiologicheskom aspekte problemy lichnosti [Concerning the sociological aspect of the problem of the person]," in Kriazhev says that while different disciplines study different aspects of a person, no discipline should exclude aspects of a person it does not study from the concept of a person. Sabirov criticizes Kriazhev's claim. He says that . . . it is hardly expeditious to "deprive" particular sciences of their "right" to express through "their" concept of a person the specific nature of their objects in the study of a human. Sabirov says that there are concepts of a person for particular sciences as well as a general sociological concept. Critical Evaluation As noted earlier, the distinction between the concepts 'person', 'human' and 'individual' becomes less clear during the 1970s. For example, even though Myslivchenko gives definitions for each of these terms, it is difficult to differentiate them on the basis of his definitions. The subject of historical activity, i.e., Myslivchenko's human, might easily be a socially determined totality of human qualities, i.e., his person. His definitions are so vague as to make any judgment concerning the relationship between these concepts difficult if not impossible. If Myslivchenko is vague, most Soviets are Lichnost'- kollektiv- obshchestvo (Krasnoyarsk, 1 9 6 8), p. 18. ^Sabirov, Chelovek kak problema, p. 208. noncommital during the 1970s concerning the distinction between the concepts 'person', 'human' and 'individual'. Demin, for example, says on the one hand that the concept 'human' signifies a species while the concept 'person' refers to a social human. On the other hand, he says that the terms 'person', 'human' and 'individual' are synonyms. In the final analysis, however, he says that the concepts 'person', 'human' and 'individual' can only be understood by A hmeans of the context in which they are used. The latter claim is both characteristic and descriptive of theories from the middle to late 1970s. The twin tendencies in the 1970s of differentiating senses of the concept 'person' and of blurring the distinction between the concepts 'person', 'human' and 'individual' are unfortunate. While, as Kagan suggests, it is unimportant that these particular terms be used to refer to an exclusively social entity, a bio-social entity and an entity which is a member of the species homo sapiens, respectively, it is at least useful to have such terminology. This terminology makes it easier to state the thesis that humans developed from creatures having a certain biological complexity. This thesis is fundamental (as I shall show in the next chapter) for theories intended to be consistent with certain Marxist claims. Use of the term 'person' to refer to an exclusively social entity also 61lDemin, Problemy teorii lichnosti, pp. 55-56. focuses attention on what Soviets agree is importantly different about humans. That difference is that humans stand in certain relations, viz., social relations, in which no other creature can stand. Using 'person' to refer to an exclusively social creature is not without its dangers. First, if by 'exclusively social creature' one means to exclude psychological characteristics, then one must say why we ordinarily need to refer to psychological characteristics when describing creatures we call 'persons'. Biological individual theories suggest that we can account for psychological properties by means of biological and social properties. But they do not give such an account. Authors of these theories might circumvent the issue by permitting use of psychological properties for characterizing persons in the absence of a thoroughgoing reduction of them to biological and sociological predicates. This sidestepping can lead, however, to an objection related to a second danger. By introducing a term referring to exclusively social entities, we leave the door open to the logical possibility that there are persons who are not members of the species homo sapiens. That is, if the term 'person' refers to an exclusively social entity and does not incorporate biological properties of individuals, then it is logically possible for there to be persons who are not individuals. These latter entities might have the material complexity necessary for being persons in a non-biological 86 way. The reason this possibility leads to difficulties for the sidestepping efforts is this. If psychological properties arise in humans because of the interaction of their biological and social characteristics, persons who are not humans might not have psychological characteristics. Characteristics other than psychological ones might be manifested by such creatures due to the interaction of their social and complex material characteristics. This would mean that the sidestepping effort, which permits attributing psychological characteristics to persons, would permit predication of characteristics which do not necessarily belong to all persons. Soviet philosophers, who take themselves to be addressing questions concerning the actual development of humans, never consider whether there can be persons who are not members of the species homo sapiens, i.e., who are not individuals. It is, however, a possibility which demands consideration if a clear distinction is to be made between persons qua social entities, individuals qua biological creatures and humans as individuals who are persons. Whether or not these terms are distinguished in this manner the Soviets should not succumb to the extremes of Demin. One can, of course, come to understand the meaning of a term by means of the various contexts in which it is used. But if context is the sole criterion for understanding the meaning of a term, use of the term becomes pointless. One can, for example, understand from context 87 the use of the term 'ball' where aardvarks are intended. One similarly can understand its use where horses, stars and political organizations are separately (and, perhaps, collectively) intended. But if all these things and anything else may be intended by the term 'ball' then its extension is too broad for discussion of the term itself or the concept is expresses to be worth our while. Part of the point of philosophical discussion in general and discussion of the problem of the person in particular is to become clear about the meanings of our terms- in this case of 'person'. If we are unwilling to summarize the results of our study of the contexts in which that term is used, any attempt to solve the problem of the person will be fruitless. Biological individual theories are preferable to other Soviet theories because they define the terms 'person', 'human' and 'individual' less ambiguously than the other theories. This sets the stage for discussion of the relative importance of biological and social characteristics in humans. It also establishes a terminology for asking questions Soviets consider important. For example, in 1966 Kriazhev suggests that members of primitive society are not yet persons because they are not fully social.^ Using the terminology of biological individual theories, he could express this by noting that ^Kriazhev, "Sotsiologicheskie voprosy," p. 14. 88 members of primitive society are individuals who are not persons. Gak objects to this position, saying that the terms 'individual' and 'person' are synonyms.^ By doing this, Gak makes it clear that he considers members of primitive society social. But he also makes it difficult to express the thesis about which both he and Kriazhev agree, namely, that humans are biological creatures (individuals in biological individual theories) who become social creatures. In addition, he makes it difficult to express the issue dividing him from Kriazhev, namely, that members of primitive society are not social creatures. Insistence on the synonymy of the terms 'individual' and 'person' tends to obscure this issue. I now turn to a consideration of the concept 'essence of Man'. ^Gak, Dialektika. p. 1 7. CHAPTER THREE THE ESSENCE OF MAN Introduction In the last chapter I discussed distinctions between the terms 'person', 'human' and 'individual'. I now discuss the term 'essence of Man'. Soviet discussion of this term often is woven into discussion of the first three terms. The points made concerning the essence of Man are, however, independent of ones made concerning persons, humans and individuals. For example, an author might say that a human is characterized by biological and social predicates but that his essence, viz., the essence of Man, includes only his social properties. This position is indeed the position taken by most Soviets. They distinguish (either explicitly or implicitly) between the properties used to describe a human and the essential properties of a human. Before proceeding to the discussion of Soviet claims concerning the essence of Man, one should be made aware of the following conventions. First, the English word 'Man' (with a capital M) is, in this dissertation, always a translation of the Russian word 'chelovek'. The same is true of the English word 'human' except when it is used as an adjective, e.g., in 'human being' or in 'human society'. Thus, 'Man' in 'essence of Man' and 'human' used as a noun are translations of the same Russian word, viz., 'chelovek'. Second, although Soviets frequently distinguish between ways humans and persons are characterized, even those who make this distinction rarely differentiate between the essence of Man and the essence of a person. In most cases discussions of the essence of Man are also considered discussions of the essence of a person. 1 noted in the first chapter that Andreeva ct al. center on Marx's sixth thesis on Feuerbach in their argument for the conclusion that a person should be studied as a person of a particular historical era and, when he lives in a class society, as a member of his class. This thesis lies at the center of Soviet discussions of the essence of Man. The important part reads* . . . the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations. All Soviets who write on the problem of the person interpret this passage to mean that social properties must be included in the essence of Man. Most take it to mean that only social properties should be included in the essence of Man. Some, however, interpret Marx to refer here only to a social essence of Man. These authors claim that humans also have a biological essence. Their claim has been attacked in ways iSee pp. 6-?. 2Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," p. 8 . the Soviets apparently consider successful. For no Soviet who currently writes on the problem of the person asserts that an essence of Man or part of the essence of Man is biological. This debate will be considered first. Soviets also have disagreed about whether Marx means to refer in his sixth thesis on Feuerbach to the essence of particular humans or to the essence of mankind. Some have asserted that Marx intends only the essence of mankind. They justify this position by indicating that no particular human could be an ensemble of all social relations. Others respond that Marx intends exactly the essence of particular humans. These authors argue that the essence of any particular human is the ensemble of all and only those social relations of which he is a term. I shall consider this debate second. However they resolve the first two issues, Soviets agree that, among all creatures known to exist, only humans may properly be said to be social. Few argue this point. Those that do attempt to dismiss apparently social behavior of non-human animals. These authors center on the non-social behavior of human children reared in the wild to support their claims. I shall consider these arguments last. Biological Essence Theories In the last chapter I indicated that when, in 1 9 6 5» Tugarinov restates his distinction between the concepts 3'person' and 'human' he does so in two ways. His first way was to say that the concept 'person' refers to a property and the concept 'human' refers to the hearer of this property. Tugarinov's second way begins with a remark that a human is both a thing of nature and a social phenomenon, i.e., an element of society. Having said this, Tugarinov continues, "These two aspects of the essence of Man play a different role in the definition of the concept of a h,person." Tugarinov adds that the property referred to by the concept 'person' belongs to a human not as a biological creature but as a social creature. What is of interest for the present discussion is not Tugarinov's distinction between the concepts 'person' and 'human'. Rather, it is his suggestion contained within his discussion of this distinction that the essence of Man has biological as well as social aspects. It is apparent from the way in which Tugarinov makes this suggestion that he assumes that the essence of Man has both biological and social aspects because humans are both biological and social creatures. Thus, Tugarinov (in this instance) does not make a distinction (characteristic of most Soviet theories on the essence of Man) between properties used to describe humans and essential properties of humans. Sokhan' makes a more direct claim than Tugarinov. ■ See pp. 53-56. hTugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. 4-3. 93 In 1966 she says that there is a biological essence of Man as well as a social essence of Man. Remarking on the sixth thesis on Feuerbach, she says: . . . in characterizing the essence of Man as the aggregate of all social relations, K. Marx in this instance has in mind the social essence of Man, which, while being the determining factor in the structure of Man, does not at all exhaust his essence. Marxism examines a human in all the richness of his multifaceted essential factors. Moreover, Marxism does not reduce the essence of Man only to his social essence. A natural, biological essence of Man is not ignored in the works of the founders of Marxism. In further support of her claim, Sokhan' cites the following passage from The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. It reads: Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on the one hand endowed with natural powers of life- he is an active natural being. These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities- as instincts. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants. Sokhan' indicates that the biological and physiological organization of a human is the foundation for his life's work. She concedes, however, that Marxism attributes decisive significance to the social essence of Man.^ ^Lidiia Vasil'evna Sokhan', Dukhovnyi progress lichnosti i kommunizm [The intellectual progress of the person and communisnf] (Kiev: Izdatel'stvo "Naukova Dumka", 1 9 6 6), p. 2 0 . 6Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. ed. Dirk J. Struik, trans. Martin Milligan (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 181. 7'Sokhan1, Dukhovnyi progress lichnosti, pp. 20-21. In 1966 Kriazhev criticizes Tugarinov for suggesting that the essence of Man has biological aspects. Referring to the sixth thesis on Feuerbach, he says that the essence g of Man is just and only social. Kriazhev gives reasons other than fidelity to the sixth thesis on Feuerbach for considering the essence of Man only social. He says 1 The essence of any material formation (system) is connected with the form of motion of matter which is basic for the given system. Lower forms of motion in a system arise in a removed manner; they arise "subordinated" to the highest one. Thus, the essence of, say, an animal is not mechanical, not physical and not chemical (although all of these forms of motion exist in it), but biological. In the same way the essence of Man is social and only social. In it is given what singles out and distinguishes humans and human society from nature (without, of course, tearing them away from nature). Thus, the essence of Man is social because the social form of motion is basic for humans. This second criticism is based on a theory I call 'the theory of levels'. The most comprehensive statement of it in Marxist classics appears in Engels's Dialectics of Nature. It has, however, been amended by the Soviets. According to the theory of levels there are at least five forms of motion. These forms of motion are mechanical, physical, chemical, biological and social. According to Kedrov, " . . . each separate form of motion is the form or mode of existence for a qualitatively specific kind of g Kriazhev, "Sotsiologicheskie voprosy," p. 14. Q 7Kriazhev, "Sotsiologicheskie voprosy," p. 14. 10matter." The kinds of material objects for which the forms of motion are modes of existence are masses, molecules, atoms, cells and humans, respectively. According to Engels, there is a science for each kind of matter which describes its form of motion. These sciences bear the names of the kinds of motion. Kedrov says that Engels concentrated his attention on . . . how objects studied by the various sciences are connected to each other and how one object passes into another and, correspondingly, to how the sciences ^ themselves are connected and pass into each other. Kedrov says that as a consequence of Engels's approach the objects of scientific investigation as well as the sciences which study these objects were ordered in a way that reflected the process of progressive development of matter in motion. This process proceeds along an ascending line from lower and simpler objects to higher and more complex ones. Kedrov adds: In other words, a more complex object is examined as having emerged and developed from a simpler one; correspondingly, the "higher" science which studies it is examined as having proceeded and developed from a "lower" one. According to Engels, the order of the sciences and their 10Bonifatii Mikhailovich Kedrov, Engel's i dialektika estestvoznaniia [Engels and the dialectics of natural scienceJ (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1 9 7 0), p. 3 1 9 . 11Kedrov, Engel's i dialektika, p. 3 1 3. ^Kedrov, Engel's i dialektika, p. 313. 96 objects is reflected by the order in which these sciences have been conducted. He says* Hence, in the historical evolution of the natural sciences we see how first of all the theory of simplest change of place, the mechanics of heavenly bodies and terrestrial masses, was developed; it was followed by the theory of molecular motion, physics, and immediately afterwards, almost alongside it and in some places in advance of it, the science of the motion of atoms, chemistry. Only after these different branches of knowledge of the forms of motion governing non-living nature had attained a high degree of development could the explanation of the processes of motion represented by the life process be successfully tackled. The order in which the sciences have been conducted, then, is mechanics, physics, chemistry, biology and, finally, the science of Man. The order of the forms of motion and of the kinds of matter is similar. Kedrov says that each more complex kind of matter emerges and develops from the preceeding, less complex, kind of matter. This occurs when a form of motion changes or passes into a higher form of motion. Kedrov says that when a material object changes because of a transition from a lower form of motion to a higher one, " . . . the higher form continues to contain the lower one, now, not as an independently existing form, but as subordinated to the 14higher one." Thus, according to Kedrov, a single kind of matter can manifest qualitatively different forms of 13-'Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, ed. and trans. C. Dutt (London* Lawrence & Wishart, 1940), p. 35* ikKedrov, Engel's i dialektika, pp. 319-320. "*v. 1 *5motion. J For example, although the "biological form of motion is the mode of existence for living organisms, they can, nevertheless, perform mechanical, physical and chemical motions. The reason that one and only one of the forms of motion performed by a given object is the mode of existence for objects of its kind is that the forms of motion performed by the object which are not the mode of existence for objects of that kind are subordinate to the form of motion which is the mode of existence for objects of that kind. When the Soviets say that one form of motion is subordinate to another they mean that the subordinating form of motion is more influential than and can transform the subordinated form of motion. Kriazhev expresses this by saying that lower forms of motion arise in a removed manner. Concerning the subordination of the biological to the social in humans, Myslivchenko says: The biological in a human exists not as something on the same level as the social but within the very sphere of the social. Under the influence of human activity the biological to a significant extent (although not completely) underwent modification and achieved a level of development higher in a number of respects than for other representatives of the animal world. That is, it was "humanized." Platonov also addresses this issue, going further than Myslivchenko. Whereas Myslivchenko says that the biological has not been completely modified by the social in humans, 1 -^Kedrov, Engel's i dialektika, p. 320. 16Myslivchenko, Chelovek kak predmet, p. 62. Platonov says that in the course of upbringing many biologically conditioned properties can be completely 17removed by socially conditioned properties. ' Kagan makes a similar point when he argues that only social properties 18belong to a person. Without attempting to resolve the difference of opinion concerning the extent of the influence of social factors in humans, one can still draw a conclusion concerning the subordination of one form of motion to another. The subordination of one form of motion, e.g., biological processes, to another form of motion, e.g., social processes, consists in the capacity of the subordinating form of motion to modify (or alter or suppress) the subordinated form of motion. For humans in particular this might mean that biological processes are altered due to social factors. Drozdov gives as examples the facts that the average height of humans, the average age of sexual maturity, length of life and the nature of human illnesses have all changed due to social life.1^ In his second criticism of Tugarinov, Kriazhev assumes that the essence of an object of a certain kind is connected with the form of motion which is basic for objects of that kind. (When Kriazhev says a form of motion is basic for objects of a certain kind he means what Kedrov means 1 "^Platonov, "K teorii lichnosti," p. 381 8See pp. 7^-77. 19Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 11. when he says a form of motion is the mode of existence for objects of a certain kind.) Kriazhev uses this assumption to justify his claim that the essence of Man is social. According to him, the essence of Man is social because the social form of motion is basic for humans. Conversely, the essence of Man is not biological because the biological form of motion is not basic for humans. The essence of a non-human animal is, however, biological because the biological form of motion is basic for it. It should be noted that Kriazhev does not claim that the essence of Man is social because humans are uniquely social. Such a claim would prevent him from making the connection he wants between the modes of existence of other kinds of matter and the essences of these kinds of matter. For example, while Kriazhev might have been able to center on humans' unique manifestation of the social form of motion to justify his claim that the essence of Man is social, he could not similarly have centered on a non-human animal's unique manifestation of the biological form of motion to justify the claim that that animal's essence is biological. Non-human animals do not uniquely manifest the biological form of motion; humans, too, manifest it. Kriazhev appeals to a different kind of uniqueness in justifying his claims that the essence of Man is social and that the essence of an animal is biological. Each displays a form of motion which alone is its mode of existence, i.e., to which all other forms of motion it manifests are subordinate. Thus, while humans uniquely manifest the social form of motion, the essence of Man is social because only in humans are all other forms of motion subordinate to the social form of motion. That is, the essence of Man is social because the mode of existence for humans is the social form of motion. Similarly, the essence of a non-human animal is biological because it is a living organism and only in non-human living organisms are all other non-social forms of motion subordinate to the biological form of motion. That is, the essence of a non-human animal is biological because the mode of existence of a non-human living organism is the biological form of motion. One could make similar claims concerning the modes of existence and the essences of masses, molecules and atoms. Thus, Kriazhev's claim that the essence of Man is social is based upon the unique position of the social form of motion as the mode of existence of humans. Sokhan' and Tugarinov also draw upon the theory of levels to support their respective claims that there is a biological and a social essence of Man and that there are biological and social aspects of the essence of Man. According to the theory of levels, each more complex kind of matter manifests both the form of motion which is the mode of existence for objects of that kind and the forms of motion which are modes of existence for objects of each of the kinds of object less complex than it. Thus, humans manifest the social form of motion, which is their mode of existence, together with the biological, chemical, physical and mechanical forms of motion. Furthermore, the theory of levels states that each more complex kind of matter emerges and develops from the kind of matter that precedes it in the hierarchy. Thus, molecules emerge and develop from masses, atoms emerge and develop from molecules, and humans emerge and develop from cells. Soviets standardly claim that an object of a certain kind must display a certain complex structural organization in order to develop into an object of the succeeding kind. Thus, not all objects of a certain kind can develop into objects of the succeeding kind. For example, in order for objects of the biological kind of matter, i.e., (in the terminology of the theory of levels) cells, to develop into objects of the social kind of matter, i.e., humans, the biological objects must manifest certain complex structural features. Again according to standard Soviet theories, the only biological objects displaying the complex structural features required for development into humans are members of the species homo sapiens, i.e., (in the terminology of biological individual theories) individuals. Thus, aardvarks and monkeys, amoebae and carrots, cannot develop into humans because they do not manifest the complex structural features necessary to do so. According to this interpretation of the theory of levels, a necessary condition for being a human is being a member of the species homo sapiens. When Sokhan' says that the biological and 102 physiological organization of a human is the foundation for his life's work and when Tugarinov says that a human's natural character is a necessary condition for the emergence of a person, they have in mind the proposition that being a member of the human race is a necessary condition for being a social creature. Since these statements constitute part of the discussions in which Sokhan' claims that there is a biological essence of Man and in which Tugarinov claims that there is a biological aspect of the essence of Man, it is safe to assume that each incorporates biological properties in the essence of Man because these properties are necessary conditions for being a social creature. In 1970 Rakhimov, Kamilov and Filatova claim that there is a biological essence of Man. Noting that Marx attached significance to a biological essence of Man, they say that a human is a natural individual. Their justification for this claim is similar to the one Sokhan' gives. They say: The biological essence is primary in a human. It serves as the basis for his active creative activity in the course of which a human, entering into social relations with other humans, becomes a person. Rakhimov, Kamilov and Filatova assert a biological essence of Man because the biological properties of a human are necessary conditions for his developing into a person, i.e., 20Abdullo Rakhimovich Rakhimov, Mirzo Kamilovich Kamilov and Polina Ivanovna Filatova, Problems, cheloveka v filosofii [The problem of Man in philosophyj (Dushanbe: Izdatel'stvo "Irfon", 1 9 7 0), p. 157. a creature with social properties. Their statement of this position is noteworthy because it appears to be the latest Soviet statement of it. Myslivchenko criticizes Rakhimov, Kamilov and Filatova in what appears to be the latest Soviet discussion of the claim that there is a biological essence of Man. He centers, as does Kriazhev, on the subordination of biological processes to social factors. His position differs from Kriazhev's in that he explains biological differences between humans and non-humans as resulting from the socialization of humans. Myslivchenko's argument also contains a point advocates of a biological essence of Man might have used to support their position. That point is that there are certain biological properties only humans possess. Advocates of a biological essence of Man might use this point to argue that Man has a biological essence not only because possessing certain biological properties is a necessary condition for being a human but also because humans alone possess these biological properties. Since humans alone possess these properties, they are differentiated from all non-humans by virtue of their possessing them. One might conclude, then, that since these properties differentiate humans from all other creatures, they should be included in the essence of Man. Myslivchenko notes that there are biological properties humans alone possess, sayings . . . the biological in a human is not only what genetically draws and relates a human to his animal ancestors but also the biologically novel (conditioned by morphophysiological properties of the gyganism) by which he is distinguished from an animal. Myslivchenko does not consider these distinctive biological characteristics of humans part of the essence of Man. He says that novel biological characteristics of humans are formed as a consequence of Man's activity. Later, he says, "The appearance of Man on earth in the course of the merging of anthropogenesis and sociogenesis signified the appearance 22of a unique biological species." Thus, according to him, the distinctive biological features of humans cannot be considered part of an essence of Man because they are a result of social processes. Myslivchenko argues that genetic evolution cannot explain human development. It proceeds too slowly. Human development can be explained only by reference to the . . . transmission of experience a person obtains by assimilating the results of the conscious activity of preceeding agd current generations to succeeding generations. J The Bearer of the Essence of Man In 1967 Kon distinguishes between the essence of Man as a species and the essence of particular humans. He says 21Myslivchenko, Chelovek kak predmet, p. 63. 22Myslivchenko, Chelovek kak predmet, p. 63. 2 3-'Myslivchenko, Chelovek kak predmet, p. 63. that when Marx speaks of the essence of Man in the sixth thesis on Feuerbach he has in mind the essence of Man as a species. Kon's interpretation of this thesis is based upon his reading of the Russian translation of it. This translation differs from the English translation quoted above. A translation into English of this Russian translation reads: But the essence of Man is not an abstraction inherent in the separate individual. In its reality it is the totality of all social relations. Note that in the English translation the essence of Man is said to be the ensemble of the social relations. In the Russian translation it is said to be the totality of all social relations. The German original of this passage reads: Aber das menlische Wesen ist kein dem einselnen Individuum inwohnendes Abstraktum. In seiner Wirklichkeit ist es das ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhaltnisse. ^ Note that the German original contains the article 'der', i.e., the equivalent of the English 'the'. 2LKarl Marx and Frederick Engels, Sochineniia [Works], 2d ed., t. 3 (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1955)» P32 5Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Werke, bd. 3 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1959)» P* 6 . Concerning the sixth thesis on Feuerbach, Kon says: Marx obviously has in mind not the unitary person but the concept of Man as a species. Man as a species actually coincides with the totality of social relations, with society. . . . But is this applicable to the separate empirical individual? 'Essence of Man' and 'concrete person' are not one and the same. Can I, without sinning against the truth, call myself the totality of all social relations when the sphere of my (and your and any concrete individual's) activity is known to include only an insignificant part of these relations? It is noteworthy that Kon equates society with the totality of social relations. For, while Kon centers on the word 'all' in his version of the sixth thesis, he offers this understanding of the composition of society as an alternative to understanding society as an aggregate of individuals. Many Soviets argue that society is not merely the sum of its individual members. Kon, however, is one of few who explicitly state such an argument. He says: . . . the make-up (sostav) of individuals changes while certain forms of social interaction- social relations- remain. Therefore, society consists not of individuals, but of the totality of relations in which we find individuals. ' He adds that this understanding of the composition of society emphasizes the stability of social structure. He apparently does not consider the essence of a particular human to consist even of the relations in which he happens to exist. His reason apparently is that if each 2 6>Kon, Sotsiologiia lichnosti, p. 9. ^Kon, Sotsiologiia lichnosti, pp. 1?-18. particular human were essentially a set of social relations, then society could be considered a set of individuals. Society then would be the set of all social relations and each individual would be a subset of this set. Unfortunately, he does not say what he considers the essence of individuals. It appears, then, that Kon has two reasons for interpreting Marx as he does. First, he is able to explain the use of the word 'all' in his translation. Second, by contrasting the essence of society with the essences of individuals, he is able to offer the model of society qua totality of social relations as an alternative to an individualist model of society qua aggregate of individuals. Without citing Kon, Drozdov disagrees with him. He agrees that society is not simply a set of individuals. He says that this is why the concept of society cannot be derived from the concept of an individual. He also says that the essence of an individual needs to be distinguished from the essence of Man in general. Nevertheless, he says that it is impossible to oppose the essence of Man in general to the essence of the individual because . . . the essence of Man in general is nothing other than the totality of all essential characteristics belonging to separate individuals and the essence of each individual is a level of development and a specific form of manifestation of the universal which belongs to all humans, i.e., the essence of Man in general. Drozdov does not explain how the essence of Man in general PRDrozdov, "'Obshchestvo' i 'lichnost''," p. 33* 108 can be the totality of essential characteristics belonging to individuals when society itself is not the sum of individuals. Klepatskii attacks Kon directly. He says that, according to Kon, Marx proves to be wrong. Denying that Marx is wrong, he says, "Those are wrong who understand his ideas straightforwardly, literally, taking their formal aspect while not investigating thoroughly their meaning. Applying Marx's claims to particular humans, Klepatskii says: The essence of a person is determined by the character of social relations; a certain environment forms a certain person, certain^conditions form certain capacities of a person.^ Kon would not necessarily disagree with this claim. He himself does not say what the essence of a particular human is and so says nothing contradicting Klepatskii's claim that it is formed by the character of social relations. Furthermore, Kon and Klepatskii agree that a particular social environment forms a certain kind of person. In fact, they give much the same argument for this latter point. Both note that each society has a certain structure. This structure consists in social relations 297L. Klepatskii, "Nekotorye voprosy opredeleniia lichnosti i ee kriterii [Some questions on the definition of the person and his criteria],'' in Filosofsko-sotsiologicheskie problemy teorii lichnosti, ch. 1* Problema lichnosti v trudakh K. Marksa i V. I. Lenina (Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1969), P. 9. 30v Klepatskii, "Nekotorye voprosy," p. 12. between positions within that structure. These positions can be identified by means of the social relations of them to other positions in the structure. Each particular person is born into a society with an already established structure. When he enters a society, he occupies a certain position within that structure. Kon, in particular, notes that a person has no control over the kind of society he enters or over the position at which he enters that 31society. According to Kon, someone who occupies a certain position fulfills a certain social role. A social role is a form of behavior expected from everyone who occupies a given position. An individual's character is formed by his coming 32to fulfill, more or less well, these expectations. Klepatskii does not describe the mechanism by which a certain kind of person is formed. He does, however, say, "The social environment forms or is conducive to the formation of or exercises a certain influence on the development of a person. These claims concerning the formation of a certain kind of person can be illustrated with the following example. Consider a child b o m into a working class family in America. The child's immediate environment is his family. The family expects certain things from him, e.g., -1Kon, Sotsiologiia lichnosti, pp. 19 & 2 3 . 3?Kon, Sotsiologiia lichnosti, p. 2 3 . 33-^Klepatskii, "Nekotorye voprosy," p. 12. that he will respect his parents, that he will do well in school, that he will help around the house, etc. A less immediate environment of the child is his neighborhood. It might expect other things of him, e.g., that he will participate in team sports with other neighborhood children, that he will attend church, etc. A still more remote environment is the child's society. American society might expect still other things from the child, e.g., that he will work in a job similar to those of his parents, that he will serve in the armed forces, that he will consider the Soviet Union an enemy of his country, etc. According to Kon and Klepatskii, this child becomes a person of a certain kind by learning to fulfill some or all or these expectations. Actually, by arguing that Marx's sixth thesis must not be interpreted literally, Klepatskii strengthens Kon's claim that society is not a set of individuals. Kon needs to deny that the essence of a particular human is his social relations. Klepatskii does deny this, saying instead that the essence of a person is determined by the character of social relations. Thus, the conflict between Kon and Klepatskii is more apparent than real. Savchenko stresses both Klepatskii's and Kon's points. He insists that while society and humans interact, their essences are different. On the one hand, society is the totality of all social relations. On the other hand, according to him, Marx's sixth thesis must be given a non-literal interpretation. Savchenko denies that the essence of a particular human is his social relations, saying, "The social relations a person, entering into life, finds ready-made are . . . not the essence of a social individual, hut its source, cause, hasis."v Note that hoth Klepatskii and Savchenko say that the essence of a particular human is determined hy his social relations; neither says what the essence of a particular human is. Both center instead on what they consider to he the primary qualities of a person. This is characteristic even of discussions in which the essence of a particular human is acknowledged to he a totality of social relations. Grier has argued that although most Soviets do acknowledge that Marx says the essence of Man is the totality of social relations, they actually accept a non-literal interpretation of the sixth thesis on Feuerhach. He notes that Soviets generally discuss characteristics they say hest reflect a person's social nature. J I will discuss some theories which focus on the characteristics of a person in the next chapter. Not all Soviets accept a non-literal interpretation of the sixth thesis on Feuerhach. Boriaz, for example, says that the sixth thesis applies hoth to Man in general and to 34J Savchenko, "0 marksistskom ponimanii," p. 5 8 . -^Philip T. Grier, "Contemporary Soviet Ethical Theory" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973), pp. 265-266. 112 separate humans. He says that Marx gives a definition in an abstract form which makes possible the definition of the essence of a human at any stage in history. Boriaz says that since the definition of the essence of Man as the totality of social relations is abstract, it relates to Man as a species or to humanity. He says, however, that when social relations are appropriately specified, this definition also relates to separate humans. Thus, the essence of a separate human is the totality of his social relations. I make no attempt to resolve the debate about whether the sixth thesis on Feuerbach applies to the essence of particular humans. Textual evidence can be cited on both sides of the issue. On the one hand, in the continuation of the sixth thesis, Marx says: Feuerbach, who does not attempt the criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled: 1. To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment as something for itself and to presuppose an abstract--isolated--human individual. 2. The human essence, therefore, can with him be comprehended only as "genus," as a dumb internal generality which merely naturally unites many individuals One might conclude from this that Marx objects to a concept of an abstract human individual and is presenting a concept of a concrete human individual to replace it. If this is Marx's purpose, then, by representing the essence of an -^Boriaz, "K dialektike," p. 100. ^Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," p. 84. individual as the totality of social relations, he replaces a concept of an isolated individual with one of an individual who necessarily is related to other individuals. On the other hand, in The German Ideology (as Savchenko notes), Marx sayss This sum of productive forces, capital funds and social forms of intercourse, which every individual and generation finds in existence as something given, is the real "basis of what the philosophers have-eonceived as "substance" and "essence of man," . . . ^ One might interpret this passage (as Savchenko does) to mean that the essence of an individual human is not social relations themselves but is caused by them. Most Soviets who claim that the sixth thesis on Feuerbach does not apply to the essence of particular humans say that is does apply to the essence of Man as a species. One might ordinarily take this to mean that the sixth thesis refers to what must be true of each member of the species Man in order for him to be a member of the species. Other features could then be used to identify the essence of any particular human. This is not, however, what Savchenko and Kon take Marx to mean. They take Marx to refer to the essence of society. In order to construe Marx's words in this way, they must equate Man as a species with society. This is illegitimate for Kon given that he wishes to differentiate society from a set of individuals. For, while -^The Marx-Engels Reader, 2d ed., edited by Robert C. Tucker (New Yorks W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.* 1978), p. 1 6 5. it might be natural to conceive of society as something other than its individual members, it is equally natural to conceive of a species as a set of entities having certain characteristics in common. Still, Kon and Savchenko's identification of Man as a species with society is understandable even if illegitimate. Those who want to deny that society is a set of individuals often suggest that society should be conceived in terms of its structure, and this can neatly be expressed by reference to social relations. Thus, Savchenko and Kon's reason for identifying Man as a species with society appears to be that what Marx says about the essence of Man in the sixth thesis more nearly fits their conception of society than their conception of humans. Kon's argument against conceiving of society as a set of individuals is also interesting in and of itself. He correctly suggests that societies are not identified by means of their membership. For example, even though there is no member of American society in 1 9 81 who was a member of American society in 1776, a single American society (which, to be sure, has undergone many changes) is said to have existed then and exists now. Kon's denial of an identity between society and its members reflects this. Whether a model of society as a set of individuals should be replaced with one of society as a totality of social relations is less clear partly because the concept 'social relation' is itself ill-defined. In order to know whether societies can be identified and re-identified by reference to social relations, one must first be able to distinguish social relations from relations of other kinds. I consider theories on the nature of social relations in the fifth chapter. Only Humans Can Be Social Drozdov gives the most comprehensive Soviet argument that only humans are social. His argument has two parts. Recall that Soviets almost unanimously agree that humans are bio-social c r e a t u r e s . T h e first part of Drozdov's argument attempts to explain away apparently social behavior of non-human animals. Recall also that the possession of certain biological characteristics is said to be a necessary condition for becoming a human. Expressed in the terms of biological individual theories, this is the thesis that one must be an individual to become a human. The second part of Drozdov's argument cites an example designed to show that only individuals can become humans. Drozdov begins by noting that animals often are united in biological associations (soobshchestvo), e.g., herds, packs, schools, colonies. He says: A biological association can vary from a few individuals (osob') to half a million and more. These unions (ob"edinenie) possess a complex0structure and perform finely coordinated activities. ^See p. 51. It0Drozdov, Obshchestvenn.ye otnosheniia, p. 19. 116 He adds that while there are similarities between biological associations and social collectives, the differences are greater. One of these is that an animal association is a biological union while a society is a social organization. Another is that an animal association is based upon biological expediency while a social organization is based upon labor. Furthermore, the activities of animals are the outcome of instinctss human activity is purposeful and directed towards a consciously established goal. Humans have many purposes whereas animal activity has only one tendency, namely, towards reproduction. Drozdov believes that consciousness also distinguishes human sensation from animal sensation. For animals sensation is an immediate reflection of the world; for humans sensation is mediated by Ll2thought. He concludes the first part of his argument by noting that an animal association is a totality of biological connections and interactions while a human society is a totality of social relations and that the existence, functioning and changes of animal associations are governed by biological laws while the existence, functioning and changes of societies are governed by social laws. Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 1 9. h.2Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 13. 117 In the second part of his argument, Drozdov says: . . . even if an animal is from the moment of birth raised in conditions absolutely identical with those of a child, it still^remains an animal and does not acquire human properties. He cites experiments conducted by Ladygina-Kots in which she raised a chimpanzee under the same conditions as a child. While Drozdov does not explicitly draw a conclusion, he would have us conclude that only individuals can become humans. Drozdov also says that an individual acquires qualitatively new properties, namely, social properties, under social conditions. He supports this claim by citing more than thirty allegedly known cases of children raised by animals. Such children remain animals but retain the capacity to become social creatures. Parygin cites similar evidence but contradicts Drozdov's claim that a child reared in the wild can become social when introduced into society. He says: The story of the wolf-children, the Indian girls Amala and Kamala who were found not very long ago in the jungles, is well known. They were unable to adapt to the social conditions of life. -'Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 9 . hhNadezhda Nikolaevna Ladygina-Kots, Ditia shimpanze i ditia cheloveka v ikh instinktakh, emotsiiakh, igrakh, privychkakh i vyrazitel'nykh dvizheniiakh fChimpanzee young and human young in their instincts, emotions, games, habits, and expressive movements] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Gosudarstvennogo Darvinskogo muzeia, 1935)iix-'Parygin, Sotsial'naia psikhologiia. p. 119. 118 Neither Drozdov nor Parygin gives a source for this information. It suggests, however, if accurate, that while being an individual is a necessary condition for becoming a social creature, it is not a sufficient condition. Critical Evaluation Many issues deserve critical discussion. Because they are the most tractable, I shall discuss Soviet claims concerning the biological essence of humans and concerning the unique social nature of humans. Drozdov's claim that animal associations are not social is weak. He explains the non-social nature of animal associations by saying that they are based on the instinctive behavior of animals. He neither explains the nature of instinctive behavior nor why instinctive behavior itself cannot be social. He instead contrasts it with human behavior which he says is directed towards a consciously established goal. This suggests that what distinguishes animal associations from human societies is that animal behavior is not consciously directed towards goals while human behavior is. Drozdov seems to assume that conscious behavior necessarily is social behavior. He should explain this. His apparent assumption that conscious behavior is social might conflict with Marxist dogma that conscious behavior is a consequence of social life if this assumption is construed to mean that being conscious is a necessary condition for becoming social. Drozdov's claim that being an individual is a necessary but insufficient condition for becoming a social creature is somewhat stronger. Still, the strongest interpretation which can be given for the experimental evidence he cites is that being an individual is a causally necessary but insufficient condition for becoming a social creature. Different arguments need to be given to show that being an individual is a logically necessary but insufficient condition for becoming a social creature. The difference of opinion in Soviet philosophy on the biological essence of Man stems from different ways of conceiving essences. Proponents of a biological essence of Man believe that all qualities necessary for being a human should be expressed in the essence. Biological properties of an individual, then, should be incorporated in the essence of Man because they are a necessary condition for becoming a social creature which each human is, of course. Opponents of a biological essence of Man believe that only those qualities a human possesses uniquely should be included in the essence. They claim that the only properties a human uniquely possesses are social. They could support their position by citing the examples of children raised in the wild and note that even biological properties possessed by members of the species homo sapiens alone do not differentiate them from all other creatures. For, although these wild children are individuals, they are not humans. These authors might then conclude that only 120 social properties should he included in the essence of Man. Opponents of a biological essence of Man could also answer the objection that since possessing the biological properties of an individual is necessary for becoming a human, these properties should be included in the essence. They could say that while possessing these properties is a causally necessary condition for becoming a human, it is not a logically necessary condition for being a social creature. They could conclude that biological properties of an individual, therefore, should not be included in the concept of the essence of Man. This answer would be inconsistent with what virtually all Soviets say about humans, namely, that humans by definition are creatures having certain biological and social properties. While possessing the required biological properties might not be a logically necessary condition for becoming a social creature, their possession is, by definition, a logically necessary condition for being a human. Thus, if these definitions are to be taken seriously, the essence of Man should include both biological and social properties. There is, however, for some Soviets, a uniquely social entity, namely, a person. Biological individual and third trend theories say that a person is, by definition, just and only a social creature. Thus, according to these theories, identifying an entity with social properties is logically sufficient for identifying a person. This would 121 be true even if it were shown that possessing the biological properties of an individual is logically sufficient for becoming a social creature. In that case, identifying a creature possessing these properties would simply be logically sufficient for identifying a creature possessing social properties- the criteria for persons. Thus, while the essence of Man should not be taken to include only social properties, the essence of a person should. This suggests that the Soviets should do what they never do, namely, differentiate between the essence of a person and the essence of Man. If they do not do this, they should modify their definition of a human so that it refers only to social properties. I now turn to a consideration of three theories of the person. CHAPTER FOUR THREE THEORIES OF THE PERSON Introduction In the previous two chapters I have considered ways Soviets characterize the person and the essence of Man. I now turn to more particular accounts of persons. These accounts are designed not to show that persons are social creatures (which their authors assume) but to provide content for the concept of a person qua social creature. The accounts I consider are not the only Soviet accounts. Furthermore, few but the authors themselves would advocate them. Nevertheless, they are among the most comprehensive accounts Soviets give and two of them are more widely discussed than any others. Each represents a fairly well-defined school of thought in Soviet theory of the person. I consider first Tugarinov's theory which he 1introduces in 1962 and refines in 1 9 6 5* He defends this 2theory in 1968 and again in 1971. Tugarinov focuses on 1Tugarinov, "Kommunizm i lichnost'" and Lichnost' i obshchestvo. 2Tugarinov, "Dialektika v cheloveke" and "Marksistskaia teoriia lichnosti na nastoiashchem etape [Marxist theory of the person at the present stage]," 122 the person as a subject of moral value. His concept of a person, thus, is a normative concept. His theory is controversial. Many Soviets criticize it for its tenet that not all humans are persons. Still, many of Tugarinov's claims are incorporated even in the most recent Soviet accounts of the person. I consider next Kon's account. He is a sociologist and he concentrates on the person as an element of society. Kon conceives of a person as an entity fulfilling social roles. He introduces this theory in 1964 and refines it in 1966 and 1 9 6 7 . Soviets attack this theory in the early 1970s; it currently has no advocates. The last account I consider is based on the proposition that a person's social nature is best reflected in his activity. Many contemporary Soviet theories proceed from this proposition. I present Demin's account because it draws upon an admixture of earlier accounts and because it represents work on the problem of the person during the 41970s. I should indicate that none of these theories is an empty concept theory. Each author assumes that the general concept of a person has content and attempts to say what Filosofskie nauki, 197i> No. 4, pp. 31-42. ^Kon, "Lichnost'," FE; Lichnost' kak sub"ekt obshchestvennykh otnoshenii~TThe person as the subject of social relationsJ (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Znanie", 1 9 6 6); and Sotsiologiia lichnosti. 4Demin, Problemy teorii lichnosti. 12^ that content is. Before proceeding to the discussion of these accounts, note the terminology. While the Soviets argue about the meanings of the terms 'person', 'human' and 'individual', even those who make a clear-cut distinction between them often (even ordinarily) do not use them as carefully as their distinctions require. Thus, for example, Tugarinov says that a human is a bio-social creature and that a person is a social creature. It would appear, then, that it is necessarily true that all humans are persons. But Tugarinov claims that there are humans who are not persons in the passages I discuss. He seems, therefore, to be using the term 'human' in these passages in the sense of the term 'individual' for biological individual theories. Kon makes a clear distinction between 'person', 'human' and 'individual' but proceeds to use them interchangeably. I translate these terms as I have up to this point, assigning 'person' to 'lichnost'', 'human' and 'Man' to 'chelovek', and 'individual' to 'individ'. But these terms must not be taken to mean the rather carefully circumscribed things their authors say of the in the passages cited in the second chapter. Tugarinov's Account As noted earlier, Tugarinov claims there are two concepts of a person.-' One concept is identical with the -'See pp. 53-56. 125 concept of a separate human (otdel'nyi chelovek). The other concept refers to a property humans can bear. Tugarinov concentrates on the concept of a person in the second sense. In 1962 he says that the basic traits of a person are rationality, responsibility, activity, freedom and individuality. He adds that personal dignity is sometimes also a trait of a person.^ Tugarinov believes that each of these traits can be perfected and argues that they will find their most perfect instantiation in persons of communist society. In a sense, then, the concept of a person is an ideal. As such, it makes it possible for us to see in which directions we should work on the development of the person.^ In 1965 Tugarinov gives a more complete account of the basic traits of a person. He lists as basic traits all the traits he lists in 1962 except activity. He now excludes activity from the list of basic traits because he believes it proceeds from a person's possession of the other traits. Before giving his account of each of the basic traits Tugarinov argues that it is impossible £ Tugarinov, "Kommunizm i lichnost'," p. 16. n'Tugarinov, "Kommunizm i lichnost'," p. 16. 126 unconditionally to consider all humans persons. He says: A person must possess the traits which belong only to an adult and psychologically normal human. Therefore, an infant and a lunatic are not persons. A human who is actually incapable of answering for his actions for some or another reason also loses the property of personality. Tugarinov qualifies these statements by indicating that all humans possess the dignity of a person. Tugarinov says he discusses rationality (razumnost') first because all other traits of a person are impossible without it. He differentiates rationality from the ability to think which he says is a more general trait than rationality. He says that the ability to think cannot be considered a criterion for a person. After all, both an infant and a lunatic think. Only the former thinks within the limits of very narrow experience--of superficial connections. And the latter has lost the ability to ascertain the mental connections which are correct and adequate to reality. He, therefore, thinks illogically, chaotically, incoherently and is unable to distinguish the subjective from the objective. Thus, infants and lunatics are not persons because they are not rational. Tugarinov admits that in a sense Man is a rational creature (homo sapiens) in contradistinction to the non-rational animal. (One can assume that even infants and lunatics are rational creatures in this sense.) But he says that we invest the concept 'rational human' with a narrower, g Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. 41. Q7Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. 45. 127 stricter meaning than the concept 'rational creature' or 'homo sapiens'. In this sense, An intelligent or rational human is one who acts deliberately, possesses a certain breadth of views and independence of thought, is able to solve important vital problems and knows4how to penetrate deeply into one or another question. Tugarinov writes that humans possessing this kind of rationality have always existed in all societies but that not all humans possess rationality to this degree. He believes that, in order for communism to be possible, this degree of rationality must be cultivated in all humans. Raionality has, for Tugarinov, a normative aspect. Referring to German war crimes during World War II and American activities in Vietnam, he concludes that "rationality" can be reactionary, perverted, inhuman and criminal. The deliberateness of such crimes increases all the more the responsibility of these murderers for crimes they committed and do commit. This responsibility proceeds precisely from the fact that these (if one may say so) humans are rational. An infant's or a lunatic's lack of responsibility is connected with a lack of development or a loss of reason. A criminal's responsibility is connected wit^his possession of reason even though this is perverted. Rationality, then, is a necessary and sufficient condition for holding a human responsible for his actions. Responsibility, according to Tugarinov, involves the use of two faculties- reason (razum) and will (volia)- for 10Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. 46. 11Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. 49. 128 the purposes of fulfilling one's obligations (oViazannost'). His definition reads: Responsibility is a human's ability to foresee the consequences of his activity and to control it, proceeding from the benefit or harm it can bring to society. There are two epistemological aspects of responsibility. First, a person is fully responsible for all consequences, however remote, of his activity he foresees. Second, a person is obliged to know what he can about the consequences of his activity. Foreseeing the consequences of one's activity is net enough. One should refrain from performing actions which, according to reason, are incorrect. One should resolve to perform actions which one acknowledges to be correct. Refraining from or performing an action involves the use of one's will which " . . , is a human * s ability to make decisions and to carry these decisions to fulfillment. The correctness or incorrectness of any given action depends on whether the agent fulfills or fails to fulfill his obligations by performing (or failing to perform) it. Tugarinov asserts that obligations are both objective and subjective. Objective obligations exist independently of anyone's recognition of them and result from the very fact that humans live in society. Subjective obligations are the ones a person acknowledges and voluntarily accepts. The 12Tugarinov, Lichnost* i obshchestvo, p. 52. 13Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. 5^* 129 correctness or incorrectness of an action depends upon whether there is an objective obligation for the agent to perform or to refrain from performing it. Tugarinov mentions three reasons a person might fail to perform his obligations. He might not acknowledge the rules of community life. He might acknowledge these rules but not wish to fulfill them. He might acknowledge these rules and wish to fulfill them but fail to do so because of some passion or weakness. It is not clear whether Tugarinov believes that failure to fulfill one's obligations for any one of these reasons mitigates his responsibility. He does say, however, that different measures need to be taken in order to overcome each of these causes. I do not discuss here Tugarinov's remarks on freedom and individuality. O'Rourke has discussed freedom in Soviet thought and, in particular, Tugarinov's theory of freedom in detail. I, therefore, refer the reader to his discussion. I do consider Tugarinov's remarks on individuality in an appendix. According to Tugarinov, personal dignity is . . . the behavior of a human, involving his protection of his rights and his fulfillment of his obligations. This behavior is expressed in a form of life worthy of a person. ^ IkJames J. O'Rourke, The Problem of Freedom in Marxist Thought: An Analysis of the Treatment of Human Freedom by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Contemporary Soviet Philosophy (Dordrechtt D. Reidel Publishing Co.. 1974). 1^Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. 79* 130 Apparently, a human is personally dignified if he protects his rights and fulfills his obligations. He accomplishes this by living a life worthy of-a person. Tugarinov only characterizes this way of living negatively. Some forms of behavior unworthy of a person are alcoholsim, debauchery, deceitfulness, cowardice, avarice and philistinism. Tugarinov concludes his account of the traits of a person by giving this definition. A person is a human who possesses a historically conditioned level of rationality and responsibility to society, who en.joys (or is capable of enjoying) certain rights and freedoms in accordance with his internal qualities, who by means of his individual activity makes a contribution to the development of society and who leads a form (pf life corresponding to the ideals of his era or class. Tugarinov qualifies this definition with the words 'or is capable of' because he believes a person is sometimes prevented from exercising his freedom or expressing his individuality. This does not mean a person loses these traits or ceases to be a person. In such a case, these simply become unexpressed traits of a person. In 1968 Tugarinov clarifies his position on personal dignity. Speaking now of the value of a person (tsennost' lichnosti) rather than of personal dignity (lichnoe dostoinstvo), he replies to a position he says is often stated in bourgeois science that Marxist ideology denies the 16Tugarinov, Lichnost1 i obshchestvo, p. 88. 131 value of a person in himself. Bourgeois theoreticians write that for Marxists only society as a whole has value, and a separate human has value only in so far as he brings benefit to society, more concretely, benefit to the matter of constructing communism. In answer to this claim Tugarinov distinguishes two types of value of a person, namely, absolute and relative value. A person has the absolute value of a person- value in himself- simply because he is a human. Under socialism a person also has the relative value of a person. This is a different evaluation of a person depending upon the benefit a person brings to society. A person who brings more actual 18benefit to society has greater relative value. This clarification almost certainly is a reply to DeGeorge who, in 1964, says: According to Marxism-Leninism, the value of an individual is extrinsic and is either a product of his usefulness to society, or is derived from the fact that he reflects the value of society. At best he is a protozoic brick of the social building and has the value of being part of a valuable whole. In himself and of himself, however, considered apart from society, he has no intrinsic value and^gan scarcely be called a man in any sense of the word. ' DeGeorge supports this claim by referring to a statement 17'Tugarinov, "Dialektika v cheloveke," p. 58. 18Tugarinov, "Dialektika v cheloveke," pp. 58-59* 19'Richard T. DeGeorge, "The Soviet Concept of Man," Studies in Soviet Thought 4 (1964):272. 132 Tugarinov makes in 1962 which reads : A separate human is an element- the simplest "brick"- of the social building, and his intellectual (dukhovnyi) world is a result of the organization- the structure- of the society he lives in. This passage is taken from a paragraph in which Tugarinov writes of perfecting the person by perfecting society. In 1967 Gak criticizes Tugarinov's and similar positions. This criticism often is cited by other Soviets. He objects primarily to the use of positive characteristics in describing a person. He considers first the following claim. A person should have "his own face": self-sufficiency in thought, definiteness of values and views, originality of feeling, strength of will, internal self-discipline and passion. Gak retorts that there are a number of people who are modest enough to admit that they do not have all these magnificent qualities. Nevertheless, these people have every reason to 22protest the claim that they are not persons. Gak considers next Tugarinov's claim that while infants and lunatics are not persons, all humans possess the dignity of a person. He says that, according to Tugarinov, 20Tugarinov, "Kommunizm i lichnost'," p. 14. 21Sotsiologiia v SSSR [Sociology in the USSR], t. 1 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl1", 1 9 6 5), pp. 433-434. 22Gak, Dialektika, p. 16. Gak repeats his retort verbatim in "Dialektika kollektivnosti i individual'nosti [Dialectics of collectivity and individuality]," in Kollektiv i lichnost1 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 1 9 6 8), P • 52 • 133 these dignities are rationality, responsibility, freedom, individuality and personal dignity. He objects, in particular, to placing individuality and responsibility on the same level. Individuality is a universal formal feature of everything that exists. For everything is a unity of the universal and the particular. But responsibility in the treatment of the author himself is a trait belonging to far from all humans. J Gak has in mind Tugarinov's claim that subjective obligation involves a person's recognition and acceptance of his objective obligations. As a counterexample to Tugarinov's account, Gak presents the money-grubber and the exploiter. They, he suggests, certainly are not responsible according to Tugarinov's interpretation of obligation. One wonders about just what kind of responsibility- concerning which acknowledgement of obligations to society- can discussion occur for these people who are busy with egotistical robbery of everything worthy? Well, maybe they shouldn't be taken for persons? But, after all, the author says thatpgvery human is a person- besides "infants and lunatics!" As noted in the second chapter, Tugarinov says each human is 2Ka person. Gak says that this is the only point on which Tugarinov is correct. Persons, he asserts, are simply human individuals. In 1969 Iadov says that Tugarinov describes an ethical concept of a person. He notes that non-normative 2 - Gak, Dialektika, pp. 16-17. 2^Gak, Dialektika, p. 17. 2-%ee p. 5313^ conceptions of a person have been presented by Kon (whom I discuss shortly) and others, and asserts that use of each of these conceptions is appropriate for particular ways of approaching the study of persons. Iadov believes that Tugarinov's definition is of an ethical concept because it includes classic moral categories. He focuses on Tugarinov's reference to obligation, attributing to him the view that a person is a human who recognizes his duty to society. Iadov outlines three alternative conceptions of a person, namely, sociological, social psychological and psychological ones. For the sociologist, a person is both an object and a subject. As an object, a person occupies a certain position in society and fulfills the roles connected with that position. As a subject, a person identifies himself with various social strata among which are a nation, a class, a party and a state. Iadov adds that the individuality of a person never interests the sociologist. He is interested in a social type, i.e., in how this type is enrolled in the social system, how it is produced by the social system and how it conceives of itself in the social ^V. A. Iadov, "0 razlichnykh podkhodakh k kontseptsii lichnosti i sviazannykh s nimi razlichnykh zadachakh issledovaniia massovykh kommunikatsii [On various approaches to the conception of the person and various tasks in studying mass communications connected with it]," in Materialy vstrechi sotsiologov, vyp. 3s Lichnost' i massovaia kommunikatsiia (Tartus Tartuskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1 9 6 9)> pp. 13-1 7• 1 135 27system. The social psychologist also studies a person as a subject and an object but accentuates the mechanisms of a person's behavior in society. Iadov believes the key category for revealing the social-psychological concept of a person is the system of value orientations. The system of value orientations may be said to be the set of a person's attitudes. The content of a person's social attitudes is wholly determined by social conditions and the social 28experience of a person. The psychologist studies the person only as a subject. He concentrates on certain general psychological properties of humans such as intellect, rigidity or adaptability, conformity or tolerance, temperament, etc.2^ In 1971 Tugarinov responds to Gak and Iadov. His reply to Gak is brief. It reads: G. M. Gak does not agree with the traits of a person indicated. Thus, concerning responsibility he asks what kind of responsibility an exploiter has. But an exploiter actually has responsibility to his class, his corporation, social opinion, the law and so on. Even a bandit is responsible to his gang for his actions. Tugarinov seems to accept Gak's concentration on subjective obligations, i.e., the obligations a person recognizes and accepts, since he does not list society as something to 2^Iadov, "0 razlichnykh podkhodakh," p. 32. 28Iadov, "0 raslichnykh podkhodakh,'' pp. 17-19. 29'Iadov, "0 razlichnykh podkhodakh," p. 22. 30Tugarinov, Filosofiia soznaniia, pp. 150-151. 1 136 which an exploiter is responsible. Tugarinov's response to Iadov is longer. Without denying that there are many concepts of a person, he asks which aspects of a person are the defining ones. He considers and rejects each conception outlined by Iadov. His rejection of role theory is discussed in the next section. I now consider only his rejection of psychological and social-psychological conceptions. Concerning the latter, Tugarinov says: However one regards value orientations . . . and despite the fact that the concept of values is particularly close to the heart of this author, still one should admit that values cannot be the basis or elements of a person. The reason values should not be considered a trait of a person is that valuation is only an aspect of a more basic characteristic of persons- rationality. Rationality involves not only valuation but also cognition of the external world. Valuation is based upon cognition of objective reality. Having come to know objective reality, one can evaluate one's own as well as society's needs, interests, etc. Tugarinov concludes, "Thus, value orientations cannot replace the concept of rationality as a criterion for the person. Concerning the psychological conception of a person, Tugarinov says that while the traits Iadov lists might be 31J Tugarinov, "Marksistskaia teoriia," p. ^0. ■^Tugarinov, "Marksistskaia teoriia," p. ^0. useful in certain ways for classifying persons, they are not person-forming characteristics. One can, for example, differentiate persons in terms of their temperaments, but 33these cannot serve as criteria for a person. If there was any doubt from Tugarinov's earlier accounts about whether his concept of a person is evaluative, he now lays that doubt to rest. He asserts: The concept of a person is a concept of great value- not replaceable with any other. . . . Marxist theory of the person is the theoretical instrument of Marxist education. It must identify the qualities of a human which have belonged to the best humans of the past and which should find their complete expression in a human of communist society. It should identify the qualities we should cultivate and maintain as well as the qualities we should overcome and liquidate. Tugarinov's concept of a person is teleological. Its definition establishes an ideal we should strive to achieve. In 1971 Anufriev considers and rejects the evaluative use of the term 'person' in all but casual circumstances. He indicates that there is an evaluative use of the term 'person'. For example, in everyday conversation we may use the word 'person' to evaluate someone in terms of a wide range of qualities. These qualities are more or less developed in different humans. One may use a special, accentuated meaning of 'person' when applying it to particular people. The word 'Man' has a 33-^Tugarinov, "Marksistskaia teoriia," p. 3 9 . 34v Tugarinov, "Marksistskaia teoriia," pp. 36-37* similar evaluative usage. For example, one may say of John Johnson that he's a Man. It does not follow from this, however, that Peter Peterson, who does not have the 35qualities John has, is not a man. ^ Anufriev denies that the formal usage of 'person' is connected with positive values for a number of reasons. He first repeats Gak's reference to modest people. Replying to Tugarinov's claim that a lunatic is not a person, he indicates that even in the legal sense of the word a psychologically inferior human is a person. As for infants, he indicates that pedagogues consider them persons. He adds • Actually, one has only to refuse a child the right to be considered a person for things such as a young human's feeling of personal worth, his rights and obligations immediately to lose their meaning. Continuing, Anufriev says that a normative definition of the concept of a person conflicts with practice. "Humans are not divided and do not divide each other into 'persons' and 37'non-persons'."^' A definition of a person in terms of positive values is of little use, according to Anufriev, because it makes it difficult to see what is primary in a person. This is the totality of social relations. Anufriev believes that a definition of a person must 35^Evgenii Aleksandrovich Anufriev, Sotsial'naia rol' i aktivnost' lichnosti [Social role and activity of the personJ (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo MGU, 1971), p. 2 3 . D Anufriev, Sotsial'naia rol', p. 2 5 . -^Anufriev, Sotsial'naia rol', p. 26. center on his social roles in order to draw attention to a person's social relations. I now consider an account centered on social roles. Kon's Account I noted earlier that Kon argues for incorporating social roles in the concept of a person.-^® He includes them in his concept of a person because a person's roles are the product of his social development and because, according to Kon, they determine the character of his mental processes. In 1967 Kon considers first the etymology of the term 'lichnost1'. 7 He indicates that the Latin word 'persona' (which he compares with the Russian word 'lichina (mask)') meant a mask an actor wore in the theater. It later came to designate the actor himself and the role he played. Kon claims that the Romans used the word 'persona' to indicate a particular social function or role, e.g., the lichnost' (personality) of a father, a caesar, a prosecutor, etc. Quoting Shakespeare, he points out that the image of a human as an actor who plays a role assigned him and who changes his roles depending upon age and social position is widespread in world literature. ^ 0 Etymological considerations aside, Kon believes it -^See pp. 56-5939 shall use the Russian terms throughout this paragraph. 40Kon, Sotsiologiia lichnosti, p. 13. 140 is impossible to describe either in everyday language or in scientific terminology a person's behavior and relationships with others unless his social roles are identified. Let us assume we want to characterize John Johnson's personality. How shall we do this? First of all, by enumerating his various roles and functions (a middle aged man, a teacher, a communist, married, father of two children, an amateur artist, etc.). Kon says that an enumeration of a person's roles does not individuate him. Each role also belongs to many other humans. A person also has individual qualities which, together with his social roles, individuate him. Still, Kon believes that a person's roles are his most important features and that we could not describe a person without referring to them. According to Kon, any social role is connected with a social position within a system of social relations. This position is correlated with society as a whole. For example, the position and role of a teacher presupposes the existence of a system where there is a certain kind of division of labor. Kon claims that even natural characteristics can be associated with social roles. The role of a woman, which ordinarily is perceived as a consequence of biological organization, is in fact conditioned upon the social position of a woman- upon the degree of her enslavement or, on the contrary, her^g emancipation, upon traditional kinds of activity, etc. Kon concludes that in order to understand any particular /4iKon, Sotsiologiia lichnosti, p. 14. 42Kon, Sotsiologiia lichnosti, p. 1?• 141 person it is insufficient to understand his direct relations with other humans. One must begin with society as a whole and proceed to the individual. As noted earlier, Kon believes a society (and not a particular human) is a totality of social relations. He suggests that these social relations are relations between social positions. An individual's social position is his place within a certain social structure. Since social relations are complex, each individual occupies a number of positions within any given social structure. A social role is, according to Kon, . . . a function, a normatively approved form of behavior, expected from everyone who occupies the given position. For example, we expect from a teacher certain professional activity with which several personal qualities (say, the ability to appraise people) are associated. J Kon says that the behavior expected of a person occupying a certain position does not depend on that person himself but is given to him as something more or less obligatory. Again as noted earlier, Kon does not argue that social roles are the only characteristic of a person. He believes there is another category of characteristics, namely, individual qualities, which affects a person's behavior and which, therefore, must be used in any complete description of him. Kon claims that these characteristics are especially important for describing the way in which a person internalizes a social role. Internalization of a 4?Kon» Sotsiologiia lichnosti, p. 23. social role is a necessary condition for that role to affect a person's behavior. This amounts to a person's own determination or definition of his social position and his attitude to this position and the obligations associated with it. The obligations of a father in general do not depend upon the characteristics of John Johnson. But how he understands this role, the kind of significance he attributes to it, the kind of position it occupies in his life and how it accords with his other social roles is a completely individual affair; depending upon the peculiarities of his biography. While Kon makes this concession, he believes that in the final analysis a person's social roles are more important in determining his behavior than his individual qualities. The importance Kon attaches to social roles vis-a-vis individual qualities is most apparent in his theory of the self (ia). He says, on the one hand, that the self is a subject and an agent and, on the other hand, he is the object of self-consciousness. In the first sense, the self is that which has experiences and performs actions. In the second sense, the self is how an individual perceives himself. He says that these concepts do not coincide. We recognize only a comparatively small part of our mental processes and behavior. Many important actions are performed impulsively or automatically. We do not give ourselves an account concerning the motives for these actions. Thus, these are called unconscious. Immediate experience is always richer than what is recognized and cannot coincide with it. hhKon, Sotsiologiia lichnosti, p. 4-3* Kon, Sotsiologiia lichnosti, pp. 53-5^* 143 Kon concludes that the concept of the self as subject is broader than the concept of the self as object. Kon also believes that how a person perceives himself depends upon his relations with others. The attitudes of groups or communities are expecially important. Thus, for example, how a person perceives himself as a soccer player depends upon how that person's team as a whole percieves him in that capacity. A person's attitudes towards himself reflect to a significant extent the 46attitudes of others towards him. When Tugarinov criticizes Kon's account, he centers on Kon's claim that we cannot characterize a person without reference to his social roles. Tugarinov finds fault with Kon's illustration of this claim, saying that he lists only external (vneshnii) characteristics of a person. According to Tugarinov, how a person fills his roles is more important than the roles themselves. If it would be said what kind of teacher Johnson is, how he relates to children and whether he teaches them well, what kind of communist he is, what kind of father he is for his two children . . . this would be a characterization of a person and not a collection of resume data without which, to be sure, it is impossible to get on, but which gives us no conception of Johnson as a person. ' Tugarinov believes that the fundamental problem with role theory is that it represents a person too much as an object and too little as a subject. 46Kon, Sotsiologiia lichnosti, p. 54. 47 ✓ 'Tugarinov, "Marksistskaia teoriia," p. 3 6 . I2j4 Dobrynina and Khoroshilov criticize Kon's role theory for being unable to account for the autonomous behavior of individuals. They say that since, according to role theory, each person is a subject of a number of social relations, all his actions ultimately are attributable to his position in a social structure. But, they say, there is behavior which is autonomous with respect to a given social structure. They conclude that role theory must be supplemented with a theory which accounts for this 48autonomy. The basic objection in general to role theory is that it portrays a person too much as a cog in a social machine. Soviets sometimes express this position by saying that such a theory sociologizes a person. What is desired is a theory which accounts for the importance of a person's membership in society without suggesting that this is all that is important about him. Demin, in particular, objects to "sociologization" of persons and recommends a theory he believes does not do this. I now consider his theory. Demin's Theory In 1977 Demin presents an account centered on human activity. Demin says that a human qua person is an active creature. He, therefore, believes that the best way to 48V. I. Dobrynina and V. A. Khoroshilov, "Marksistskoe uchenie o lichnosti (stat'ia II)," Filosofskie nauki, 1975. No. 3 , pp. 113-11^4. 145 describe a person is to explain his activity. Demin attempts to do this by describing activity as the outcome of both external and internal phenomena. Demin begins his account of activity by differentiating stimuli and motives. A stimulus is a subjective phenomenon which induces one to act and which is caused by external factors. Demin says that these external hofactors are stimulators. 7 Motives are internal, subjective factors which induce a person to act. They fall into two groups. One of these includes motives which have an internal origin* needs, inclinations (vlechenie) and interests. Motives conditioned upon the social environment- the immediate surroundings of nature--constitute the other group. Demin notes that it is difficult to differentiate motives in the second group from stimuli. Demin says that there are motives connected with a human's organic needs. These needs can have corresponding inclinations when a person recognizes the thing which would satisfy them. He adds: However, notwithstanding this, it is necessary to note that dynamic tendencies having an internal, somatic source are not the sole motives for human activity. In many instances a person is induced^to act not by an inclination but by an obligation. Demin says that a motive of obligation is a most important hôDemin, Problemy teorii lichnosti. p. 6 5 . ^°Demin, Problemy teorii lichnosti, p. ?2. Demin, Problemy teorii lichnosti. p. 74. tk6 and specifically social inducement to human activity. He indicates, furthermore, that something obligatory only becomes a motive for action if it has become a conviction of the person for whom it is a motive. Demin concludes this part of his account by pointing out that both stimuli and motives are inducements to act. A motive, however, is not only an inducement to act; it also is the basis owing to which an activity is performed. One might interpret this to mean that while both stimuli and motives are causes of actions, motives alone are reasons. Demin feels that the single most important kind of motive is interests. An interest is an attitude or relationship to the achievement of an established goal. It has both an objective and a subjective aspect. An objective interest is a relation of a human to the external world which exists independently of his consciousness. It is the material basis for a subjective interest which is a recognized objective interest. In order to be a cause for human activity, an objective interest must become a subjective interest. The fundamental difference between needs and interests consists in the fact that a need expresses a dependence of a human upon the external world. An interest, on the contrary, is directed towards mastery of some part of the external world. Demin feels that it is in the activity bsned upon his actual interests that a person becomes free. Ik7 Concerning this last point, Demin notes that it is possible for a person to misconstrue his objective interests. When a person fails to recognize the true nature of his objective interests, the misconstrued objective interest becomes a subjectivist interest. A subjectivist interest is a genuine interest for the person holding it and it can be the basis for the performance of an activity. But activity which proceeds on the basis of a subjectivist interest cannot, in the final analysis, result in an actual 52success. It is not clear what Demin means by 'success'. He might consider a success the achievement of a goal which would be based upon a correct interpretation of an objective interest. In this case, one might achieve the intended goal based upon a subjectivist interest; but the achievement of this goal would not be considered a success because it would not be the same goal as the goal which would be based upon the misinterpreted objective interest. Demin might, however, consider achievement of a goal to be a success. In this case, one might establish a goal based upon a subjectivist interest but be unable to achieve it because it is based upon a misinterpretation of an objective interest. Demin believes that the importance of interests lies in the fact that they are both objective and subjective. If one interprets them correctly, he cannot arrive at an *52 J Demin, Problemy teorii lichnosti, p. 88. 148 over-simplified or distorted view of the person which would place too much stress either on a person as object or on a person as subject. A correct interpretation of interests, according to Demin, permits us to understand the essence of Man himself. Critical Evaluation Each of these theories is at least somewhat independent of the other two. I therefore consider their merits and demerits separately. Demin begins his account with a philosophically respectable proposal to characterize a person as an agent. He promises to do so by describing human activity. But this description is incomplete. Demin suggests that his distinction between stimuli and motives is one between an external phenomenon and an internal phenomenon respectively. Nevertheless, he describes a stimulus as a particular kind of internal or subjective phenomenon (one which induces a person to act) caused by external factors. As Demin notes, it is difficult to distinguish stimuli from motives falling into his second group, i.e., motives conditioned upon the social environment. Both are caused by external factors, and both are inducements to act. If, however, my interpretation of Demin's claim that motives are also the basis for an action is correct, then the difference between a stimulated action and a motivated action might be that the latter requires a cognitive element the former does not require. For example, a stimulated action might he Peter's jumping after he has heen pricked with a pin. In this case, the pin prick is the stimulator, the nervous impulses this causes are the stimuli and the jump is the action induced. Peter's jumping is not a motivated action because it is an automatic response. The pain he feels is a cause but not a reason for his jumping. If this is what Demin intends by his distinction between stimuli and motives, then there are cases where it is difficult to say whether an action is stimulated or motivated. For example, imagine that while Peter strolls down the street, a car alongside him bursts into flames. Peter immediately rushes to the aid of the passengers inside. While it might generally be said that Peter rescued the passengers for reasons, i.e., that this action was motivated, the immediacy of his response might lend credence to the claim that his action was stimulated. He might be such a well-trained fireman that his response was automatic. If his action was motivated, then it presumably was conditioned upon the social environment since his motive appears to be none of needs, inclinations or interests. While an exploding car might, by some stretch of the imagination, be considered part of the social environment, it is more naturally considered part of the immediate surroundings of nature with which Demin equates the social environment. In any case, Demin simply does not make clear what motives are. Note that, if my interpretation is correct, then what Demin considers activity encompasses more than what ordinarily is considered an action in analytic philosophy where actions often are differentiated from bodily movements by indicating that the former are performed for reasons whereas the latter are not. For Demin, however, activity can be either. Demin's lack of clarity on this point is not the major shortcoming of his account. His purpose in giving an account was to provide content for the concept of a person as a social creature. Demin does say that motives of obligation are social inducements to act, but he does not rule out the possibility that there are persons, e.g., the wolf children mentioned in the last chapter, for whom such motives never arise. Such a person might act only because of stimuli or motives falling into the first group. Furthermore, such a person could even have interests since these are, according to Demin, simply relations of a human to the external world which exist independently of consciousness. Amala, the wolf girl Parygin mentions, might stand in some physical relation to a piece of meat. She might come to recognize this relation (whence the relation becomes subjective) and attempt to get the meat. This action would, on Demin's account, be performed on the basis of an interest and, furthermore, be free, but it would not be social since no motive of obligation is involved. 151 Thus, while Demin's account might be acceptable as an account of human activity, it is unacceptable as an account of persons as social creatures. It fails to show that anything social is a necessary condition for the performance of an activity. And, as it is presented, it is possible for an agent, according to this account, to be completely non-social. Kon's account avoids the pitfall of permitting non-social creatures to be considered persons since he considers fulfilling a social role a necessary condition for being a person. As noted, the standard Soviet objection to this theory is that it portrays a person too much as a cog in a social machine. It asserts that the most important features of a person are his social roles and thereby suggests that a person's actions are largely (if not wholly) an outcome of his social position. No room seems to be left for the influence a person exercises on society or, if there is room, this influence is largely a consequence of a person's social position. These considerations have led at least one Soviet author, Sabirov, to assert that the most important feature of a person is not the roles he fulfills; rather, it is his autonomy with respect to society. ^ While Kon might overstate the case for social roles, his account does not clearly suffer from the defects this "^Sabirov, Chelovek kak problema, p. 209* criticism suggests. Kon does, to be sure, say that the identification of a person's roles is a necessary condition for individuating him. But it follows neither from this nor from the fact that social roles are necessary for describing a person's behavior that that person is a cog in a social machine where this is understood to mean that each of a person's actions is an instantiation of a consequent of a causal law whose antecedents all refer to social roles. In order for a person to be such a cog two other conditions need to be met. First, his social roles need to be the only factors relevant for describing his behavior. Second, there would need to be a causal law of the kind described above for each of a person's actions. Kon's theory does not meet the first condition. First, he says that identification of a person's roles is insufficient for individuating him. One must also identify his individual qualities. Second, while a person's social roles are the most important factors in a description of his behavior, individual qualities are relevant factors in such a description. Thus, if each of a person's actions is the consequence of laws, then these laws have not only a person's roles but also his individual qualities as antecedents. At least part of Kon's remarks on the internalization of roles suggests that such a law is required in an explanation of a person's behavior. Recall that he says a person's roles do not depend upon his 153 individual qualities. A person, it seems, is assigned his roles. But Kon also says that a person defines his social roles. He means by this, in part, that how a person understands his roles depends on his individual qualities. Since, however, how a person understands his roles depends upon his qualities and not upon the person himself, it seems more likely that Kon considers this dependence causal than non-causal. One is left to wonder just what purpose is served by Kon's identification of the self in the first sense, i.e., the self as subject of experience and as agent. It appears that this self is simply the bearer of the properties on the basis of which a person's life proceeds. Since Kon says that the self in this sense is not the object of self-consciousness, we are left, in the final analysis, not understanding its role in Kon's ontology. It seems, then, that the standard criticism is just if it is broadened. A person, on Kon's account, is not a cog in a social machine. He is, however, a cog in a machine where social properties play the most important part. A person's individual qualities and how he conceives his social roles also play a part albeit a less important one. The problem is that a person's actions are conceived by Kon to be a consequence merely of his social roles and his individual qualities (upon which the person's understanding of his social roles depends). A person's actions are not conceived to be caused by the person 154 himself, i.e., as an agent. <I±Tugarinov's account is, as O'Rourke has noted, the most comprehensive Soviet account of the person. He has two purposes in giving this account. One is to specify the criteria a human must satisfy in order to be a person. The other is to identify characteristics a human should try to manifest. A human who manifests these characteristics is a person in a teleological sense. Unfortunately, Tugarinov confuses these two purposes. This confusion is most apparent in his description of the relationship between rationality and responsibility. Recall that there are two senses of 'rationality'. On the one hand, rationality is a property of all humans (including infants and lunatics) simply because they are members of the species homo sapiens. On the other hand, rationality is a property possessed by humans having rather well-developed intellectual abilities. Tugarinov notes, moreover, that few humans are rational in this second sense. Nevertheless, rationality is said to be a necessary and sufficient condition for a human to be responsible for his actions. For example, according to Tugarinov, Germans and Americans are responsible for their war crimes in World War II and the Vietnam War, respectively, because they are rational. He rules out considering rationality in the first zLlJ O'Rourke, Freedom in Marxist Thought, p. 101. 155 sense the necessary and sufficient condition for the Germans and Americans' responsibility for these crimes since he claims that infants and lunatics are not responsible for their actions. So, he must consider rationality in the second sense the necessary and sufficient condition for the Germans and Americans' responsibility. But most of the Germans who participated in World War II and most of the Americans who took part in the Vietnam War are not rational in the second sense. It appears, then, that they cannot be responsible for the crimes to which Tugarinov refers. Such a conclusion, however, would be premature. Recall that Tugarinov says that not all humans possess rationality in the second sense to the degree he indicates. This suggests that rationality in the second sense can be possessed in degrees. One might interpret this suggestion to mean that infants and lunatics are rational in the second sense to no degree whatsoever, whereas all other humans are rational in this sense to some degree. The Germans and the Americans are, therefore, responsible for their crimes precisely because they are rational in the second sense to some degree. One question Tugarinov does not address directly but which now presents itself is whether a human is responsible to the extent that he possesses the intellectual abilities Tugarinov incorporates in his second sense of rationality. It appears that he is. For, according to Tugarinov, a person is responsible for the consequences of his actions he 156 foresees and is obliged to foresee what he can of the consequences of his actions. Thus, it appears that a person with limited intellectual abilities is less responsible for the consequences of his actions (because he can foresee fewer of them) than a person with manifold intellectual abilities (who can foresee more). (This interpretation presupposes, of course, that the ability to foresee the consequences of one's actions is an intellectual ability. If there are fools who are prophets, they would constitute a counterexample to these conclusions.) The relationship between degree of rationality and degree of responsibility can hold only if the obligation to foresee what one can of the consequences of one's actions is construed as an objective obligation. Recall that one's objective obligations do not depend upon one's recognition of them but are incurred simply by living in society. Subjective obligations, on the contrary, do depend upon one's recognition and acceptance of objective obligations. If the obligation to foresee what one can of the consequences of one's actions were a subjective obligation, a person with limited intellectual abilities could have this obligation (because he accepts it) while a person with extensive intellectual abilities might not (because he does not accept it). The Germans and Americans' responsibility for their war crimes must also depend upon their objective obligations. For, if this responsibility depended upon 157 their subjective obligations, they might in no way be responsible for these crimes. They would not necessarily accept the obligations on the basis of which the criminality of their actions is assessed. Gak loses sight of Tugarinov's distinction between subjective and objective obligations when he criticizes Tugarinov for suggesting that an exploiter is responsible for his actions and, therefore, is a person while infants and lunatics are not responsible for their actions and, therefore, are not persons. By asking what kind of obligations the exploiter acknowledges, Gak makes clear that he assesses responsibility on the basis of subjective obligations. Tugarinov's reply to Gak should be that there are two senses of responsibility. In one sense, a human is said to be responsible for the performance or non-performance of all actions he has an objective obligation to perform or to refrain from performing. A human is responsible in this sense if he can be held accountable for his actions. In this sense, an exploiter is responsible because he can be held accountable for failing to fulfill his objective obligations. In another sense, a human is said to be responsible because he accepts certain obligations and acts in accordance with them. A human is responsible in this sense because he behaves responsibly. In this sense, an exploiter is not responsible because he does not accept the objective obligations on the basis of which he would be held accountable for his crimes. 158 Tugarinov himself loses sight of his distinction between subjective and objective obligations when he replies to Gak. He does not explain why an exploiter is responsible for his exploitation. He indicates instead that there are obligations even an exploiter accepts, i.e., obligations to his class, his corporation, social opinion, the law, etc. By answering Gak in this way, Tugarinov makes mysterious why either the exploiter should be considered responsible for his exploitation or the Germans and the Americans should be considered responsible for their war crimes. For, surely neither the exploiter nor the Germans and the Americans accepts the obligations with respect to which their criminality is assessed. Tugarinov's answer also loses the thread connecting rationality with responsibility. A human could be rational to the highest degree and accept no obligation whatsoever. If responsibility is assessed on the basis of a human's subjective obligations, then this human could be held accountable for none of his actions. If the connection between rationality and responsibility is to be preserved, the responsibility with which rationality is connected must be based on objective obligations. Assuming that this is the case, one finds a rather interesting theory. A person is responsible because he is rational. But a person's obligations are not derived in some Kantian manner from propositions pertaining to whatever it is that makes a person rational. A person's obligations depend rather upon propositions pertaining to his being a member of society. They are to be discovered not by examining what is involved in being rational but by turning outward (as it were) and studying one's actual relations to other persons and the institutions of society. Tugarinov does not suggest how these obligations might be recognized. Nevertheless, the suggestion is an intriguing one. I now turn to a consideration of social relations. CHAPTER FIVE SOCIAL RELATIONS Introduction When, in 1 9 6 1, the CPSU calls for the formation of the communist person, it also calls for the development and perfection of communist social relations. The CPSU considers these tasks to be related. In order for a person to develop, his social relations must also develop. A communist person in particular is said to be the outcome of all historical development. As such, he embodies the social relations of the final stage of historical development, namely, communist society. In so far as historical development itself is evaluated positively, the development of communist persons and the social relations they embody can be considered the perfection of social relations and persons. The emergence in the early 1960s of a literature centered on social relations is a consequence of the interest expressed in them in the Third Program of the CPSU. Soviet discussions of the concept 'social relations' are, broadly speaking, attempts to say what social relations are. Two methods have been used to do this. The first method is the enumeration of the categories of relation which are social relations. Authors who use this method 160 l6l might say, for example, that social relations are production, political, social (sotsial'nyi), class, ancestral, national and familial relations. Soviets disagree about which categories of relation should be included in a list of social relations. These usually are not disagreements, however, over whether any particular kind of relation should or should not be considered a social relation. Rather, they are disagreements about the propriety of including a particular kind of relation in the list of categories of social relation instead of subsuming it under one of the other categories. There is no dispute, Two Russian words, 1 obshchestvenn.yi' and 'sotsial'nyi1, are usually translated by the English word 'social'. This would pose no particular difficulty were it not for the fact that the Soviets dispute the meanings of these words. Some use them interchangeably. Others contend that social (sotsial'nyi) relations are one of the categories of social (obshchestvennyi) relation. Still others contend that social (obshchestvennyi) relations are a subset of social (sotsial'nyi) relations. The differences in usage of 'sotsial'nyi' and 'obshchestvennyi' probably are a consequence of differences in their etymologies. The word 'sotsial'nyi' is derived from the Latin word 'socius '. The immediate ancestor of the word 'obshchestvennyi' is the word 'obshchestvo1 (in English, 'society'). Its more remote ancestor is the adjective 1obshchii' meaning 'common' or 'general'. An acceptable translation of 'obshchestvennyi' is 'societal'. It is not translated as 'societal' here primarily because the English word 'social' and the Russian word 'obshchestvennyi' are standardly used to translate the German word 'gesellschaftlich' in Marx's sixth thesis on Feuerbach. Furthermore, translation of 'obshchestvennyi' as 'societal' might obscure a debate in Soviet philosophy over whether individuals or groups or both stand in social relations. Translation of 1obshchestvennyi' as 'societal' might suggest too strongly that social (obshchestvennyi) relations are relations between groups. For the remainder of this chapter the English word 'social' is a translation of the Russian word 'obshchestvennyi' unless it is followed by the Russian word 'sotsial'nyi' in parentheses, i.e., 'social (sotsial'nyi)'. though, about which are the two most general categories of social relation. These are material and ideological relations. According to Soviet accounts, all other kinds of social relation can he subsumed under these two categories. Soviets do disagree about how material and ideological relations should be characterized. They disagree in particular over how much of a role consciousness should play in characterizations of material relations. I shall discuss this difference of opinion. 1 shall not discuss differences in opinion concerning the kinds of relation that should be listed among the categories of social relation. I am interested in what differentiates social relations from other kinds of relation, but not in their categories, because it is in being social that persons are differentiated from other kinds of entities. The second method is the differentiation of social relations from other kinds of relation in terms of their 2elements. Soviets attempt to do this either (i) by naming the things which can be elements of social relations, e.g., humans, or (2) by identifying a characteristic of elements of social relations, e.g., consciousness, or (3) by both (1) and (2). There are differences of opinion both about what the elements of social relations are and about how their elements should be characterized. Disputes of the first 2I use the word 'element' to refer to a related entity. For example, in the expression '2+2=4', '2+2' and '4' are elements of the relation '='. 163 sort arise because social relations have two functions in Soviet philosophy. They are, on the one hand, constituents of social structure and, on the other hand, (according to a literal reading of the sixth thesis on Feuerbach) components of the essence of Man. Drozdov and Batenin note this ambiguity. Society is first and foremost a totality of social relations- a system of historical forms of interconnection and interaction between humans. A human, appearing as a subject of these relations--their bearer- is himself nothing other than a totality of social relations. A human exists in a multitude of social connections, relations and interactions with other humans.-^ Focusing on social relations as constituents of social structure, some authors contend that social relations are relations only between groups, classes, etc. These authors argue that relations between particular humans should not be considered social relations. Other authors reply that since social relations are components of the essence of particular humans, relations between particular humans must be considered social relations. Disputes of the second sort concern characterizations of the elements of social relations. Some authors say that the elements of social relations are conscious. Others respond that one should not characterize rt-'Aleksandr Vasil'evich Drozdov and Sergei Stepanovich Batenin, "Razrabotka V. I. Leninym problemy material'nykh i ideologicheskikh obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [V. I. Lenin's elaboration of the problem of material and ideological social relations]," Vestnik LGU, 1965» No. 5» P31. 164 the elements of social relations as conscious because consciousness is a consequence--not a cause- of being social. Soviet discussions of social relations following the 22d Congress of the CPSU fall into three periods. During the first period (1962-1 9 6 5) authors usually are more interested in explaining how social relations of each of a number of categories must change during the transition from socialism to communism. They are less interested in 4describing the nature of social relations themselves. Still, some brief accounts of the nature of social relations do appear during this period. The second period begins with the publication of Drozdov's Chelovek i obshchestvennye 4Some early accounts are Konstantin Pavlovich Grin'ko, Formirovanie kommunisticheskikh obshchestvennykh otnoshenii ("The formation of communist social relations I (Tula*. Tul'skoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1962); Petr Konstantinovich Topilin, Razvitie obshchestvennykh otnoshenii v period razvernutogo stroitel1stva kommunisticheskogo obshchestva TThe development of social relations during the period of large-scale construction of communist society] (Saratov: Saratovskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1 9 6 2); Georgii Lukich Smirnov, Formirovanie kommunisticheskikh obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [The formation of communist social relations] (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1962)5 Vasilii Pavlovich Rozhin, Vvedenie v marksistskuiu sotsiologiiu [introduction to Marxist sociology] (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1962); Petr Vasil'evich Presniakov, Formirovanie kommunisticheskikh obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [The formation of communist social relations] (Alma-Ata: Kazakhskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1964); and Aleksandr Platonovich Mashkov, Razvitie obshchestvennykh otnoshenii v period perekhoda ot sotsializma k kommunizmu [~The development of social relations during the period of transition from socialism to communism] (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 5)165 otnosheniia Man and social relations in 1966 and ends with the rejection of his theories sometime in the early 1970s.^ Other middle period accounts are Kon, Lichnost* kak sub"ekt obshchestvennykh otnoshenii; Aleksandr Vasil'evich Drozdov, Aleksandr Platonovich Mashkov and Vasilii Pavlovich Rozhin, "Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, ikh elementy, struktura i klassifikatsiia [Social relations, their elements, structure and classification]," in Uchenye zapiski kafedr obshchestvennykh nauk g. Leningrada. Filosofiia, vyp. 8 (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1967)1 PP* 9 6-IO95 0. F. Ivanov, "K voprosu o poniatii obshchestvennogo otnosheniia [Towards the question concerning the concept of a social relation]," in XXIII s"ezd KPSS i nekotorye voprosy filosofii i sotsiologii (materialy nauchno-teoreticheskoi konferentsii), ch. 2 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 7), pp. 27-40; V. S. Semenov, Velikii oktiabr' i razvitie novykh obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [Glorious October and the development of new social relations] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Znanie", 1 9 6 7); A. S. Zakharov, "Kategoriia 'obshchestvennye otnosheniia' [The category 'social relations']," in Tezisv dokladov 14-i nauchnoi konferentsii (27-29 marta 1967 goda) (Kaluga: Kalrazhskii gosudarstvennyi pedagogicheskii institut, 1 9 6 7), pp. 29-32; Vladislav Zanovich Kelle, "Rol' sub"ektivnogo faktora v sovershenstvovanii sotsialisticheskikh obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [The role of the subjective factor in the perfection of socialist social relations]," Filosofskie nauki, 1 9 6 8, No. 1, pp. 14-22; V. P. Vyrelkin, "K voprosu ob opredelenii poniatiia 'obshchestvennye otnosheniia' [Towards the question concerning the definition of the concept 'social relations']," Vestnik LGU, 1 9 6 8, No. 1 7, pp. 50-55; Aleksandr Vasil'evich Drozdov, V. I. Lenin o probleme obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [V. I. Lenin concerning the problem of social relations] (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 9); Namir Makhdi al'-Ani, "K voprosu ob opredelenii poniatiia obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [Towards the question concerning the definition of the concept of social relations]," Vestnik LGU, 1970, No. 17, pp. 118-122; Aleksandr Vasil'evich Drozdov, "0 poniatii obshchestvennykh otnoshenii v svete leninskikh idei [On the concept of social relations in light of Lenin's ideas]," in V. I. Lenin i problemy filosofskikh nauk i nauchnogo kommunizma (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1 9 7 0), pp. 64-76; 0. V. Larmin, "0 strukture obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [On the structure of social relations]," in Ocherki metodologii poznaniia sotsial'nykh iavlenii (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl ', 1970), pp. 48-62; Margarita Nikolaevna Rosenko, "Sovremennaia nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia i formirovanie 166 Drozdov defends a theory in which consciousness is used to characterize the elements of social relations. The third period overlaps the second; it begins in 1969 and continues 6to the present. Authors of these theories reject Drozdov's kommunisticheskikh obshchestvennykh otnoshenii v SSSR [The modem scientific-technological revolution and the formation of communist social relations in the USSR]," in Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia i razvitie sovremennykh obshchestvennykh otnoshenii (nekotorye problem.y) (Leningrad, i970), pp. 48-63; Aleksandr Vasil'evich Drozdov, "Obshchestvennye otnosheniia i sotsial'naia struktura [Social relations and social structure]," in Metodologicheskie voprosy obshchestvennykh nauk, vyp. 3 (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1972), pp. 31-40. Recent accounts include Iurii Konstantinovich Pletnikov, "0 prirode obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [On the nature of social relations]," Vestnik MGU. Seriia 8 : Filosofiia, 1 9 6 9, No. 3, pp. 13-24; G. V. Mokronosov, A. M. Mosorov and V. E. Kemerov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, interesy, motivy [Social relations, interests, motives] (Sverdlovsk: Izdanie UPI, 1971)* Iurii Konstantinovich Pletnikov, 0 prirode sotsial'noi formy dvizheniia [On the nature of the social form of motion] (Moscow; Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1971); German Viktorovich Mokronosov, Metodologicheskie problemy issledovaniia obshchestvennykh otnoshenii I Methodological problems in studying social relations] (Sverdlovsk; Sredne-ural'skoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1972); K. S. Shariia, Nekotorye voprosy razvitiia sotsialisticheskikh obshchesctvennykh otnoshenii v period stroitel'stva kommunizma [Some questions on the development of socialist social relations during the period of the construction of communism] (Tbilisi: Izdatel'stvo "Metsniereba", 1972); Iu. D. Vorobei, "Obshchestvennye otnosheniia kak forma obshchestvenno-istoricheskoi praktiki [Social relations as a form of social-historical practice]," Vestnik MGU. Seriia 8 : Filosofiia, 1973* No. 6 , pp. 3-Hs Marat Nikolaevich Perfil'ev and Lidiia Vladimirovna Orlova, Sotsial 'n.ye otnosheniia [Social relations] (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1973)* Marat Nikolaevich Perfil'ev, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia [Social relations] (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1974); Obshchestvennye otnosheniia i soznanie [Social relations and consciousness] (Sverdlovsk: IzdanieUPI , 1975)* Iu. L. Fedorov, "Lichnost' v sisteme obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [The person in the system of of social relations]," Nauchnye trudy Tiumenskogo 167 use of consciousness to characterize elements of social relations. They usually use human activity in their attempts to describe the nature of social relations. Early Period Theories Authors of early accounts of the nature of social relations (and not simply of their categories) most often characterize social relations by identifying entities which are elements of social relations. In 1962 Rozhin characterizes material relations in this way; but he also qualifies this characterization, saying that material relations are formed in a certain way. He says, "Material relations are relations formed between humans in the course of production, exchange, distribution and use of material 7goods. Rozhin does not mention the elements of ideological relations in his characterization of them. He instead refers only to the way they are formed. He says, "The fact that ideological relations are formed by O proceeding through consciousness is their peculiarity." universiteta, 1976, sb. 19. pp. 7^-90. Aktual'nye problemy teorii obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [Pressing problems in the theory of social relationsj (Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 7 8); Valentin Nikolaevich Pesenko, Obshchestvennye sviazi i otnosheniia [Social connections and relations] (Rostov-na-Don: Izdatel'stvo Rostovskogo universiteta, 1978); Iurii Konstantinovich Pletnikov, "Teoriia obshchestvennykh otnoshenii: sushchnost' i aktual'nye problemy [The theory of social relations: essence and pressing problems]," Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, 1978, No. 2, pp. 21-32. 7'Rozhin, Vvedenie v sotsiologiiu. p. 52. Q Rozhin, Vvedenie v sotsiologiiu, p. 53168 According to Rozhin, social relations are divided into material, social (sotsial'nyi), political and intellectual (dukhovnyi) relations. He continues, "Consequently, material and ideological relations are poles in the system Qof social relations."7 Rozhin apparently believes that the set of material relations intersects the set of ideological relations since he describes class, national and family relations both as material and as ideological relations. The 1963 edition of Filosofskii slovar1 Philosophical dictionary characterizes all social relations (not just material relations) by identifying elements of them. It says that social relations are " . . . relations between humans established in the course of their joint practical and intellectual (dukhovnyi) activity."10 What these two accounts have in common is that the only entities they explicitly say are elements of (some or all) social relations are humans. This also is true of the account Presniakov gives in 196 . But his illustrations make clear he also considers non-humans elements of social 97Rozhin, Vvedenie v sotsiologiiu, p. 5 2 . 1 0Filosofskii slovar*, 1963 ed . 1 s.v. "obshchestvennye otnosheniia (social relations)." 169 relations. He sayss Social relations are relations between humans in the course of their social life as, for example, relations to the means and products of production, to family, classes, nat|^n, the state and its laws, to morals, art and science. Presniakov lists both groups (e.g., classes) and entities which neither are nor contain humans (e.g., the means and products of production) as elements of social relations. Thus, according to Presniakov, social relations include relations between humans and certain non-human entities. Presniakov might believe that only relations between humans and certain non-human entities are social relations. He says: Social relations are not personal, individual relations of one human to another, but relations between humans in the course of social life, of joint labor and intercourse in production, of political life and in the area of culture. It is not clear whether by 'personal relations' Presniakov means all relations between particular humans (i.e., all relations all of the elements of which are particular humans) or only relations between particular humans which do not arise in certain ways. It is clear that he believes some relations between particular humans are not social relations. According to Presniakov, then, the fact that a given relation is one between humans is neither logically necessary nor logically sufficient for saying it is a social 1 1Presniakov, Formirovanie, p. 6. 12Presniakov, Formirovanie, p. 7170 relation. In a 1965 discussion, Mashkov identifies only relations between groups as social relations. He says: Under the category of social relations historical materialism understands the totality of economic, social (sotsial'nyi), political and intellectual (dukhovnyi) connections which arise between social groups of humans on the basis^of a historically determined means of production. * Unlike his predecessors, Mashkov does not say that either particular humans or certain entities which neither are nor contain particular humans are elements of social relations. In a 1962 work written to explain the Third Program of the CPSU, Smirnov introduces consciousness into an account of social relations. He quotes a passage from The German Ideology where Marx says: Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me; the animal does not enter into "relations" with anything, it does not enter into any relation at all. For the aniipa.1, its relation to others does not exist as a relation. 13-'Mashkov, Razvitie otnoshenii, p. 8. The Marx-Engels Reader, 2d ed., p. 1 5 8. 171 Smirnov interprets this to mean that . . . social relations are relations between humans brought about with the participation of consciousness when a human in some way relates a part of his selfl£. ("ia") to another human or other humans in general. He says nothing beyond this concerning the role of consciousness in the formation of social relations. And he also characterizes social relations in terms of activity. He says, " . . . social relations are relations between humans in the course of their joint material and 16intellectual (dukhovnyi) activity." When Smirnov says that social relations are relations between humans, he should be interpreted as loosely as Presniakov. For he refers to each of states, nations, classes, estates, society and the separate individual as elements of social relations. What is distinctive about Smirnov's account among early theories is that it is the first to assert that consciousness plays a role in the formation of social relations. In 1965 Drozdov and Batenin give an account of the role of consciousness in material relations. They begin this account by noting, "The objective character of material 17relations is an important feature of them." ' They say that the objectivity of material relations consists in the fact that they exist outside and independently of consciousness. 1 *5-'Smirnov, Formirovanie otnoshenii, p. 7 . 16Smirnov, Formirovanie otnoshenii, p. 8 . 17'Drozdov and Batenin, "Razrabotka Leninym," p. 34. 172 They claim, however, that this does not mean that consciousness plays no role in the characterization of material relations. In order to identify the role consciousness does play, they differentiate two ways of speaking about it. On the one hand, consciousness in general is said to he a property of a human; a human is, in virtue of his possession of consciousness, a conscious participant in history. On the other hand, consciousness is one's understanding of social relations as a whole. Drozdov and Batenin call consciousness in this latter sense 'theoretical knowledge'. They claim that any human who is an element of a material relation is conscious in the first sense; he is not necessarily conscious in the second sense. They suggest, furthermore, that in order to be an element of a material relation a human must consciously perform an act of relation. Concerning production relations in particular, they say, "Any act of relation by a human even in the course 18of production proceeds through his consciousness." Drozdov and Batenin do not specify what an act of relation is. They do suggest, however, that an act of relation is performed in conformity with a human's needs, desires, etc. This suggests that by 'act of relation' they might mean some action directed towards some thing other oneself when that action does not run counter to one's needs, desires, etc. 18Drozdov and Batenin, "Razrabotka Leninym," p. 34. 173 For example, an act of relation might be Peter's reaching for a piece of bread. The bread is something other than Peter and Peter wants the bread because he is hungry. Thus, reaching for the bread accords with Peter's desires. Whatever Drozdov and Batenin mean by 'act of relation', they appear to believe that simply being conscious is not a sufficient condition for being an element of a material relation. A human must consciously act in a certain way in order to be an element of a given material relation. They do not believe, however, that the fact that a human must consciously act in a certain way in order to be an element of a material relation means that he consciously participates in the creation of this relation. On the contrary, they believe that one characteristic of a material relation is that it is not necessarily created by one of its conscious elements. They say that in order to create or to control the development of material relations, one must recognize the significance of material relations. Drozdov and Batenin say that recognizing the significance of material relations involves recognizing how they are formed, the laws according to which they develop and their place within a social structure. When a human recognizes these things about a material relation, he possesses theoretical knowledge of that material relation. And armed with this theoretical knowledge, a human can control the development of a material relation. When no one possesses theoretical knowledge of a material relation or when those who possess 174 this knowledge do not act on it, the material relation develops spontaneously (stikhiino). Drozdov and Batenin believe one thing that differentiates pre-socialist (i.e., primitive, slave-owning, feudal and capitalist) societies from socialist and communist societies is that in the former material relations develop spontaneously whereas in the latter they do not. Again, Drozdov and Batenin do not give examples. Speculating again, one might imagine that the relation between an employer and employee is a material relation. Suppose, for example, that Janice hires Peter for twenty-five cents an hour. Janice knows that Peter is her employee but does not know the market rate for workers. Peter knows that Janice is his employer but, similarly, does not know what he might expect to be paid. Given that the market price for workers is three dollars an hour, Janice exploits Peter (albeit unwittingly). The material relation, then, is exploitation. The relation might continue for some time until either Peter or Janice discovers the market rate for workers. Imagine Peter discovers it. He can now control his relationship with Janice by insisting she pay him more or by going on strike. What was an unrecognized (material) relation has now become a recognized and controllable relation. According to Drozdov and Batenin's account, a material relation is a relation with at least one conscious element. This element consciously performs a certain action in order to be an element of this material relation. One's conscious performance of an action is, therefore, a necessary condition for one's being an element of a material relation. It is also the first kind of consciousness. A conscious element of a material relation does not necessarily create or control the development of that relation. In order to do so, this element would need to possess theoretical knowledge of the material relation. Theoretical knowledge is the second kind of consciousness. When no one possesses theoretical knowledge of a material relation or when those who do have this theoretical knowledge do not act on it, the material relation develops spontaneously. Middle Period Accounts Two separate but related discussions about social relations take place during the middle period. One of these discussions focuses on the elements of social relations; the other centers on the role of consciousness in social relations. I shall consider the former discussions first. In 1966 Drozdov criticizes earlier accounts of social relations. He says that the majority of these accounts are descriptions of how certain categories of social relation must change during the transition from socialism to communism. Few works, he complains, address general questions in the theory of social relations. Drozdov says even works that do address general 176 questions about social relations are inadequate. Mashkov's account (in which social relations are said to be various kinds of relation between groups or humans), according to Drozdov, is correct but too general. He does not, however, specify the inadequacies of Mashkov's account. In so far as Drozdov does say that Mashkov's account is correct, it is reasonable to assume he believes groups can be elements of social relations. While Drozdov believes that groups can be elements of social relations, he generally speaks of them as relations between humans. A relation is a connection. Social relation is one of the forms of universal connection and interaction. It is inherent onl^-gin Man, and social life is the form of its expression. ' He adds that, strictly speaking, one should not speak even of relations simpliciter either in inorganic nature or in the plant and animal world. In these instances one should rather speak of connections (sviaz') and interactions (vzaimodeistvie). Thus, according to Drozdov, the elements not only of social relations but also of relations in general are humans. Relations in general are indistinguishable from social relations in the first of three senses Drozdov gives 1 9'Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 23. 177 for the concept 'social relations'. First, in the broadest sense the concept 'social relations' is used to designate connections between humans as opposed to all other forms of connection20 between phenomena of inanimate and animate nature. Since the elements of relations in general and of social relations in this sense are humans, relations in general and social relations in this sense are the same. I shall call social relations in this, Drozdov's broadest sense (i.e., where social relations are connections between humans) 'social relations^'. Social relations in Drozdov's second sense are distinguishable from relations in general. Second, we use this concept for designating the more essential, generalized mediated connections engendered by a social structure (class, national, professional, work, etc. relations) as opposed to personal, individual, singular connections (of friends, familial and so forth) just as we differentiate sog^al and personal interests, needs, purposes, etc. I shall call social relations in this second sense 'social relationsg1. Drozdov's remarks on social relationSg can be interpreted in at least two ways. According to one interpretation, social relationsg would have both particular humans and groups as elements. Individual relations (as their name suggests) would have only particular humans as elements. Social relationSg and individual relations would not be differentiated by means of a difference in elements 20Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 25. 2iDrozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 25. 178 since particular humans could be elements both of social relationSg and of individual relations. They would instead be differentiated in terms of the ways they arise. Social relationSg are engendered by a social structure; individual relations are not. For example, consider (1) the relation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, (2 ) the relation of a bourgeois and a proletarian, and (3 ) the relation of one friend to another. (1 ) and (2 ) would, on this interpretation, be social relationSg because they are engendered by the social structure. (3 ) would be an individual relation because it is not engendered by the social structure. Note that, on this interpretation, having groups as elements is not a necessary condition for being a social relation^,. According to another interpretation, social relationsg would have only groups as elements. Individual relations again would have only particular humans as elements. Social relations2 would again be said to be engendered by a social structure, but the only relations engendered by a social structure would, according to this interpretation, be relations having groups as elements. Thus, (1) would be a social relation2 and (2) and (3) would be individual relations. One reason for preferring this interpretation is that Drozdov contrasts social relations2 with individual relations. Individual relations are naturally construed as relations between particular humans. Since social 179 relationSg do not include individual relations, they are naturally construed as relations not between particular humans but between groups. Another reason for preferring this interpretation has to do with Drozdov's remarks concerning his third sense of the concept 'social relations'. (I shall call social relations in this sense 'social relations^'.) Third, social relations can designate connections engendered by membership in various communities (class, state, production collective, etc.) and also by ideal motives as opposed to psychological connections (sympathy, antipathy, hate, etc.) which are based on personal feelings. (Drozdov also calls social relations in this third sense 'social (sotsial'nyi) relations'.) Social relations^ appear to have only particular humans as elements because Drozdov says that the elements of these relations are members of groups and have ideal motives. Groups themselves are not generally considered members of groups; particular humans, however, are. Furthermore, particular humans are generally considered the only creatures with motives of any kind, whether ideal or non-ideal. A social relation^ is engendered by membership in a given community. Thus, one might say that the relation between a bourgeois and a proletarian, i.e., (2 ) above, is a social relation^ because the bourgeois is a member of the bourgeoisie and the proletarian is a member of the proletariat. The fact that (2) is a social relation^ could, 22Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 25. 180 therefore, be dependent upon the fact that the relation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, i.e., (1 ) above, is a social relation2 . In an argument for his distinction between social relations^ and psychological relations, Drozdov says that while it is difficult to distinguish ideas from feelings, " . . . we do distinguish relations at the level of psychology (general or social (sotsial'nyi)) and of 23ideology." J Persons, he adds, who have common interests as a consequence of their membership in the same group do not necessarily feel sympathy or love for each other. Conversely, persons who are members of inimical groups can feel affection and sympathy for one another. Drozdov believes that it is, therefore, necessary to distinguish the relations of a particular human based upon feelings, i.e., his psychological relations, from the relations of that particular human based upon his membership in a certain group, i.e., his social relations^. Drozdov takes care to note that although individual and psychological relations are distinguishable from social and social (sotsial'nyi) relations (i.e., social,, and 23-'Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 25. 181 social^ relations, respectively), . . . social and social (sotsial'nyi) connections determine individual and psychological relations. The latter are formed under the influence of general social (obshchesotsial 'n.yi) factors and appear as their 2k unrepeatahly unique expression and amplification. He says, furthermore, that it would be a mistake to overemphasize the role of individual psychological factors to the detriment of general social (obshchesotsial'nyi) factors. While individual relations are contrasted with social relationsg and psychological relations with social relations^, both individual and psychological relations are social relations^. Both are relations (redundantly, between humans), and so fit the criterion Drozdov specifies for social relations^. Since social relations^ are relations between particular humans they also meet this criterion and, thus, are social relations.^. Social relations2 (which I assume to be relations only between groups) only fit this criterion if Drozdov speaks as broadly as Presniakov speaks in giving his definition of 'social relations'. Since Drozdov does not object to Mashkov's account of social relations on the grounds that he says that social relations are relations between groups of humans, it is reasonable to suppose that Drozdov does speak broadly when he says social relations^ are relations between humans. Thus, the elements of social relationst are both particular humans and 24Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, pp. 25-26. 182 entities which contain particular humans as members, i.e., groups. The fact that particular humans or groups of them are the elements of these relations distinguishes them from all other categories of connection. By distinguishing three senses of the concept 'social relation' Drozdov is able to accommodate an objection by Presniakov that personal relations are not social relations (see pp. I6 9-I7O). In the sense of social relations2 » they are not. Still, in Drozdov's broadest sense, namely, social relationsj, they are. Drozdov also accommodates Presniakov's objection in another way. When he gives his account of social relations in the broadest sense, he says he abstracts from the individual psychological forms of their manifestation.^ So, while he considers individual and psychological relations to be social relations^ he does not consider them the most important social relations^. I shall consider Drozdov's account of social relations in the broadest sense later in this section. In 1967 Ivanov criticizes his contemporaries for treating social relations arbitrarily. He says that they make no distinction between social relations as such and other phenomena of social life. He finds this especially surprising in light of the fact that a number of Soviet authors say that at the foundation of the objective 2 *5-^Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 26. 183 structure of all real phenomena lies a division of objects into the totality of things, properties and relations. He says that although this division is made for phenomena in general no one seems to object to the absence of this p division in discussions of social phenomena. Ivanov proposes to remedy this situation be giving an account of social relations in particular. Introducing this account, he sayss In any relation one should differentiate, first, the correlated elements and, second, the very connection, i.e., the moment itself of interaction, of mutuals influence, of mutual conditionality of elements. He focuses a great deal of attention on the former, i.e., on the elements of social relations. Ivanov claims that the elements of social relations are humans. But, he adds, it is correct to consider social relations relations between humans . . . even when the directly correlated elements are institutions or organizations (as, for example, in a number of legal relations); relations of humans can appear in the form of relations ofpideas and theories or even as relations of things . . . Ivanov does not indicate how these latter relations can be relations between humans. He does say, however, that in political economy relations between humans are always connected with things and are manifested as things. An example of a physical manifestation of an economic relation 26Ivanov, "0 poniatii otnosheniia," p. 2 9 . 27'Ivanov, "0 poniatii otnosheniia," p. 3 1 . 2 8Ivanov, "0 poniatii otnosheniia," p. 31. 184 might he currency which is a medium for the exchange of goods between humans. { , , Ivanov says different orders of social relation can be differentiated in terms of elements. One order of social relation is constituted by relations between social formations. Another order comprises relations between classes. Classes and the relations between them are constituents of certain social formations. The constituents of classes are, in turn, strata, social (sotsial'nyi) groups, etc. and the relations between them. The relations between strata, social (sotsial'nyi) groups, etc. constitute a third order of social relation. A fourth order of social relation is constituted by relations between collectives which are constituents of strata, social (sotsial*nyi) groups, etc. A fifth order of social relation is constituted by relations between groups, which sometimes are the constituents of collectives. When the constituents of collectives are not groups, they are particular humans. Relations between particular humans constitute a sixth and final order of social relation. A hierarchy of the 185 different elements of social relations, then, is thiss Social formations (feudal society, capitalist society, etc.) Classes (the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, etc.) Strata, social (sotsial'nyi) groups, etc. (steelworkers, shopkeepers, etc.) Collectives (Pittsburgh steelworkers(?), Brooklyn shopkeepers(?), etc.) Groups Particular humans According to Ivanov, the extension, social significance and characteristic traits of a set of social relations and their elements depends upon the order of the relations and 29elements belonging to that set. 7 He considers an individual to be the smallest element of social interaction. But on this level one is almost never able to capture the activity of universal socio-economic and other laws. Thus, historical materialism, when studying important social processes, reduces the individual- the particular- to the social (sotsial'nyi), i.e., to the relations of social (sotsial'nyi) elements of the highest order. This does not mean for him, however, that relations of lower orders should be ignored. But, he insists, study of these relations presupposes the elaboration of a theory of groups of all levels and types. Ivanov, therefore, answers Presniakov's objection (as Drozdov does) by distinguishing 29'Ivanov, "0 poniatii otnosheniia," p. 32. 30v Ivanov, "0 poniatii otnosheniia," p. 32. 186 a sense of the concept 'social relation' in which individual relations are not social relations. He instead asserts that individual relations are less important than other social relations, in particular, relations between social formations. Drozdov and Ivanov do agree, however, (in both Ivanov's senses and in Drozdov's broadest sense) that individuals are elements of social relations. Ivanov considers not only humans and groups but also ideas and things elements of social relations. His remarks concerning things as elements of economic relations suggest, however, that they may be considered elements of social relations only in so far as they are manifestations of social relations having humans and groups as elements. One might suppose that the same is true of ideas which are elements of social relations. If this assumption is correct, Ivanov operates with a broad sense and a narrow sense of the concept 'social relation'. In the narrow sense, social relations have only humans and groups as elements. This sense of the concept 'social relation' is the same as Drozdov's concept 'social relation^'. In the broad sense, social relations have humans, groups, ideas and things as elements. If a connection is a social relation only in the broad sense, then there is a connection which is a social relation in the narrow sense. In 1968 Vyrelkin rejects any distinction between a narrow sense and a broad sense of the concept 'social relation'. He objects particularly to the definition of social relations in Filosofskii slovar' where they are said to be relations between humans (see p. 168). He says, first, that social relations are not all relations between 31humans. Some are relations of humans to nature. Thus, according to Yyrelkin, it is not a necessary condition for a relation to have only humans as elements for it to be a social relation. He does believe, however, that " . . . in the final analysis at least one of the elements of any 32social relation is a human or a group of humans."-' Thus, for him, it is a necessary condition for a relation to have at least one human or group of humans as an element for it to be a social relation. This is not, however, a sufficient condition. He says there are relations with humans as elements which are not social relations. For example, there are sunspots. Observations have shown that they lead to changes in the psychological and physiological condition of humans, to an increase in suicides and highway accidents, and to disruption„of technical means of communication between humans. ^ While admitting that these phenomena affect interrelations of humans, he denies that a connection between humans and a certain condition of the sun's corona should be considered a social relation. He points out that humans are elements of many kinds of connection- biological, chemical and physical together with psychological and social. Social relations 31^ Vyrelkin, "Ob opredelenii poniatiia," p. 51- -2Vyrelkin, "Ob opredelenii poniatiia," p. 52. 33-'-'Vyrelkin, "Ob opredelenii poniatiia," p. 53* are just one of many. Vyrelkin does not say so, but his discussion amounts to an attack on the whole procedure of differentiating social relations from other kinds of connection by naming the things which can be elements of social relations. This does not prevent other Soviets from continuing to use this procedure, though. In fact, only Drozdov (in 1970) even notes that this is one of the points of Vyrelkin's article. Authors of the later part of the middle period do not discuss the elements of social relations in quite the detail in which Drozdov, Ivanov and Vyrelkin do although they continue to make an issue of the status of individual relations. Unfortunately, however, their discussions contain numerous misinterpretations of other Soviet authors. One author who avoids such misinterpretation is al'-Ani. In 1970 he says that particular humans can be elements of social relations but that not all relations of which particular humans are elements are social relations. An example is personal (lichnyi) relations. He says, "We include in the concept of personal relations mainly natural 3*5relations of h u m a n s . A l ' A n i believes that these relations are reflected in the acts an individual performs solely for self-preservation. Thus, al'-Ani and Vyrelkin -^Drozdov, "0 poniatii otnoshenii," p. 66. 3*5-'-'al'-Ani, "Ob opredelenii poniatiia," p. 119. 189 agree that it is not a sufficient condition for a relation to be a social relation that it has humans as elements. Mokronosov's work belongs to the last period, but it is appropriate here to consider one of his criticisms of Drozdov. In a book published in 1972 he says Drozdov denies that particular humans are elements of social relations. Centering only on Drozdov's second sense of the concept 'social relation', he says that Drozdov's distinction between social relations and individual relations has the consequence that social relations are divorced from their bearers. Ignoring Drozdov's social relations^, Mokronosov concludes that particular humans must be considered elements of social relations.^ Writing in 197^ Perfil'ev suggests that both al'-Ani and Mokronosov deny that relations of which particular humans are elements can be social relations. He indicates that al'-Ani says personal relations are natural and that Mokronosov characterizes them as being psychological. Perfil'ev misinterprets al'-Ani because he takes personal relations to be the only relations between particular humans. Al'-Ani actually takes them to be only a subset of these relations. Perfil'ev simply misreads Mokronosov. Mokronosov does not say that personal relations are psychological; he attributes that position to Drozdov. In any case, citing Drozdov in support of his Mokronosov, Metodologicheskie problemy, pp. 82-83. 190 position, Perfil'ev says individual relations must be considered social relations because they help typify the ultimate units of society, namely, particular humans. Humans, according to Perfil'ev, are social only as members of society. He argues, "To imagine society without the individual, who belongs to a more extensive whole, is just as senseless as it is to imagine the latter outside of s o c i e t y . H e concludes that individual relations are social relations, ultimately, because particular humans are members of society. Towards the end of the middle period, then, there is no disagreement about whether particular humans can be elements of social relations. Both they and groups are standardly identified as such. But the fact that the elements of a relation are particular humans or groups is not always considered a sufficient condition for that relation to be a social relation. Other criteria for social relations are often introduced. Even if an author speaks as though all relations having particular humans or groups as elements are social relations, he also describes social relations in other ways. The standard additional way is to say that social relations are subject-object relations. Authors who say this generally center on consciousness as a property of a subject of a social relation. 37-"Perfil'ev, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 109. 191 Writing in 1 9 6 6, Drozdov identifies four characteristics of social relations. He says social relations differ from other forms of connection in that (1 ) they are subject-object relations; (2 ) they are more complex than other connections; (3 ) they have a normative character; and (4) they are mediated. Drozdov's comments on the latter three items are brief. He believes social relations are more complex than other kinds of connection, e.g., biological connections, because social relations are superimposed on biological relations in humans. They, therefore, are ways in which humans are connected to other phenomena added to the ways in which non-humans are connected with other phenomena. Drozdov also believes social relations are more complex than other kinds of relation because there are so many kinds, for example, economic, political, legal, moral, etc.-^® Concerning the normative character of social relations, he writes* Society creates a whole system of norms for the relations between its members and of values for their behavior (political, legal, ethical, etc. values). These norms and values are a product of the historical development of social life and belong only to Man- to society. A human correlates each action and intention with the norms and values existing in society. ' Thus, the normative character of social relations consists in the fact that a human evaluates each act of relation 37-"Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 28. -^Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, pp. 28-29. 192 he performs in terms of the values his society assigns that act. Drozdov holds that, unlike other kinds of connection, social relations are mediated. In any case connection and interaction between humans are mediated by a number of factors: by relations with other humans, by norms and values created by society, by multi-graded exchange by means of activity, by the products of social labor- by the enormous totality and system created by Man of things which includg0both material and intellectual (dukhovnyi) value. Note that some of the phenomena Drozdov says mediate social relations, e.g., norms, values and the products of labor, are similar to phenomena Ivanov says can be elements of social relations, e.g., ideas and things. Drozdov appears not to regard binary relations having a non-human element social relations. He might, however, consider a ternary relation with a non-human element to be a social relation. One such relation might be the relation between a shopper, a dollar bill and a shopkeeper when the shopper hands the shopkeeper the dollar bill in exchange for some goods. Before introducing his own account of the role of consciousness in social relations, Drozdov criticizes Smirnov's account, finding it . . . both inadequate and quite inexact since it specifies only two criteria. Besides, they are not the defining- not the primary- ones, although they include in themselves^an important difference from natural connections. Drozdov does not, however, develop this objection. JLloDrozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 2 9 . 4lDrozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, pp. 2^-25. 193 Whereas in 1965 Drozdov and Batenin said that, in order to he an element of a social relation, a human must consciously perform a certain act, Drozdov now suggests that the subject of a social relation must be conscious of himself. If in nature a connection always appears as a connection between objects, then a social relation appears as a connection between a subject and an object. The origin of social relation is connected with the appearance of self-consciousness in Man. A human not only is related but recognizes his relation. Drozdov continues to hold (as he and Batenin did in 1 9 6 5) that a human must perform a certain kind of act in order to be an element of a social relation. But he now also holds that a human must recognize that act. Drozdov says that the kind of act a human must perform in order to be an element of a social relation appears as a process of striving for an established purpose. He adds, . . . a social relation is a purposeful connection, the purposes, ways, means and methods of its accomplishment being determined by social (sotsial 'n.vi) conditions and individual peculiarities of âhuman (by personal experience, knowledge, etc.). J Thus, Drozdov again centers on purposeful behavior for characterizing social relations, but now describes this behavior more comprehensively. In describing the purposeful behavior of humans, Drozdov contrasts it with animal behavior. Whereas an L 2Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 26. I|,3-'Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 26. 19^ animal's goal and means of achieving it are immediate and situational, he points out that a human has both immediate and remote goals which may not always be compatible. When a human's actions are determined by long-term goals they can even conflict with the requirements flowing from the concrete situation. A human can sacrifice achieving immediate goals or restrict them in the name of achieving remote goals. As a rule, an animal acts to satisfy its immediate requirements. These requirements are stimulated by the animal's need for biological existence. He concedes that an animal can store leftover food for later use, but denies, on three grounds, that this establishes any fundamental similarity. First, there are many kinds of human goal. Second, a human can sacrifice the satisfaction of physical requirements or restrict them for the sake of "ideal" goals. Third, a human can strive to reach a goal for years and decades. In criticism, it should be pointed out that none of these replies answers the claim that an animal can have long-term goals. The fact that there are more kinds of human goal that there are kinds of animal goal does not mean that an animal's goal cannot be remote. The fact that a human can strive to reach a goal longer than an animal simply means that human goals can be more remote than animal goals. It does not mean that there are no remote animal goals. Finally, the fact that a human can forego hh,Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, pp. 26-27. 195 satisfying immediate physical requirements for long-term goals does not mean that animals cannot have long-term goals. Drozdov might have meant to suggest by this last reply that animals cannot give up satisfying immediate requirements, while humans can, but he is not clear. Drozdov finds another factor connected with the conscious character of human behavior. This is the ability to sacrifice one's own goals in the name of social goals and ideals. According to Drozdov, an animal lacks this ability. He concedes that there are cases of apparent animal self-sacrifice, but dismisses them, saying that in such cases instinct and not subordination of one's goals to those of the collective operates. He adds, "Animals do not follow noble motives and rational considerations, but the Ll Kauthoritative command of instinct." y As a further criticism, it is not clear that Drozdov satisfactorily answers the claim that an animal can sacrifice its own goals for social ones. What supposedly makes it impossible for an animal to sacrifice its own goals for social ones is that its behavior is instinctive. Still, Drozdov does attribute goals to animals. So, the fact that an animal's behavior is instinctive does not prevent it from having goals. Furthermore, Drozdov does admit that there are apparent cases of animal self-sacrifice. What is not clear is why the fact that animal behavior is instinctive Ilk•^Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 27. 196 does not prevent it from having goals hut does prevent it from having social goals. Drozdov presents both the argument based upon a human's possession of long-term goals and the argument based upon a human's ability to sacrifice himself for social goals to illustrate how the conscious nature of purposeful human behavior makes it different from animal behavior. He does not succeed in showing that animals lack either long-term goals or social goals. But he does suggest a difference between purposeful human behavior and animal behavior when he says that animals do not follow rational considerations. Presumably, humans do. This suggests that what differentiates purposeful human behavior from animal behavior is that a human considers and recognizes his goals while an animal does not. It appears, then, that, according to Drozdov, social relations are different from other kinds of relation because they are subject-object relations. In order to be a subject of a social relation, a human must consciously perform some act and be conscious of that act, recognize the relation of which he is an element as a consequence of the performance of that act, and recognize the goals for which that act was performed. In remarks similar to those he and Batenin made in 1 9 6 5, Drozdov says, " . . . the degree and level of recognition of social relations is different in different 197 46epochs and for different humans." He again associates the level of one's recognition of social relations with one's ability to control their development. In 1967 Ivanov, discussing the role of consciousness in the formation of social relations, says, "One must say that, actually, an intellectual (dukhovnyi) factor is 4?present during the formation of social relations." ' He qualifies this claim. . . . the will, motives and goals, by which humans are guided when they enter (or do not enter) into some or another relations, are directed by causes which, in^ h e final analysis, do not depend on humans themselves. These causes, he maintains, are the socio-economic connections and relations between the masses which he holds to be independent of the will and desire of humans. As an aside, note an interesting remark Ivanov makes concerning the role of an intellectual factor in social relations. Observing that Soviet philosophers have and still do pay little attention to this problem, he gives credit to Westerners in general and Americans in particular for work on this problem which (according to Ivanov) is 4qmistaken but significant. 7 In 1968 Vyrelkin criticizes Smirnov's account of social relations. (For Smirnov, recall, social relations 46Drozdov, Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, p. 2 7 . 47 1 'Ivanov, "0 poniatii otnosheniia," p. 34. 48Ivanov, "0 poniatii otnosheniia," p. 34. 40Ivanov, "0 poniatii otnosheniia," p. 34. 198 are formed by means of consciousness.) Vyrelkin agrees with Drozdov's criticism of this account and adds* It is unclear, furthermore, which consciousness is being discussed- consciousness in the sense of a property of each rational being or consciousness as an understanding of social relations. Undoubtedly, humans must be conscious in order to be humans and to be able to enter into social relations. But one should not forget the primacy of social being and the secondary position of social consciousness; one should not forget that social consciousness is a reflection of social relations. Vyrelkin appears to refer to the distinction Drozdov and Batenin made in 1965 between consciousness in general and consciousness as an understanding of social relations. He, as they did, appears to believe that a human must be conscious in the first sense in order to be an element of a social relation. In 1970 Drozdov again addresses the problem of the role of consciousness in the formation of material relations. He does not modify his position but argues that Lenin does not deny that consciousness plays a role in the formation of material relations. He argues this despite textual evidence to the contrary. For example, Lenin says material relations . . . take shape without passing through man's consciousness: when exchanging products men enter into production relations without even realising that there is a social relation of production here. Drozdov thinks it would be premature to conclude that ^°Vyrelkin, "Ob opredelenii poniatiia," p. 53- -^Vladimir Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 1: 1893-1894 (London: Lawrence & Wishart^ 1 9 6 3). p. 1^0. 199 consciousness plays no role in the formation of production relations, first, because Lenin's purpose in making these remarks was to assert that not all history proceeds in accordance with the wishes, desires and goals of humans and, second, because Marx, Engels and Lenin assert that history is made by humans. Drozdov claims that the laws of history are manifested owing to the conscious activity of humans, adding that humans recognize their relations. He qualifies this latter claim, noting that a human does not necessarily recognize the essence of the system of social relations in epwhich he exists. Recent Accounts Two positions typify recent accounts. One is the denial of an important role for consciousness in a definition of social relations. The other is an affirmation of an important role for human activity in a definition of social relations. In 1969 and in 1971 Pletnikov attacks using consciousness in definitions of social relations. He frames this attack as a criticism of definitions of social relations given by bourgeois sociologists. He says that ^2Drozdov, "0 poniatii otnoshenii," pp. 70-73. 200 according to them, "Elementary interaction" is based completely on the consciousness of individuals, their emotions, feelings and moods. Social relations are unconditionally identified with personal relations; the content of social relations„is reduced to the subjective aspect of human activity. He calls this psychologism and apparently believes that this claim together with his assertion that human activity plays a basic role in definitions of social relations is sufficient for rejecting use of consciousness in these definitions. In 1972 Mokronosov criticizes Drozdov for using consciousness in his definitions of social relations. Referring to Drozdov's 1966 book and 1970 article, he attributes to Drozdov the view that recognition of social relations is what differentiates them from all other kinds of connection. He continues: Of course, humans always act as beings possessing consciousness, and in this sense all relations of humans are "recognized." But social relations of humans acquire their specific essence "not with the appearance of self-consciousness," the origin of which should, in turn, be explained socially (sotsial 'no]tKbut via the objective practical activity of humans. Mokronosov does not wish to deny any rple whatsoever for consciousness in the formation of social relations. He does, however, want to deny that social relations should be characterized in terms of the role consciousness plays in -'-'Pletnikov, "0 prirode otnoshenii," pp. 13-14, and 0 prirode dvizheniia, p. 3 9 . <4Mokronosov, Metodologicheskie problemy, p. 101. 201 their formation. In 1973 Vorobei criticizes Drozdov, attributing to him the position that social relations are the conscious practical embodiment of ideas. He believes that the difference in the categories of social relation cannot be explained by reference to ideas alone. The differences in the ideas themselves must be explained. According to Vorobei, this difference can only be explained by reference to the material conditions that give rise to certain ideas. Thus, for him, a description of social relations ultimately involves a reference to material conditions which give rise to the ideas on which conscious activity is based. In 1977 Demin repeats Mokronosov's criticism of Drozdov and adds that accounts such as Drozdov's reduce social relations to personal relations.^ It is clear, then, that by the middle 1970s the Soviets reject Drozdov's account of social relations. Pletnikov gives the clearest statement of the position that activity plays a basic role in the description of social relations. In 1969 and in 1971 he explains social relations in terms of labor. On the one hand, the products of labor are the result of a human's deliberate activity. Because of this, part of their content is subjective. On the other hand, the products of labor are objects just like -^Vorobei, "Otnosheniia kak forma," pp. 4-5. -^Demin, Problemy teorii lichnosti, p. 46. 202 any other object; they can be physically removed from their producers and be acquired by other humans. Pletnikov concludes both that by separating the product of his labor from himself and becoming useful to other humans, an individual relates himself to others, and that objectified labor binds humans in social relations. ' According to Pletnikov, the subject of a social relation is neither consciousness nor will, but a physical being capable of creatively relating itself to the world. Such thinking matter can be either a social individual or any social formation up to and including society as a whole.^ One difference, for Pletnikov, between social (sotsial'nyi) connections and natural ones is that the former are mediated while the latter are not. Social connections cannot be reduced to physical contact between their elements, to an exchange of substances, to an exchange of energy or even to an exchange of information. They do, however, include all these exchanges. In the final analysis, a social relation is an exchange between social 9creatures by means of activity. ^ In December 1977 Pletnikov presents a paper to a -^Pletnikov, "0 prirode otnoshenii," pp. l4-15i and 0 prirode dvizheniia, p. 40. -^Pletnikov, "0 prirode otnoshenii," p. 16, and 0 prirode dvizheniia, p . 42. ^Pletnikov, "0 prirode otnoshenii," pp. 17-18, and 0 prirode dvizheniia, pp. 44-45. 203 conference of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. He repeats many of his earlier claims hut modifies his position in one way, saying now that relations between particular humans (which he calls 'personal relations') are not social relations. Personal relations are the individual form of social relations and an addition to them. Without Man, without personal relations there is not and cannot be social life and social processes. But the supplementation to social relations goes further. It is impossible to include among social relations, first, psychological relations- relations of sympathy, antipathy, friendship, hate, etc.z-Rand, second, natural (biological) relations. Particular humans, thus, are not considered elements of social relations. In 1978 Pletnikov publishes an article (based on the paper he presented at the 1977 conference) in which he concedes that one should not construe Lenin's claim that material relations are formed without proceeding through consciousness to mean that consciousness plays no role in the formation of material relations. According to Pletnikov, this passage should be taken to mean that the existence of material relations does not depend upon 61consciousness. Pletnikov does not identify, however, the role consciousness plays in the formation of material relations. Aktual'nye problemy teorii otnoshenii, p. 8 7 . fi 1Pletnikov, "Teoriia otnoshenii," p. 25. 204 Critical Evaluation At the beginning of this chapter I noted that social relations play two roles in Soviet philosophy. They are, on the one hand, constituents of social structure and, on the other hand, components of the essence of Man. When Pletnikov denies that personal relations are social relations he centers on the former role. He excludes personal relations from social relations apparently because he does not consider psychological relations or biological relations between particular humans constituents of social structure. His remedy is too strong. By excluding personal relations from social structure, he rules out considering entities, the components of the essence of which are social relations, elements of these relations. These entities are particular humans. If social relations are to be considered components of the essence of particular humans, then particular humans must be considered elements of them. Pletnikov describes social relations as exchanges between social creatures. One obvious problem with this description is that it is circular. What makes a social creature social presumably is the fact that it is an element of a social relation. Describing these relations as ones between social creatures does not, therefore, clarify the concept 'social relation'. Accounts according to which social relations are relations between humans (e.g., Drozdov's account) suffer from the same defect. Recall that in the second chapter it 205 was noted that the majority of Soviets say that humans are bio-social creatures (see p. 5l)» They are social creatures, again, presumably because they are elements of social relations. It, therefore, will not do to describe social relations as relations between humans. What is needed is a way of characterizing social relations which does not presuppose that their elements are social. One way would be to characterize the relations as a certain kind of relation between certain kinds of entity. Another way would be to characterize the relation itself without reference to the entities related. Drozdov's attempt to characterize social relations by attributing certain kinds of conscious activity to their elements suggests a promising way of modifying his theory in order to characterize social relations in the first way. Instead of saying that social relations are relations between humans, one would now say that social relations are relations between conscious beings. But this would need to be further modified in order to exclude certain physical relations between conscious beings from being considered social relations. For example, under the present description of social relations, the relation standing to the north of is a social relation between Tom and A1 (two conscious beings) when Tom is standing to the north of Al. In order to exclude these relations, one could say that a social relation is a relation such that, necessarily, at least two of its elements are conscious beings. Under this 206 description, standing to the north of is not a social relation since non-conscious beings can stand to the north of other entities. It is not clear that Drozdov would accept such a description of social relations. It is clear, however, that Pletnikov would not accept such a description. One reason he would have for rejecting it is that it apparently contradicts Lenin's claim that material social relations are formed without proceeding through consciousness. More generally, however, the problem with such a description of social relations is that it presupposes that being conscious is a necessary condition for being social. The Soviets assert that the reverse is, in fact, the case. That is, they assert that being social is a necessary condition for being conscious. This doctrine apparently is what motivates the Soviets to reject Drozdov's account of social relations. It also prompts Pletnikov to present his account of social relations as exchanges between social creatures. But even if one does not object to Pletnikov's account because of his use of the term 'social creature', one can object to it on the grounds that it does not solve the problem of describing social relations without reference to consciousness5 it merely hides the problem. The kinds of exchanges to which Pletnikov refers in his description of social relations presuppose that each of at least two creatures deliberately performs an action. By 207 characterizing the performance of this action as deliberate, Pletnikov implicitly attributes to these creatures mental processes which are a necessary condition for these actions to be deliberate. (These mental processes might even be a necessary condition for these actions to be actions.) Pletnikov apparently recognizes this presupposition. For, he does eventually concede (in 1978) that consciousness plays a role in the formation even of material relations. Pletnikov might not need to make this concession if he were to attempt to characterize social relations in the second way, i.e., without reference to the elements of social relations. He could say that social relations are primitive. By this he would mean that being social is a fundamental property of certain relations and that characterization of this property is, in principle, impossible. Another such primitive property might be being blue. Those acquainted with the property can recognize its instantiation, but they cannot characterize the property for 62someone not familiar with it. One could continue by saying that the elements of social relations are social precisely because they are elements of social relations. Such a solution would still leave unsolved a fundamental problem for Soviet theory of the person. That problem is to describe how being conscious is a consequence of being social. While Soviets generally claim that being 62I owe this suggestion to Bernard Peach although he should not be held accountable for its presentation. conscious is a consequence of being social, they neither demonstrate this claim nor show how consciousness results from being social. Giving an account of how being conscious is a consequence of being social is, I believe, the fundamental challenge for Soviet theory of the person. APPENDIX ONE INDIVIDUALITY AND AUTONOMY Introduction In the body of this dissertation I discussed the Soviets' claims that a person is social and some of their accounts of the properties that make him social. Most Soviets also characterize a person with the term 'individuality (individual'nost1)1. The Russian term 'individual'nost'' is ambiguous in the same way that the Russian term 'lichnost'' is; it is, on the one hand, a property term and, on the other hand, a substantive. Thus, a person is said either to possess individuality or to be an individuality. In either sense, individuality is associated with the uniqueness (unikal'nost') or unrepeatability (nepovtorimost1) of a person. Possession of individuality or being an individuality is often said to be a consequence of a person's having a unique or unrepeatable set of properties. Individuality is often used to explain a person's autonomy (avtonomnost'). His autonomy is said to result from the relative independence of each of his actions from any one of his properties. Thus, a person's autonomy is always qualified by what he is autonomous from. Autonomy, 209 for the Soviets, is not categorical. Soviet treatments of the concepts of individuality and autonomy are, as Grier has noted, often separated from 1discussions of other properties characterizing a person. I also discuss them separately. In this appendix I break the pattern of distinguishing periods of discussion. Soviets have few differences concerning individuality and autonomy; and, what differences there are do not represent distinct - tendencies. Individuality In the first chapter I noted that the Soviets say there are three categories of property which are differentiated according to their levels of generality (see p. 21). These are universal (obshchii), particular (osobennyi) and singular (edinichnyi) properties. Tugarinov distinguishes these categories as follows! In contradistinction to animals he [a separate human] is a human- a representative of the human race--with all the human traits belonging to it. This is the universal in him. Furthermore, he belongs to some race, nationality, and a certain sex with all the traits belonging to these communities of humankind. This is the particular in him. Finally, he has his own individual (individual'n.vi) traits which belong, among all ljumans, only to him alone. This is the singular in him. According to Tugarinov, each human has traits from each of these categories. ^Grier, "Soviet Ethical Theory," p. 2 6 3 . 2Tugarinov, Lichnost1 i obshchestvo, p. 12. 211 While Soviets often claim that a person can or does have singular properties, they deny that possession of these properties is a necessary condition for having or being an individuality. Bueva, for example, says, "Not all traits which characterize individuality are absolute and singular In some or another degree of development they belong to many humans."-^ Speaking of an individuality, Gak says, "If an individuality were something absolutely unique, it would Llcease to be an object of science." Dissociating individuality from the possession of singular properties, the Soviets claim that it consists rather in the possession of a unique set of universal and particular properties. In the continuation of the passage quoted above, Gak asserts: Scientific knowledge of its [an individuality's] sources and spheres of manifestation is possible precisely because an individuality is a unique form of existence of the universal.-5 Elsewhere, he claims, "Actually, an individuality is a distinctive, unrepeatable manifestation of the universal and not anything beyond this." Bueva continues her remarks, -^Bueva, Sotsial'naia sreda, p. Jl. ^Gak, "Dialektika," p. 52. ■ Gak, "Dialektika," pp. 52 ~53* ^Gak, Dialektika, p. 1 9. 212 concluding: . . . individuality speaks more of a peculiar composition of universal traits and of the extent of their appearance and development in each human. The individual can be a specific form of„manifestation of the universal; it can supplement it. Making a similar but somewhat different point, Rezvitskii says that while being unique is a necessary condition for possessing individuality, individuality is related less to the fact that a person is unique than to the fact that he is Qan integral unity of many kinds of traits. Associating individuality with the possession of a unique set of universal and particular properties, some Soviets suggest that a person's individuality is accidental. Tugarinov, for example, says: The individual (individual'noe) is only a variation of what is universally significant. The individual combination of abilities and traits of a person is unrepeatable because the total repetition of just such a combination in another person is simply improbable. Kon makes a similar point when he says that individuality is related first and foremost to a biological fact. He indicates that the number of possible combinations of genes is almost as large as the number of atoms in the universe. 10He concludes that each human has a unique genotype. 7'Bueva, Sotsial'naia sreda, p. 31. O Ivan Ivanovich Rezvitskii, Filosofskie osnovy teorii individual'nosti [The philosophical fundamentals of the theory of individuality] (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1973)# P10. g'Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo. p. 71. ^Kon, Sotsiologiia lichnosti, p. 31. 213 Sokhan', who (unlike other Soviets) separates individuality from a person's possession of social properties, says that individuality is associated only with a person's possession of accidental properties. The individual (individual'noe) fixes upon accidental, external determinations of an individual (individ) which do not proceed from his social essence. In other words, these properties have no direct relationship to the social position of a given person and to th^jforms of his social activity as a member of society. For Sokhan', then, the fact that a person possesses individuality is (as Grier has put it) a "second class" fact 12about him. Rezvitskii disputes this claim. He says that advocates of it often add that a person's individuality is of no real interest to sociologists. They assert that sociologists are interested only in a person's social type. To these additional claims, Rezvitskii answers: The discovery of the essence of Man presupposes knowledge of him as a whole in the unity of universal and specific (spetsifichnyi) traits. That is, this discovery is irrevocably connected with his individuality. J Rezvitskii does not answer the particular claim, however, that individuality is associated with accidental properties. Sokhan' appears to be alone in making this claim. Most Soviets would claim with Kon that individuality 11Sokhan', Dukhovnyi progress lichnosti, p. 32. 12Grier, "Soviet Ethical Theory," p. 264. 1-^Rezvitskii, Osnovy individual'nosti, pp. 34-35. 214 consists in a person's possession of a unique set of properties some of which are biological and others of which are social. Kon presents two reasons for including social properties in this set. He says, first, that the influence of non-social properties on a person's behavior is often mediated by social properties. He says, second, that social properties exercise an influence greater than that of other 14properties on a person's behavior. Soviets often indicate that individuality 1 *5develops. They appear to mean by this that the set of a person's properties is constantly changing and, in general, their number and kinds increase. Thus, the number of factors affecting a person's behavior also steadily increases. Rezvitskii alone among Soviet philosophers associates individuality with personal identity. This is somewhat surprising since the Soviets frequently say that individuality differentiates one person from another. Rezvitskii says: The formation of individuality guarantees the maintenance of a certain identity (tozhdestvo) of a human to himself. It makes him capable of preserving his integrity and stability within a continually changing external world. This suggests that individuality is a condition for personal ih,Kon, Sotsiologiia lichnosti, p. 31. 1^Tugarinov, Lichnost' i obshchestvo, p. 73s Kon, Sotsiologiia lichnosti, pp. 32-33. 16Rezvitskii, Osnovy individual'nosti, p. 33. 215 identity. Rezvitskii suggests later, however, that personal identity is a condition for individuality. If individuality is a particular form of being for a human in society, then our self is its nucleus preserving the identity of a human to himself. During all changes a human's inner self as the recognition of his own unity and identity remains. One and the same human can change his character, his dispositions and convictions, remaining individually identical to himself. Rezvitskii says that this individual identity is not absolute. A human himself is always changing. He does not say, however, what would constitute a change in the inner self. Autonomy Individuality often is associated with autonomy. Kon, for example, says that it is a condition for 18autonomy. Rezvitskii believes that a person's 19individuality makes him capable of acting autonomously. 7 Neither says what autonomy is. This must be garnered from how they justify the claim that individuality is a condition for autonomy. Kon claims that autonomy is a consequence of the multiplicity and contradictoriness of a person's social roles. He says that the roles associated with a person's position in the group with which he identifies most strongly 17'Rezvitskii, Osnovy individual'nosti, p. 3^1^Kon, Sotsiologiia lichnosti, p. 3^» 1 9'Rezvitskii, Osnovy individual'nosti, p. 13. 216 influence his behavior. But a person occupies so many other positions that these roles cannot be regarded categorically influential. The roles associated with each of a person's 20positions influence his behavior to some extent. Autonomy, for Kon, seems to consist in the relative independence of a person's behavior from any one of his social roles. Rezvitskii connects autonomy with two kinds of independence. He says, on the one hand, that individuality is associated with a person's ability to be an independent subject of activity. He suggests that this is an independence with respect to society. He claims, on the other hand, that individuality is connected with an independence with respect to oneself. He asserts that a person who is independent in this sense '  a' le to organize his internal forces and capacities for the achievement of 21an established goal. Sabirov, who claims that autonomy is a person's most important property, associates autonomy with a person's relative isolation (obosoblenie) from society. He says that this isolation makes it possible for a person to become a distinctive individual element of a social system. He also onKon, Sotiologiia lichnosti, pp. 3^-35• 21Rezvitskii, Osnovy individual'nosti, p. 13217 says s A person's autonomy is expressed in his ability to develop independently the views and convictions by means of which he isgguided in his actions, activity and in his behavior. Sabirov claims that the most important manifestation of autonomy is a person's ability consciously to occupy a certain position in society. A person can be assigned a position. But when he is, he does not occupy this position autonomously. A person can occupy a position autonomously 2 3when he recognizes and evaluates this position. ^ It is unlikely that, being Marxists, Rezvitskii and Sabirov would deny any influence of social factors on the behavior of a person who acts autonomously. They might suggest that social factors limit but do not determine a person's behavior. Myslivchenko makes such a suggestion. He says that social factors limit a person's alternatives. He insists, however, that there are genuine alternatives and 24that a person who knows them can choose between them. Critical Evaluation Soviets use the concept 'individuality' to identify something that differentiates a person from all other persons. They do so by suggesting that each person has a unique set of properties; but they also allow that there is 22Sabirov, Chelovek kak problema, p. 2 3 1 . ^Sabirov, Chelovek kak problema, pp. 238-240. 24Myslivchenko, Chelovek kak predmet, p. 119. 218 no set of properties which could not be possessed by more than one person. According to their own accounts, it is logically possible that one set of properties is possessed by two distinct entities. This suggests that the concept of individuality does not serve the purpose for which it is intended. The distinctness of two entities does not depend upon their possessing a unique set of properties, i.e., upon their individuality, but upon something else. The Soviets never say what this something else might be. Rezvitskii does suggest that the existence of a self is a necessary condition for a person to have individuality; but he does not develop a theory of the self. The Soviets need a theory of personal identity to clarify what they believe makes two persons distinct and to clarify why a person remains the same person over time. They give no such theory. The Soviets never say what autonomy is. Kon suggests that each of a person's actions is determined but autonomous in the sense that it does not depend causally on any single factor. Rezvitskii and Sabirov suggest that the actions of an autonomous person are not determined. They do not suggest, however, how the actions of an autonomous person occur. They need such a theory. APPENDIX TWO BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION This appendix contains some biographical information on some of the participants in the Soviet discussion of the problem of the person. Not all participants are included in this list because biographical data are unavailable for all. Some of this information is not current because it was gathered from sixteen years of issues of the Soviet journal Vo prosy filosofii [Questions of philosophy]]. ANDREEVA, Galina Mikhailovna. Doctor of philosophical sciences. DEMIN, Mikhail Vasil'evich. Doctor of philosophical sciences. Senior lecturer in the Department of Historical Materialism at Moscow State University. DROZDOV, Aleksandr Vasil'evich. Doctor of philosophical sciences. Professor of historical materialism at an institute in Leningrad. DUBININ, Nikolai Petrovich. Doctor of philosophical sciences. Director of the Institute of Genetics, Academy of Sciences of the USSR. 219 220 DZHIOEV, Otar Ivanovich. Candidate of philosophical sciences. Chairman, Department of Historical Materialism, Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Georgian SSR. EGIDES, Petr Markovich. Senior lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, Rostov University. GAK, Grigorii Moiseevich, b. 1893* Professor of Historical Materialism, Academy of Social Sciences attached to the Central Committee of the CPSU. IADOV, V. A. Candidate of philosophical sciences. In the late 1 9 6 0s, he was Chairman of the Laboratory for Sociological Research at Leningrad State University. IL'ENKOV, Eval'd Vasil'evich. Candidate of philosophical sciences. Senior research fellow, Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Science of the USSR. KEDROV, Bonifatii Mikhailovich. Professor and full member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Director, Institute of the History of Natural Science and Technology. KELLE, Vladislav Zanovich. Doctor of philosophical sciences. Senior research fellow, Institute of the History of Natural Science and Technology, Academy of Sciences, USSR. 221 KON, Igor' Semenovich. Doctor of philosophical sciences. Served as a senior research fellow at the Institute for Concrete Sociological Research of the Academy of Sciences, USSR, until it was closed in the early 1970s. Now serves as a senior research fellow at the Institute of Ethnography (Leningrad) of the Academy of Sciences, USSR. K0S0LAP0V, Ricard Ivanovich. Editor of "Kommunist". KRIAZHEV, Petr Efimovich. Candidate of philosophical sciences. Chairman, Department of Philosophy and Scientific Communism, Krasnoyarsk Institute of Non-Ferrous Metals. LIUBUTIN, Konstantin Mikhailovich. Senior lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, Ural University. MITROKHIN, Lev Nikolaevich. Doctor of philosophical sciences. Chairman of the section for contemporary philosophy in Western countries at the Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences, USSR. MYSLIVCHENKO, Aleksandr Grigor'evich. Doctor of philosophical sciences. Senior research fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences, USSR. NAUMOVA, Nina Fedorovna. Served as a senior research fellow at the Institute for Concrete Sociological Research, Academy of Sciences, USSR. 222 OIZERMAN, Teodor Il'ich. Corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, USSR. Senior research fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences, USSR. Member of the editorial board of Voprosy filosofii. PLATONOV, Konstantin Konstantinovich. Doctor of medical sciences. Senior research fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences, USSR. PLETNIKOV, Iurii Konstantinovich. Doctor of philosophical sciences. Professor and chairman of the section for immediate problems of historical materialism at the Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences, USSR. Corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, USSR. ROZHIN, Vasilii Pavlovich. Doctor of philosophical sciences. Chairman, Department of Dialeccical and Historical Materialism, Leningrad State University. Dean of the Philosophy Faculty, Leningrad State University. TUGARINOV, Vasilii Petrovich. (I8 9 9-I9 7 8 ). Doctor of philosophical sciences. Chairman, Department of Dialectical and Historical Materialism, Leningrad State University. Dean of the Philosophy Faculty, Leningrad State University. ZDRAVOMYSLOV, Andrei Grigor'evich. Served as assistant to the Chairman of the Laboratory for Sociological Research at Leningrad State University. BIBLIOGRAPHY Abalkin, Leonid Ivanovich. Ekonomicheskie zakony sotsializma [Economic laws of socialism]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1971. Acton, Harry Burrows. The Illusion of the Epoch: Marxism-Leninism as a Philosophical Creed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1 9 6 2. Aktual'nye problemy teorii obshchestvenn.ykh otnoshenii [Pressing problems in the theory of social relations]. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 7 8. al'-Ani, Namir Makhdi. "K voprosu ob opredelenii poniatiia obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [Towards the question concerning the definition of the concept of social relations]." Vestnik LGU, 1970, No. 17, pp. 118-122. Anan'ev, Boris Gerasimovich. "Nekotorye voprosy izucheniia cheloveka [Some questions in the study of Man]." In Chelovek i obshchestvo. Vyp. 1, pp. 176-I8 3 . Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1966. ________ . Chelovek kak predmet poznaniia [Man as an object of cognition]. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 8. Andreev, Iu. P. "Priznaki obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [Criteria of social relations]." In Obshchestvennye otnosheniia i soznanie, pp. 19-21)-. Sverdlovsk: Izdanie UPI, 1 9 7 5. Andreeva, Galina Mikhailovna. "Chelovek kak ob"ekt sotsiologicheskogo analiza [Man as an object of sociological analysis]." In Chelovek v sotsialisticheskom i burzhuaznom obshchestve: Materialy simpoziuma. Vyp. 1, pp. 111-128. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 6 6. ________ . "Chelovek kak ob"ekt sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia [Man as an object of sociological study]." In Lichnost' pri sotsializme, pp. 110-125. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1 9 6 8. 223 224 Anufriev, Evgenii Aleksandrovich. Sotsial'naia rol1 i aktivnost' lichnosti [Social role and activity of the person]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1 9 7 1* Asatrian, Mamikon Vagonovich. Zakon i usloviia ego deistviia [Law and the conditions of its action]. Erevan: Izdatel'stvo Erevanskogo universiteta, 1973* Balabeshko, A. P. Obshchestvo i lichnost' [Society and the person]. Alma-Ata: Kazakhskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1 9 6 2. Balakina, Irena Fedorovna. "Individ i lichnost' [The individual and the person]." In Chelovek v sotsialisticheskom i burzhuaznom obshchestve: Simpozium (doklady i soobshcheniia), pp. 44-58. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 6 6. ______ . "Individ i lichnost' v obshchestve otchuzhdeniia [The individual and the person in a society of alienation]." In Problema cheloveka v sovremennoi filosofii, pp. 231-247. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1969. Bailer, Eleazer Aleksandrovich. Chelovek i svoboda [Man and freedom]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaia Rossiia", 1972. Balycheva, Galina Dmitrievna. "Voprosy sotsialisticheskogo gumanizma v trudakh V. I. Lenina [Questions of socialist humanism in the works of V. I. Lenin]." Filosofskie nauki, 19^9. No. 5 , pp. 14-24. Batenin, Sergei Stepanovich. "Osnovnoi kriterii progressa lichnosti [The basic Criterion of the progress of the person]." In Chelovek v sotsialisticheskom i burzhuaznom obshchestve: Materialy simpoziuma. Vyp. 1, pp. 6l-74. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1966. ________ . "Kriterii progressa lichnosti [The criterion of the progress of the person]." In Lichnost' pri sotsializme, pp. 93-109« Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1968. ________ . "0 rodovoi prirode cheloveka [Concerning the generic nature of Man]." In Marksistsko-leninskaia filosofiia i sovremennyi obshchestvennyi progress, PP. 135-!47. M o s c o w : Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 9. 225 Bodalev, Aleksei Aleksandrovich. Vospriiatie cheloveka chslovekom [Perception of Man by Man]. Leningrad* Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 5. ________ . Formirovanie poniatiia 0 drugom cheloveke kak lichnosti [Formation of the concept of another human as a person]. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1 9 7 0. Boriaz, Vadim Nikolaevich. "K dialektike sviazi poniatii 'chelovek', 'lichnost'', 'individ' [Towards a dialectics of the connection of the concepts 'human', 'person', 'individual']." In Problemy dialektiki. Vyp. 2. Edited ty V. V. II'in. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1973Bueva, Liudmilla Panteleevna. "Sotsializm i formirovanie lichnosti [Socialism and the formation of the person]." Filosofskie nauki, 1 9 6 7, No. 6, pp. 10-17. ________ . Sotsial'naia sreda i soznanie lichnosti [Social environment and consciousness of the person], Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 8. ________ . "Problema deiatel'nosti lichnosti v marksistskoi i burzhuaznoi sotsiologii [The problem of the activity of the person in Marxist and bourgeois sociology]." In Istoricheskii materializm kak teoriia sotsial'nogo poznaniia i deiatel'nosti, pp. 32-63. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1 9 7 2. ________ . Chelovek: Deiatel'nost' i obshchenie [Man: Activity and intercourse]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 1978. Chelovek v sotsialisticheskom i burzhuaznom obshchestve: Materialy simpoziuma [ Man in socialist and bourgeois society: Materials of a symposium]. Vyp. 1 & 2. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 6 6. Chelovek v sotsialisticheskom i burzhuaznom obshchestve: Simpozium (doklady i soobshcheniia) [Man in socialist and bourgeois society: Symposium (reports and communications)]. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 6 6. Chelovek kak ob"ekt sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia [Man as an object of sociological study]. Edited by L. I. Spiridonov and la. I. Gilinskii. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1977* 226 Chesnokov, Dmitrii Ivanovich. "Obshchestvennyi interes i mekhanizm deistviia sotsial'nykh zakonov [Social interest and the mechanism of action of social laws]." Vopros.y filosofii, 1 9 6 6, No. 9 , pp. 3-14'. Dautov, Tasbolat Moldiiarovich. Lichnost' kak sotsiologichesk.ila problema [ The person as a sociological problem]. Alma-Ata: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1970. Davidovich, Vsevolod Evgen'evich. Obshchestvo i lichnost' [Society and the person]. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo "Vysshaia shkola", 1 9 6 2. ________ . Problemy chelovecheskoi svobody [Problems of human freedom]. L'vov: Izdatel'stvo L'vovskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 7. ________ . Grani svobody [The limits of freedom]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Molodaia gvardiia", 1 9 6 9. ________ . "0 rodovoi sushchnosti cheloveka [Concerning the generic essence of Man]." Filosofskie nauki, 1973. No. 3 , pp. 107-110. DeGeorge, Richard T. "The Soviet Concept of Man." Studies in Soviet Thought 4 (1964):26l-276. ________ . Patterns of Soviet Thought: The Origins and Development of Dialectical and Historical Materialism. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1 9 6 6. Demin, Mikhail Vasil'evich. "Sootnoshenie biologicheskogo i sotsial'nogo [The correlation of the biological and the social]." In Marksistsko-leninskaia filosofiia i sovremenn.yi obshchestvennyi progress. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 9. ______ . "K voprosu o strukture obshchestvennogo soznaniia [Towards the question concerning the structure of social consciousness]." Vestnik MGU. Seriia 8 : Filosofiia, 1973> No. 4, pp. 57-66. ________ . Problemy teorii lichnosti [Problems in the theory of the person]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1 9 7 7. Drobyshev, A. A. "Poniatie lichnoi i obshchestvennoi svobody [The concept of personal and social freedom]." In Filosofskie issledovaniia. Vyp. 2, pp. 101-110. Moscow, 1977* 227 Drozdov, Aleksandr Vasil'evich. Chelovek i obshchestvennye otnosheniia [Man and social relations]. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 6. ________ . "0 poniatiiakh 'obshchestvo' i 'lichnost'' i ikh metodologicheskom znachenii [Concerning the concepts 'society' and 'person' and their methodological significance]." In Metodologicheskie voprosy obshchestvennykh nauk, pp. 31-^3. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 8. ________ . V. I. Lenin o probleme obshchestvennykh otnoshenii I V. I. Lenin concerning the problem of social relations]. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 9. ________ . "0 poniatii obshchestvennykh otnoshenii v svete leninskikh idei [On the concept of social relations in light of Lenin's ideas]." In V. I. Lenin i problemy filosofskikh nauk i nauchnogo kommunizma, pp. 6^-7 6 . Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1970. ________ . "0 kompleksno-strukturnom podkhode k issledovaniiu cheloveka [Concerning the complex structural approach to the study of Man]." In Metodologicheskie voprosy obshchestvennykh nauk. Vyp. 2, pp. 95-104. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1971* ________ . "Obshchestvennye otnosheniia i sotsial'naia struktura [Social relations and social structure]." In Metodologicheskie voprosy obshchestvennykh nauk. Vyp. 3, pp. 31-40. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1972. ______ . "Tekhnika i obshchestvennye otnosheniia [Technology and social relations]." In Problemy istoricheskogo materializma. Vyp. 2, pp. 21-42. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1972. Drozdov, Aleksandr Vasil'evich, and Batenin, Sergei Stepanovich. "Razrabotka V. I. Leninym problemy material'nykh i ideologicheskikh obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [V. I. Lenin's elaboration of the problem of material and ideological social relations]." Vestnik LGU, 1965. No* 5. PP. 31-^2. 228 Drozdov, Aleksandr Vasil'evichj Mashkov, Aleksandr Platonovich; and Rozhin, Vasilii Pavlovich. "Obshchestvennye otnosheniia, ikh elementy, struktura i klassifikatsiia [Social relations, their elements, structure and classification]." In Uchenye zapiski kafedr obshchestvennykh nauk g. Leningrada. Filosofiia. Vyp. 8, pp. 96-109. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 7. Dubinin, Nikolai Petrovich. "Filosofskie i sotsiologicheskie aspekti genetiki cheloveka [Philosophical and sociological aspects of the genetics of Man]." Voprosy filosofii, 1971. No. 1, pp. 3 6-^5 ; No. 2, pp. 55-6W. Dzhioev, Otar Ivanovich. "Tsennost' i istoricheskaia neobkhodimost' [Value and historical necessity]." Filosofskie nauki, 1 9 6 6, No. 6, pp. 3^-39* Egides, Petr Markovich. "Lichnost' kak sotsiologicheskaia kategoriia [The person as a sociological category]." In Chelovek v sotsialisticheskom i burzhuaznom obshchestve: Simpozium (doklady i soobshcheniia), pp. 321-3^5* Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 196 6 . ________ . "Lichnost' kak sotsiologicheskaia katergoriia [The person as a sociological category]." In Lichnost' pri sotsializme, pp. 78-92. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1968. El'meev, V. Ia. "Lichnost' i ee sushchnost' [The person and his essence]." Vestnik LGU, 1972, No. 11, pp. 153-155* Fedorov, Iu. L. "Lichnost' v sisteme obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [The person in the system of social relations]." Nauchnye trudy Tiumenskogo universiteta, 1976, Sb. 1 9 , pp. 7^-90. Filosofsko-sotsiologicheskie problemy teorii lichnosti [Philosophical-sociological problems in the theory of the person]. Ch. 1: Problema lichnosti v trudakh K. Marksa i V. I. Lenina [The problem of the person in the works of K. Marx and V. I. Lenin]. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 6 9. Gak, Grigorii Moiseevich. Dialektika kollektivnosti i individual'nosti [Dialectics of collectivity and individuality]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 1 9 6 7* 229 ______ . "Dialektika kollektivnosti i individual'nosti [Dialectics of collectivity and individuality]." In Kollektiv i lichnost', pp. $1-60. Moscow* Izdatel'stvo "Mysi1", 1968. Glezerman, Grigorii Efimovich. Zakon.y obshchestvennogo razvitiiat Ikh kharakter i ispol'zovanie [ Laws of social development: Their character and use]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1979* Goncharuk, Sergei Ivanovich. Zakon.y razvitiia i funktsionirovaniia obshchestva I The laws of the development and functioning of society]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Vysshaia shkola", 1977* Grier, Philip T. "Contemporary Soviet Ethical Theory." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973* ________ . Marxist Ethical Theory in the Soviet Union. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1978. Grigor'ian, Boris Tigranovich. Filosofiia o sushchnosti cheloveka [Philosophy concerning the essence of Man], Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1973* Grin'ko, Konstantin Pavlovich. Formirovanie kommunisticheskikh obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [The formation of communist social relations]. Tula: Tul'skoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1 9 6 2. Hollis, Martin. Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Iadov, V. A. "0 razlichnykh podkhodakh k kontseptsii lichnosti i sviazannykh s nimi razlichnykh zadachakh issledoyaniia massovykh kommunikatsii [On various approaches to the conception of the person and various tasks in studying mass communications connected with it]." In Materialy vstrechi sotsiologov. Vyp. 3* Lichnost' i massovaia kommunikatsiia, pp. 12-32. Tartu: Tartuskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1 9 6 9. Iakuba, E. A., and Burdina, A. I. "Obshchestvennye soznanie i ego struktura [Social consciousness and its structure]." Filosofskie nauki, 1972, No. 2, pp. 135-1^5. Il'enkov, Eval'd Vasil'evich. "Ponimanie abstraktnogo i konkretnogo v dialektike i formal'noi logike [Understanding the abstract and the concrete in dialectics and formal logic]." In Formy myshleniia. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1 9 6 2. 230 ________ . "Psikhika i mozg [The psyche and the brain]." Voprosy filosofii. 1 9 0 8, No. 11, pp. 145-155* Ivanov, 0. F. "K voprosu o poniatii obshchestvennogo otnosheniia [Towards the question concerning the concept of a social relation]." In XXIII s"ezd KPSS i nekotorye voprosy filosofii i sotsiologii (material" nauchno-teoreticheskoi konferentsii). Ch. 2, pp. 27-40. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 7. Kagan, Moisei Samoilovich. "K postroeniiu filosofskoi teorii lichnosti [Towards the construction of a philosophical theory of the person]." Filosofskie nauki, 1971, No. 6, pp. 11-20. ________ . Chelovecheskaia deiatel'nost' [Human activity], Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1974. Kedrov, Bonifatii Mikhailovich. Engel's i dialektika estestvoznaniia [Engels and the dialectics of natural science]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1 9 7 0. Kelle, Vladislav Zanovich. "Rol' sub"ektivnogo faktora v sovershenstvovanii sotsialisticheskikh obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [The role of the subjective factor in the perfection of socialist social relations]." Filosofskie nauki, 1 9 6 8, No. 1, pp. 14-22. Klepatskii, L. "Nekotorye voprosy opredeleniia lichnosti i ee kriterii [Some questions on the definition of the person and his criteria]." In Filosofskosotsiologicheskie problemy teorii lichnosti. Ch. 1: Problema lichnosti v trudakh K. Marksa i V. I. Lenina, pp. 3-24. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 6 9. Kollektiv i lichnost* [The collective and the person]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 1 9 6 8. Kommunizm i lichnost' [Communism and the person]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1964. Kon, Igor' Semenovich. Svoboda v svobodnom obshchestve [Freedom in a free society]. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1 9 6 1. ______ . Pozitivizm v sotsiologii: Istoricheskii ocherk [Positivism in sociology: A historical study]. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1964. 231 ______ . Lichnost' kak sub"ekt obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [The person as the object of social relations]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Znanie", 1966. ________ . Sotsiologiia lichnosti [Sociology of the person], Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1 9 6 7. ________ . "Lichnost' i ee sotsial'nye roli [The person and his social roles]." In Sotsiologiia i ideologiia, pp. 248-261. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1969• . "Liudi i roli [Humans and roles]." Novyi mir, 1970, No. 12, pp. 168-191. Korneev, Mikhail Iakovlevich. Problemy sotsial'noi tipologii lichnosti [Problems in the social typology of the person], Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1 9 7 1* Kosolapov, Ricard Ivanovich. Kommunizm i svoboda [Communism and freedom]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 5. Kosolapov, Ricard Ivanovich, and Markov, Vladimir Semenovich. Svoboda i otvetstvennost' [Freedom and responsibility]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1 9 6 9* Krechmar, A. "0 poniatiinom apparate sotsiologicheskoi kontseptsii lichnosti [Concerning the conceptual apparatus of the sociological conception of the person]." In Sotsial'nye issledovaniia. Vyp. 5 ! Teoriia i metody, pp. 77-88. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1 9 7 0. Kriazhev, Petr Efimovich. Obshchestvo i lichnost' [Society and the person], Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1 9 6 1. ________ . "Nekotorye sotsiologicheskie voprosy formirovaniia lichnosti [Some sociological questions on the formation of the person]." Voprosy filosofii, 1 9 6 6, No. 7 , pp. 13-24. ________ . "Problema formirovaniia lichnosti v marksistskom sotsiologii [The problem of the formation of the person in Marxist sociology]." In Chelovek v sotsialisticheskom i burzhuaznom obshchestve: Simpozium (doklad.v i soobshcheniia), pp. 87-115. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 6 6. 232 ________ . "Formirovanie lichnosti--protsess ovladeniia opytom sotsial'noi zhizni [The formation of the person- a process of mastering the experience of social life]." In lichnost' pri sotsializme, PP35-51■ Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1 9 6 8. ______ . "0 sotsiologicheskom aspekte problemy lichnosti [Concerning the sociological aspect of the problem of the person]." In Lichnost'--kollektiv- obshchestvo, pp. 3-20. Krasnoyarsk, 1968. Kuptsov, Vladimir Ivanovich. Determinizm i veroiatnost' [Determinism and probability]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1976. Kvetnoi, Moisei Solomonovich. Chelovecheskaia deiatel'nost': Sushchnost', struktura, tip.y [Human action: Essence, structure, types]. Saratov: Izdatel'stvo Saratovskogo universiteta, 197 *-Larmin, 0. V. "0 strukture obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [On the structure of social relations]." In Ocherki metodologii poznaniia sotsial'nykh iavlenii, pp. 48-62. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl"', 1970. Leont'ev, Aleksei Nikolaevich. "Deiatel'nost' i soznanie [Activity and consciousness]." Voprosy filosofii, 1972, No. 12, pp. 129-140. ________ . "Deiatel'nost' i lichnost' [Activity and the person]." Voprosy filosofii, 1974, No. 4, pp. 8 7-9 7 . ________ . Deiatel'nost', soznanie, lichnost' [Activity, consciousness, the person], Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1 9 7 7* Lichnost' i obshchestvo (material.y nauchno-teoreticheskoi konferentsii) [The person and society (materials of a scientific-theoretical conference)]. Edited by V, I. Razin, V. A. Mansurov and K. G. Khaina. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1969* Lichnost'- kollektiv- obshchestvo (Sotsiologicheskie i ekonomicheskie problemy) [The person--collective- society (Sociological and economic problems)]. Edited by P. E. Kriazhev and A. A. Sergeev. Krasnoyarsk, 1968. Lichnost' pri sotsializme [The person under socialism]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1 9 6 8. 233 Liubutin, Konstantin Mikhailovich. "Starve idei v novoi odezhde [Old ideas in new clothing]." Voprosy filosofii, 1 9 6 5, No. 7, pp. 126-136. Malyshev, Boris Tikhonovich. Cheiovecheskaia lichnost' i ee proiavleniia [The human person and his manifestations]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1964. Mandelbaum, Maurice. "Societal Facts." In Philosophy of Social Explanation. Edited by Alan Ryan. Pp. 105-118. London: Oxford University Press, 1973* Marksistsko-leninskaia filosofiia i sovremennyi obshchestvennyi progress [Marxist-Leninist philosophy and modem social progress]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 9. Mashkov, Aleksandr Platonovich. Razvitie obshchestvennykh otnoshenii v period perekhoda ot sotsializma k kommunizmu 1 The development of social relations during the period of transition from socialism to communism]. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1965. Materialy vstrechi sotsiologov [Materials of a meeting of sociologists]. Vyp. 3> Lichnost' i massovaia kommunikatsiia [The person and mass communication], Tartu: Tartuskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1 9 6 9* Mitias, Michael H. "Marx and the Human Individual." Studies in Soviet Thought 12 (1972):245-254. Mitin, Mark Borisovich. "V. I. Lenin i problema cheloveka [V. I. Lenin and the problem of Man]." Voprosy filosofii, 1967» No. 8 , pp. 19-3 0 . Mitrokhin, Lev Nikolaevich. "Problema cheloveka v marksistskom osveshchesnii [The problem of Man in Marxist light]." Voprosy filosofii, 1 9 6 3* No. 8 , pp. 13-24. ________ . "Problema lichnosti v protestantizme [The problem of the person in Protestantism]." In Chelovek v sotsialisticheskom i burzhuaznom obshchestve: Simpozium (doklad.v i soobshcheniia), pp. 59-86. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 6 6. ______ . "Metodologicheskie problemy izucheniia lichnosti [Methodological proolems in studying the person]." In Lichnost' pri sotsializme, pp. 7-3^» Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1 9 6 8. 234 Mokronosov, German Viktorovich. Metodologicheskie problemy issledovaniia obshchestvennykh otnoshenii LMethodological problems in studying social relations]. Sverdlovsk: Sredne-ural'skoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1 9 7 2. Mokronosov, German Viktorovich; Mosorov, A. M.; and Kemerov, V. E. Ohshchestvennye otnosheniia, interes.y, motivy [Social relations, interests, motivesJ. Sverdlovsk: Izdanie UPI, 1971. Myslivchenko, Aleksandr Grigor'evich. "Problema vnutrennei svobody cheloveka [The problem of the internal freedom of Man]." In Chelovek v sotsialisticheskom i burzhuaznom obshchestve: Simpozium (doklady~i ~soobshcheniia), pp. 234-2^4. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 6 6. ________ . "0 vnutrennei svobode cheloveka [On the internal freedom of Man]." In Problema cheloveka v sovremennoi filosofii, pp. 248-265. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", T959: ________ . Chelovek kak predmet filosofskogo poznaniia [Man as an object of philosophical knowledge]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl"', 1972. Naumova, Nina Fedorovna. "Problema cheloveka v sotsiologii [The problem of Man in sociology]." Voprosy filosofii, 1971, No. 7 , pp. 5 9-6 8 . Nekotorye metodologicheskie problemy issledovaniia lichnosti i obshchestva (materialy nauchno-teoreticheskoi konferentsii) [Some methodological problems in studying the person and society (materials of a scientific-theoretical conference)]. Edited by V. I. Shishkina. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1976. Nekotorye metodologicheskie problemy istoricheskogo materializma (obshchestvennye otnosheniia i lichnost') [Some methodological problems of historical materialism (social relations and the person)]. Ryazan': Riazanskii gosudarstvennyi pedagogicheskii institut, 1 9 7 5. Nekotorye problemy lichnosti (sbornik aspirantskikh statei) [Some problems of the person (a collection of graduate student articles)]. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 7 1. 235 Nikolaeva, Lidiia Vasil'evna. Lichnost1 v protsesse istoricheskogo razvitiia I The person in the course of historical development]. Moscow! Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 3. ________ . Svoboda- neobkhodimyi produkt istoricheskogo razvitiia [Freedom- a necessary product of historical development]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1964. Obshchestvennye otnosheniia i soznanie [Social relations and consciousness]. Sverdlovsk: Izdanie UPI, 1975* Oizerman, Teodor Il'ich. "Lichnost' i svoboda [The person and freedom]." In Chelovek v sotsialisticheskom i burzhuaznom obshchestve: Simpozium (doklady i soobshcheniia), pp. 28-43. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 6 6. ________ . "Filosofiia i obydennoe soznanie [Philosophy and everday consciousness]." Voprosy filosofii, 1 9 6 7* No. 4, pp. II9-I3 0 . ________ . Marksistsko-leninskoe ponimanie svobody [The Marxist-Leninist understanding of freedom]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Znanie", 1967* Oridzhev, Z. M. "'Kapital' K. Marksa- neischerpaemyi ob"ekt filosofskikh issledovanii [K. Marx's Capital- an inexhaustible object of philosophical study]." Vestnik MGU. Seriia 8: Filosofiia, 1 9 6 9, No. 5» PP» 8 9-9 3 . O'Rourke, James J. The Problem of Freedom in Marxist Thought: An Analysis of the Treatment of Human Freedom by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Contemporary Soviet Philosophy. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1 9 7 4. Osipova, Elena Vladimirovna. "Nekotorye problemy teorii lichnosti [Some problems in the theory of the person]." In Sotsial'nye issledovaniia. Vyp. 3: Problemy truda i lichnosti, pp. 5-37* Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1970. Otrazhenie nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progressa v obshchestvennykh otnosheniiakh: Sbomik statei [The reflection of scientific-technical progress in social relations: A collection of articles]. Tallinn: Akademiia nauk Estonskoi SSR, Institut istorii, 1972. Parygin, Boris Dmitrievich. Sotsial'naia psikhologiia kak nauka [Social psychology as science]. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 5* 236 ______ . Osnovy sotsial'no-psikhologicheskoi teorii [Fundamentals of social psychological theory]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl*", 1971* Perfil'ev, Marat Nikolaevich. Obshchestvennye otnosheniia [Social relations]. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1974. Perfil'ev, Marat Nikolaevich, and Orlova, Lidiia Vladimirovna. Sotsial'nye otnosheniia [Social relations], Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1973Pesenko, Valentin Nikolaevich. Obshchestvennye sviazi i otnosheniia [Social connections and relations]. Rostov-na-Don: Izdatel'stvo Rostovskogo universiteta, 1978. Platonov, Konstantin Konstantinovich. "K teorii lichnosti [Towards a theory of the person]." In Lichnost' i trud, pp. 9-51 • Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 1 9 6 5. ________ . "Psikhologiia lichnosti [Psychology of the person]." In Chelovek v sotsialisticheskom i burzhuaznom obshchestve: Simpozium (doklady i soobshcheniiapp. 305-320. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 6 6. ______ . "Psikhologicheskaia struktura lichnosti [Psychological structure of the person]." In Lichnost' pri sotsializme, pp. 62-77. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1 9 6 8. ________ . "Poniatie 'struktura' v uchenii 0 lichnosti [The concept 'structure' in the doctrine concerning the person]." In Problemy lichnosti: Materialy simpoziuma. [T. 1], pp. 51-62. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 6 9. ________ . "Sotsial'noe i biologicheskoe v strukture lichnosti [The social and the biological in the structure of the person]." Voprosy filosofii, 1970, No. 9, pp. 141-147. ________ . 0 sisteme psikhologii [On the system of psychology]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 1972. ________ . Problemy sposobnostei [Problems of sbilities]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1972. Pletnikov, Iurii Konstantinovich. "0 prirode obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [On the nature of social relations]." Vestnik MGU. Seriia 8: Filosofiia, 1 9 6 9. No. 3 , pp. 13-24. 237 ________ . 0 prirode sotsial'noi formy dvizheniia [On the nature of the social form of motion]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1971. ________ . "Teoriia obshchestvennykh otnoshenii: susuchnost' i aktual'nye problemy [The theory of social relations: essence and pressing problems]." Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, 1978, No. 2, pp. 21-32. Presniakov, Petr Vasil'evich. Formirovanie kommunisticheskikh obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [The formation of communist social relations]. Alma-Ata: Kazakhskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1964. Presniakov, Petr Vasil'evich et al. Razvitie sotsialisticheskikh obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [The development of socialist social relations]. Alma-Ata: Izdatel'stvo "Kazakhstan", 1976. Problema cheloveka v sovremennoi filosofii [The problem of Man in modern philosophy]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1 9 6 9. Problemy lichnosti: Materialy simpoziuma [Problems of the person: Materials of a symposium]. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1 9 6 9. Problemy lichnosti: Materialy simpoziuma [Problems of the person: Materials of a symposium]. T. 2. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1970. Problemy soznaniia: Materialy simpoziuma [Problems of consciousness: Materials of a symposium]. Moscow, 1 9 6 6. Rahmani, Levy. "Social Psychology in the Soviet Union." Studies in Soviet Thought 13 (1973)*218-250. Rapp, Fritz. "Open Questions in Contemporary Soviet Theory of Social Law." Studies in Soviet Thought 6 (1 9 6 6): 190-2 0 1 . Rasmussen, David. "Capital, Sociality and the Status of the Subject." Studies in Soviet Thought 16 (1976):157-173* Rakhimov, Abdullo Rakhimovich; Kamilov, Mirzo Kamilovich; and Filatova, Polina Ivanovna. Problema cheloveka v filosofii [The problem of Man in philosophy]. Dushanbe: Izdatel'stvo "Irfon", 1970. 238 Rezvitskii, Ivan Ivanovich. Filosofskie osnovy teorii individual'nosti [The philosophical fundamentals of the theory of individuality]. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1973* Rosenko, Margarita Nikolaevna. "Sovremennaia nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia i formirovanie kommunisticheskikh ohshchestvennykh otnoshenii v SSSR [The modem scientific-technical revolution and the formation of communist social relations in the USSR]." In Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia i razvitie sovremennykh ohshchestvennykh otnoshenii (nekotor.ye problemy), pp. 48-63. Leningrad. 1970. Rozhin, Vasilii Pavlovich. Kommunizm i lichnost' [Communism and the person]. Leningrad: Obshchestvo po rasprostraneniiu politicheskikh i nauchnykh znanii RSFSR, 1962. ______ . Vvedenie v marksistskuiu sotsiologiiu [introduction to Marxist sociology]. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 2. Sabirov, Kharis Fatykhovich. Chelovek kak sotsiologicheskaia problema (teoretiko-metodologicheskii aspekt) fMan as a sociological problem (the theoretical-methodological aspect)]. Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1972. Savchenko, G. I. "0 marksistskom ponimanii sushchnosti cheloveka kak sotsial'nogo individa [On the Marxist understanding of the essence of Man as a social individual]." In Nekotor.ye problemy lichnosti. pp. 47-65. Moscow: Institut filosofii Akademii nauk SSSR, 1971. Semenov, V. S. Velikii oktiabr' i razvitie novykh obshchestvenn.vkh otnoshenii I Glorious October and the development of new social relations], Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Znanie", 1 9 6 7. Serov, Iurii Mikhailovich. Obshchestvennoe i individual'noe soznanie [Social and individual consciousness]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl"', 1964. Shariia, K. S. Nekotorye voprosy razvitiia sotsialisticheskikh obshchestvennykh otnoshenii v period stroitel' stva kommunizma ["Some questions on the development of socialist social relations during the period of the construction of communism], Tbilisi: Izdatel'stvo "Metsiereba", 1 9 7 2. 239 Shubniakov, Boris Pavlovich. Svoboda obshchestva i lichnosti [Freedom of society and the person]. Yaroslavl': Verkh.-Volz. kn. izd., 1 9 6 7. Shul'ga, Nikolai Aleksandrovich. Klassovaia tipologiia lichnosti [The class typology of the person], Kiev: Izdatel'stvo "Naukova dumka", 1978. Smirnov, Georgii Lukich. Formirovanie kommunisticheskikh obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [The formation of communist social relations]. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1 9 6 2. ________ . Sovetskii chelovek: Formirovanie sotsialisticheskogo tipa lichnosti [Soviet Man: The formation of the socialist type of a person], Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1 97i• Sokhan', Lidiia Yasil'evna. Dukhovnyi progress lichnosti i kommunizm [The intellectual progress of the person and communism]. Kiev: Izdatel'stvo "Naukova dumka", 1 9 6 6. Spirkin, Aleksandr Georgievich. Soznanie i samos0znanie [Consciousness and self-consciousness]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1972. Stroitel'stvo kommunizma i razvitie obshchestvennykh otnoshenii [The construction of communism and the developmerr^of social relations]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1 9 6 6. Teriaev, Grigorii Vasil'evich. Obshchestvennoekonomicheskaia formatsiia [Social-economic formation]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo VPS i LON pri TsK KPSS, 1 9 6 3. Topilin, Petr Konstantinovich. Razvitie obshchestvennykh otnoshenii v period razvernutogo stroitel'stva kommunisticheskogo obshchestva I The development of social relations during the period of the large-scale construction of communist society]. Saratov: Saratovskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1 9 6 2. Tugarinov, Vasilii Petrovich. Sootnoshenie kategorii dialekticheskogo materializma [The correlation of the categories of dialectical materialism], Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 195°■ ________ . Obshchestvennoe bytie [Social being]. Leningrad: Obshchestvo po rasprostraneniiu politicheskikh i nauchnykh znanii RSFSR, 1958. 240 ________ . "Kommunizm i lichnost' [Communism and the person]." Voprosy filosofii, 1 9 6 2, No. 6 , pp. 14-23. ________ . Lichnost' i obshchestvo [The person and society]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 196 5 . ________ . Kommunizm i lichnost' [Communism and the person]. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo "Znanie", 1 9 6 6. ________ . Teoriia tsennostei v marksizme* [Theory of values in Marxism]. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1 9 6 8. ________ . "Dialektika sotsial'nogo i biologicheskogo v cheloveke [Dialectics of the social and the biological in Man]." In Lichnost' pri sotsializme, pp. 52-61. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1 9 6 8. ________ . Filosofiia. soznaniia [Philosophy of consciousness]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 1971. ________ . "Marksistskaia teoriia lichnosti na nastoiashchem etape [Marxist theory of the person at the present stage]." Filosofskie nauki, 1971. No. 4, pp. 31-42. Vorobei, Iu. D. "Obshchestvennye otnosheniia kak forma obshchestvenno-istoricheskoi praktiki [Social relations as a form of social-historical practice]." Vestnik MGU. Seriia 8: Filosofiia, 1973. No. 6, pp. 3-11. Voronovich, Boris Andreevich. Kategoriia deiatel'nosti v istoricheskom materializme I The category of activity in historical materialism]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Znanie", 1975Vyrelkin, V. P. "K voprosu ob opredelenii poniatiia 'obshchestvennye otnosheniia' [Towards the question concerning the definition of the concept 'social relations']." Vestnik LGU, 1 9 6 8, No. 1 7, pp. 50-55* Zakharov, A. S. "Kategoriia 'obshchestvennye otnosheniia' [The category 'social relations']." In Tezisy dokladov 14-i nauchnoi konfsrentsii (27-29 marta 1967 goda), pp. 2 9-3 2 . Kaluga: Kaluzhskii gosudarstvennyi pedagogicheskii institut, 1 9 6 7. Zdravomyslov, Andrei Grigor'evich. Problema interesa v sotsiologicheskoi teorii [The problem of interest in sociological theory]. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1964. 241 Zhezhelenko, V. P. "Razvitie obshchestvennykh otnoshenii v khode stroitel1stva kommunizma [The development of social relations in the course of building communism]." In Stroitel'stvo kommunizma i razvitie obshchestvennykh otnoshenii. Vyp. 1, pp. 3-19• Tyumen': Izdatel'stvo "Omskaia pravda", 1 9 6 7. BIOGRAPHY Jon Erik Larson was born on 9 February 1951 in Covington, Kentucky. He has attended Gustavus Adolphus College (B.A., philosophy, 1971) and Duke University (Ph.D., philosophy, I9 8 I). He is cited by W. Bernard Peach for his research assistance on the title page of Richard Price and the Ethical Foundations of the American Revolution, ed. W. Bernard Peach (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1979)He has been a part-time instructor of philosophy at Duke University (1976-1979) and at Wake Forest University (1979)He is a member of the American Philosophical Association. He received a departmental fellowship from the Philosophy Department, Duke University (197/1-1 9 7 6). In 1979-1980 he studied at Moscow State University on a graduate student exchange administered by the International Research and Exchanges Board. He currently is a graduate student in the M.B.A. program of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 2^